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I. INTRODUCTION  
This much is certain: The future must not simply unfold. Rather, it will 
need to be shaped by your leadership. The decisions you make...will 
determine America's future. 
    Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld 
    U.S. Naval Academy Commencement Address  
    May 23, 2003 
A. BACKGROUND 
Secretary Rumsfeld told the Class of 2003 what the nation requires of U.S. Naval 
Academy graduates: strong leadership and sound decision making.  These two traits are 
inseparable for military officers.  Decision making has been called "the essence of 
leadership" (Beach & Scott, 1989, p. 55).  First and foremost, "a battlefield commander is 
a decision maker" (Athens, 1992, p. 1).  To command is "to think and decide" (Nye, 
1986, p. 19).  Decision making is "the essence of command in battle" (Schmitt, 1988, p. 
18).  The linkage between leadership--specifically military leadership--and decision 
making is clear and indisputable. 
The Naval Academy's mission is: 
To develop midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and to imbue 
them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to provide 
graduates who are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential 
for future development in mind and character to assume the highest 
responsibilities of command, citizenship and government (USNA Strategic 
Plan, 2004).  
Every facet of the midshipmen's experience at the Naval Academy is designed to prepare 
them for the challenges they will face as commissioned officers.  Because the literature 
makes plain that military officers must be effective decision makers to be effective 
leaders, it would be reasonable to assume that the Naval Academy would have a well-
defined, clearly-articulated program designed to produce capable decision makers.  This 





The purpose of this research is to assess what the Naval Academy does to develop 
decision-making skills in its midshipmen.  It identifies to what extent the Naval Academy 
has stated the development of decision-making skills in midshipmen as a goal and has 
articulated that goal to those responsible for midshipmen's professional development.  In 
addition, it explores to what extent midshipmen believe they are being developed as 
decision makers. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
The primary research question this study answers is: What does the U.S. Naval 
Academy do to develop decision-making skills in its midshipmen?  A number of 
secondary questions are answered as well: (1) Why are decision-making skills important 
for military leaders? (2) What are the different decision-making models? (3) How can 
decision-making skills be taught or developed? (4) Has the Naval Academy stated 
anywhere that it places substantial emphasis on the importance of developing decision-
making skills in its midshipmen, and if so, where? (5) To what extent do those responsible 
for the midshipmen's professional development perceive this importance? (6) What 
opportunities do midshipmen have to develop decision-making skills? (7) To what extent 
do midshipmen believe the Naval Academy is developing them as decision makers, and 
how is this done? 
The methodology used in this thesis research consists of the following steps: 
1. Conduct a literature review of journal articles, professional publications, and 
other information resources. 
2. Examine Naval Academy missions and documents to learn what the 
institution's goals are in terms of producing officers who will be effective 
decision makers.  
3. Interview senior leadership responsible for achieving any Naval Academy 
goals related to decision making. 
4. Collect qualitative and quantitative data from company officers via a survey 
designed by the author. 
5. Collect qualitative and quantitative data from representative samples of 
midshipmen via focus groups conducted by the author. 
6. Analyze data from the company officer survey and midshipmen focus groups. 
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D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
Through the literature review, this study provides a concise compilation of 
decision-making research relevant to preparing midshipmen for commissioned service in 
the Navy and Marine Corps, to include what the midshipmen need to know about 
decision making and methods to teach them.  The assessment of what the Naval 
Academy does to develop midshipmen's decision-making skills determines whether or 
not any explicit goals in this area exist.  Further, the study identifies how well these goals 
are understood by those primarily responsible for achieving them, namely the company 
officers.  Lastly, the data collected from the midshipmen gives the Naval Academy 
feedback on how well it is achieving these goals. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This thesis begins with an introduction to the research topic.  Chapter II then 
presents decision-making literature that is relevant to the Naval Academy's efforts to 
prepare midshipmen for commissioned service in the Navy and Marine Corps.  Chapter 
III explains how the data were collected in sufficient detail that would allow the study to 
be replicated.  Chapter IV is an analysis of the data collected for this study.  Chapter V 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Decisionmaking is essential to the conduct of war since all actions are the 
results of decisions or of nondecisions [Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting, 1997, p. 85]. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Decision making is a fundamental aspect of leadership, be it on the bridge of a 
Navy ship or in a Wall Street boardroom.  Vast amounts of research have been dedicated 
to develop ways to improve people's decision-making abilities, resulting in an abundance 
of literature.  This chapter will define decision making as it pertains to this study and 
organize the literature in a manner that is relevant and useful to the leadership of the 
Naval Academy. 
After acknowledging the limitations of this literature review and then establishing 
an operational definition of decision making, the literature will be used to demonstrate 
the importance of good decision-making skills for military leaders.  Next, decision-
making processes generally fall into one of two models, and these models will be 
examined.  Finally, this chapter will present ways that decision-making skills can be 
taught. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
Extant literature on decision making is enormous.  A comprehensive review of 
such a body would be unwieldy and lack the focus both appropriate and necessary for this 
study.  As a result, the author reviewed literature deemed relevant to the aspect of 
decision making addressed in this research, that is, decision making as it pertains to 
preparing Naval Academy midshipmen for service as commissioned officers in the Navy 
and Marine Corps.  While this review is not intended to be exhaustive in terms of the 
expansive body of decision-making literature, it is thorough in covering the aspect 
addressed herein. 
C. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF DECISION MAKING 
People routinely face a wide range of decisions.  Decisions can vary from trivial 
to momentous, simple to complex, routine to extraordinary.  The consequences of a 
decision can be insignificant or lasting and far-reaching.  Some decisions are strictly 
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personal while others are job-related.  Some are made by individuals, and others are made 
by groups. 
According to Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, to "decide" is to arrive 
at a solution that ends uncertainty or dispute; it implies previous consideration of a matter 
causing doubt, wavering, debate, or controversy.  A "decision" is a determination arrived 
at after consideration (Webster, 1990).  Decision making is the process one uses to reach 
a decision.  That process will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
When speaking of decision making by military officers, there is an ethical aspect 
that cannot be discounted.  These leaders are entrusted with the responsible, controlled 
employment of violence.  Young service members' lives are placed in their care.  
Noncombatants can find themselves inadvertently and helplessly caught in the path of 
hostilities.  It is not enough for officers to be able to make legal decisions--they must be 
prepared to make moral decisions as well. 
This study is concerned with "leadership decisions," that is, decisions in which the 
decision maker must take into account more than just himself or herself.  Leadership 
decisions go beyond "job-related" decisions in that military officers are expected to 
demonstrate leadership in every aspect of their lives.  In the sense that an officer's duty is 
far-reaching, one could say that leadership decisions are any decisions related to an 
officer's duty.  For the midshipmen of the Brigade at the Naval Academy, their duty is 
much-encompassing as well.  They are expected to demonstrate leadership in the 
decisions they make in Bancroft Hall, on the athletic playing fields, in extra-curricular 
activities, as well as on liberty and leave.  The leadership decisions that confront 
midshipmen at the Naval Academy should prepare them for the decisions they will face 
as officers; these decisions will be the focus of this study. 
D. IMPORTANCE OF DECISION-MAKING SKILLS IN LEADERS 
When all is said and done the greatest quality in a commander is 
'decision'...Indecision and hesitation are fatal in (an) officer... (Heinl, 
1966, p. 80) 
   Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery 
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The conditions under which military leaders must make decisions are unlike those 
faced by any other profession.  One needs to have at least some understanding of the 
nature of the modern battlefield to appreciate the environment in which a military 
decision maker operates.  In addition to the conditions, it is useful, as well, to have an 
insight into the demands that modern warfare places on the military decision maker. 
1. The Modern Battlefield 
Many elements of war are timeless.  The great Prussian military philosopher Carl 
von Clausewitz observed nearly two centuries ago that, "war is the realm of uncertainty" 
(Clausewitz, 1984, p. 101).  Despite astonishing advances in technology, uncertainty 
continues to pervade today's battlefield (MCDP 6: Command & Control, 1997). 
Although uncertainty is inescapable on the modern battlefield, it is far from being 
the only challenge a military decision maker faces.  Disorder and confusion are 
compounded by high-tempo operations and rapid change (MCDP 1-3: Tactics, 1997).  
War is fraught with danger and stress as each side attempts to violently impose its will on 
the other.  Even the simplest of things become difficult--a phenomenon described as 
"friction" (Clausewitz, 1984, p. 119).  The battlefield is fluid and dynamic.  Fleeting 
opportunities demand that leaders accept risk and act on incomplete or ambiguous 
information.  To succeed, military leaders must do more than accept or merely endure 
these conditions--they must embrace them. 
2. The Demands of Maneuver Warfare 
Until late in the last century, victory in war was usually achieved by a 
combination of devastating firepower and numerical superiority.  This type of war was 
known as Attrition Warfare.  The most notable historical exception to this was 
demonstrated at times by the Germans in World Wars I & II.  In the late 1980s, U.S. 
Armed Forces--led by the U.S. Marine Corps--developed what came to be known as 
Maneuver Warfare.  While not discarding the need for decisive firepower and 
overwhelming violence, Maneuver Warfare seeks to destroy the enemy's will to resist.  
The effectiveness of Maneuver Warfare was witnessed by the entire world during 
Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and again in Operation Iraqi Freedom 12 years later.  
This dramatic shift in doctrine required a shift in thinking by military officers. 
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a) War is Time-Competitive 
As previously discussed, war is a competitive struggle where situations 
change rapidly and unexpectedly.  Whoever can make and implement decisions 
consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage (MCDP 1, 1997).  One 
model of the decision cycle that is closely associated with Maneuver Warfare is the 
"Boyd Cycle."  The Boyd Cycle, named after its creator, retired U.S. Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd, addresses the time-competitive process of decision making in combat.  This 
continually recurring cycle consists of four steps: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (from 
this, the Boyd Cycle is also commonly known as the OODA Loop).  Central to this 
theory is timeliness of decisions (MCDP 1, 1997).  As one is able to cycle through the 
OODA Loop consistently faster than one's enemy, the enemy falls further and further 
behind.  Everything he does is too late, making his actions ineffective and irrelevant, and 
contributing to a state of panic (MCDP 1-3, 1997). 
The rapid decision cycle described here cannot be achieved if leaders must 
send information to their higher headquarters and await a decision.  Rather, the most 
effective way to generate speed is through decentralized execution (MCDP 1-3, 1997).  
For decision-making authority to be pushed down, however, a unit must have leaders in 
place at every level who are capable of making sound decisions in a timely manner. 
In addition to being capable of making decisions, military leaders must 
recognize their obligation to make decisions.  In fact, when faced by a situation to make a 
decision, a military leader has a solemn duty to make a decision (MCDP 1-3, 1997).  
Remember that all actions in war are the result of decisions or nondecisions (MCDP 1, 
1997).  To fail to make a decision surrenders the initiative to the enemy.  From this, it can 
be deduced that failure to make a decision is a failure to lead. 
 This is not to imply that making a decision on the modern battlefield is in 
any way easy, as demonstrated by the conditions depicted in the previous section.  
Although uncertainty can be reduced, it can never be eliminated.  In the face of 
uncertainty, the natural inclination is to postpone a decision until more information can 
be gathered (MCDP 1, 1997).  To continue to wait for information that may or may not 
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ever arrive is not acceptable on a time-competitive battlefield.  A leader must accept a 
certain degree of uncertainty (Schmitt, 1988), decide, and act. 
b) No Perfect Answers 
If there were perfect solutions to be found on the battlefield, then it would 
appear that the military decision maker is placed in an impossible situation.  The reality, 
however, is that there are no perfect solutions on the battlefield, and therefore leaders 
must not agonize over finding one.  The challenge for the military decision maker, then, 
is to select a promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk, and do so more 
quickly than the enemy (MCDP 1, 1997). 
Rather than optimal solutions, the fast tempo of the modern battlefield 
requires rapid, "close enough," acceptable decisions (Student text 101-5, 1996).  In other 
words, as General George S. Patton once said, "A good plan violently executed now is 
better than a perfect plan next week" (MCDP 6, 1997, p. 116).  This "close enough" 
solution is what is known in the literature as "satisficing" (Athens, 1992, p. 12).  
Satisficing in combat does not come without risk, however, and should not be undertaken 
lightly.  Improperly applied by inexperienced personnel, satisficing in combat could have 
catastrophic results. 
c) Coup D'Oeil 
How, then, does a military decision maker know when a solution is good 
enough?  The answer lies in a French term, coup d'oeil, coined by Clausewitz 
(Clausewitz, 1984, p. 102).  The literal translation is "stroke of the eye;" more commonly 
it is called "tactical sense" (MCDP 1-3, 1997, p. 27).  It is an intuitive ability to quickly 
recognize the essential elements of a situation and make an effective, timely decision 
(Athens, 1992).  The Germans call it fingerspitzengefϋhl, which describes a combat 
leader's "fingertip feel" for the battlefield (Tritten, 1996, p. 30). 
Coup d'oeil is gained through experience.  A military leader's expertise is 
organized in his or her mind and readily accessible for recall (Allen, 1993).  Clausewitz 
described it as an indispensable quality on the battlefield (Clausewitz, 1984).  It is what 




d) Moral Courage 
A military leader must have one last trait to be able to be an effective 
decision maker: moral courage.  Moral courage here is the ability to make and carry out 
decisions regardless of the cost (MCDP 1-3, 1997).  Leaders must have the moral courage 
to make tough decisions in the face of uncertainty and accept full responsibility for their 
decisions (Schmitt, 1988).  Failure to make a decision and act because of a lack of moral 
courage is a serious breach of a leader's obligations.  Many decisions faced by military 
leaders, both in and out of combat, can be difficult, and without moral courage, those 
leaders are ill-equipped to carry out their duties. 
E. DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
There are several variations to existing decision-making models.  Generally, 
though, these variations can be classified into two categories, the analytical decision-
making model and intuitive decision-making model.  These two models are 
fundamentally different in theory and application. 
1. Analytical Decision-Making Model 
This is the classical, traditional view of the process of making decisions (Klein, 
2003).  Basically, a problem is thoroughly analyzed, different options are evaluated and 
compared, and the option deemed best is selected.  The analytical decision-making model 
has been the standard against which all other methods have been compared.  Criticism of 
alternative decision-making processes has been rooted in how close they come to finding 
the perfect solution that the analytical decision-making model is designed to uncover. 
a) Optimization 
The goal behind analytical decision making is to find the optimal solution.  
It is a process-based model (Schmitt, 1995) that relies on several assumptions.  The first 
assumption is there is a "best answer" to a particular problem.  A second assumption is 
that the information needed to decide which solution is best actually exists and can be 
found.  A third assumption is that one has the time and resources necessary to gather and 
evaluate this information. 
b) Methodical 
Analytical decision making requires reason, but not necessarily 
experience.  As long as one follows the steps properly, one will reach a good, maybe 
11 
even perfect, solution.  For military leaders and planners, this has great appeal.  In a 
profession in which actual decision-making experiences in combat can be rare--
particularly for junior officers--the analytical decision-making model offers hope: to 
make good decisions, one simply has to learn the process and systematically follow it.  
As long as one has the required reasoning skills to choose the best option, a novice can 
reach the same answer as a seasoned military genius (Schmitt, 1995). 
Along the "is it art or is it science?" continuum, analytical decision 
making is highly scientific.  It is methodical and time consuming and leaves nothing to 
chance (Klein, 2003).  The decision maker exhaustively gathers information to better 
analyze, evaluate, and compare different options.  This concurrent comparison of 
multiple options is known in the literature as multiattribute utility analysis (MAUA) and 
is the core of analytical decision making (Klein, 1989; Schmitt, 1996). 
c) Poor Fit for Military Decision Making 
The appeal of the analytical decision-making model is that it depicts 
decision making as a neat, orderly process that--properly executed--promises 
optimization (Schmitt, 1995).  As demonstrated earlier in the depiction of the 
environment on the modern battlefield in which military decision makers operate, 
however, this is not the case.  Instead, combat decision making takes place amid 
confusion and ambiguity where time is scarce and information frequently is unavailable.  
Often, what the enemy does present is deceptive and misleading.  Furthermore, optimal 
solutions--the objective of analytical decision making--seldom, if ever, exist on the 
battlefield. 
Klein (1989) has done extensive research on the decision-making 
processes people use in these and similar environments.  What he has found is that the 
concurrent option comparison that serves as the core of analytical decision making rarely 
occurs.  In fact, two decades of research have shown that more than 90% of critical 
decisions made are based on intuition (Klein, 2003, p. 18), which is examined in the 
second model. 
2. Intuitive Decision-Making Model 
It has been established that analytical decision making is not well suited for the 
conditions under which military leaders often have to make decisions.  But this classical 
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decision-making model of concurrent option comparison was not seriously questioned 
until the 1970s, when cognitive psychologists began to study how experienced decision 
makers made "real-life" decisions.  Their research led to a very different decision-making 
model than the one that had been taught for years. 
a) What's in a Name? 
The term "naturalistic decision making" was created because researchers 
sought to study decision making under naturalistic rather than controlled conditions 
(Schmitt, 1995).  Klein would later coin the phrase "recognition-primed decision making" 
(Klein, 1989, p. 59), a process that will be explained in greater detail later in this section.  
Like naturalistic decision making, recognition-primed decision making is characterized 
by uncertain, dynamic environments; lack of information; unclear or competing goals; 
stress; friction; and time constraints (Schmitt, 1995).  Although the name for intuitive 
decision making has evolved over the years, they all describe a decision-making process 
that is fundamentally different than the traditional model. 
b) Satisficing 
A principal difference between intuitive and analytical decision making is 
the type of solution sought.  Analytical decision making searches for the optimal solution.  
Intuitive decision making, however, seeks a satisfactory solution.  Central to intuitive 
decision making is Simon's principal of "satisficing" (Athens, 1992).  Satisficing is 
commonly done either when an optimal solution is not needed (i.e. a "good enough" 
solution will suffice) or when it is believed that there is no absolutely right answer to be 
found (Schmitt, 1995).  Both of these cases describe the decisions with which military 
leaders are often confronted, particularly in combat. 
c) The Role of Experience 
Whereas experience is of minimal importance in analytical decision 
making, it is essential for intuitive decision making.  The basis for intuitive decision 
making is the decision maker's assessment of the situation (Schmitt, 1995).  Absent 
experience, he or she will be unable to make any sense of the situation intuitively, and 
would likely have to resort to a more analytical approach.  Research has shown that the 
more experience one has, the more one relies on one's intuition in making decisions 
(Klein, 2003); the converse is true, as well. 
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Proficient decision makers are able to use their experience to recognize 
situations as familiar (Klein, 1989).  Amid apparent chaos and disorder, he or she is able 
to identify patterns and determine which cues are important.  This is where intuition--
which is based on one's abilities to distinguish patterns and interpret cues--aids the 
decision-making process; people develop intuition as they gain experience in their field 
(Klein, 2003). 
Intuition is not magic.  To better understand how it enables one to 
recognize patterns and interpret cues, it is important to understand how the mind 
organizes and stores information.  A pattern is merely a set of cues "chunked" together 
(Klein, 2003).  Miller's concept of "chunking," as cited by Athens (1992), refers to the 
mind's ability to group information in such a way that makes it easier to store and 
retrieve.   
Short-term memory is able to hold only about seven chunks of 
information.  Chunking information into larger and larger units is one of the most 
important processes of short-term memory (Athens, 1992).  For information to reach 
long-term memory, it must be related to other information already in long-term storage 
and be given meaning (Beach & Scott, 1989).  The key to intuitive decision making is 
one's ability to retrieve this information that has been chunked and stored from one's 
experiences. 
What experts know is better organized and more readily accessible than 
what novices know (Nickerson, Perkins, & Smith, 1985).  This is particularly relevant in 
intuitive decision making, where the effective decision maker is able to rapidly retrieve 
stored information and apply it to a problem (Athens, 1992).  This helps explain the 
critical role experience plays in intuitive decision making.  Intuitive decision making is 
the realm of the expert, not the novice. 
d) The Model 
Klein has led the way in research of intuitive decision making.  He has 
spent years mapping and refining the model of how people use their experience and 
intuition to make decisions.  His most recent publication, Intuition at Work (2003), 
emphasizes that intuitive decision making is not random or "shooting from the hip."  
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Rather, his research has shown that there is a method, or process, to intuitive decision 























Figure 1. Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model. 
 
i. Does Not Consider Multiple Options 
Intuitive decision making does not involve the consideration of 
multiple options.  This is a fundamental departure from analytical decision making, 
which centers on concurrent option comparison.  Research has shown that experienced 
decision makers are able to generate a workable option (i.e. one that meets the 
requirements of satisficing) first (Klein, 1989).  This eliminates the need to weigh 
advantages and disadvantages of multiple options (Klein, 1989; Schmitt, 1995).  It is 
immediately evident that this would make the decision-making process faster, which 
creates opportunities and cumulative advantage on the battlefield. 
ii. Situation Assessment 
Instead of systematic comparison of multiple options, intuitive 
decision making focuses on assessment of the situation (Schmitt, 1995; MCDP 6, 1997).  
The experienced decision maker scans the environment and determines which cues are 
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relevant to the decision at hand (Athens, 1992).  He or she is able to access and retrieve 
pertinent information from memory to begin to make sense of the situation. 
iii. Pattern Recognition 
Expert decision makers use their experience to recognize key 
aspects of situations, enabling them to make a decision rapidly (Klein, 1989).  
Mandelbrot used the term "fractals" to describe ordered elements that emerge from 
seeming chaos.  Within these "Mandelbrot Sets," repetitious patterns appear; while not 
identical to one another, there are enough similarities to identify patterns (Row, 1999). 
iv. Mental Simulation 
Because intuitive decision-making does not compare multiple 
options, it is important to evaluate the solution generated.  Although pattern recognition 
primes the decision-making process, the generated solution needs to be tested.  The 
patterns include routines for responding that are known as "action scripts."  These action 
scripts are appraised by mental simulation.  Through experience, people build mental 
models, which aid in mental simulation; good mental models of how things work are 
necessary for effective mental simulation (Klein, 2003). 
Mental simulation is the way people evaluate their decisions and 
figure out what to expect before taking action so they can determine whether or not the 
decision will have the desired effect.  If the decision maker is satisfied, he or she 
responds.  If a problem is spotted, the action script is altered.  If no way around the 
problem can be found, the option is discarded and the next option is evaluated, without 
comparing the two options (Klein, 2003). 
v. Summary of RPD Model 
Intuition is not a mysterious quality.  Rather, it is a developed skill, 
firmly grounded in experience, and it can be further developed through education and 
practice (MCDP 1-3, 1997).  Intuitive decision making is much faster than analytical 
decision making and copes with uncertainty, ambiguity, and dynamic situations more 
effectively (Schmitt, 1995).  For this reason, although most professional military 
education (PME) schools teach the methodical, time-consuming analytical model of 
concurrent option comparison, most military leaders actually use intuitive decision 
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making.  In fact, research has shown that 95% of decisions by naval commanders are 
based on intuition (Klein, 2003, p. 18). 
3. Which is Better? 
The literature does not suggest that one model--analytical or intuitive decision 
making--is inherently better than the other (Infantry Officer Course, 1999).  Different 
conditions call for different strategies (Klein, 1989), and the decision-making approach 
should be based on the situation (MCDP 6, 1997).  What is important for military leaders 
is to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each model and use their judgment to 
decide which model is most appropriate for a given situation. 
a) Strengths and Weaknesses 
The following draws out and summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of 
each model. 
i. Analytical Decision Making 
There are many occasions when analytical decision making is the 
appropriate model to use.  Two of the most important factors to take into account are the 
amount of time available and the decision maker's experience level.  When time allows a 
military leader to apply analytical decision making (usually pre-hostilities), he or she 
should make the most of it (MCDP 1-3, 1997).  The analytical approach should also be 
used when novices lack the experience base to make proper intuitive decisions, or when a 
seasoned decision maker encounters novel conditions (MCDP 6, 1997; Klein, 2003).  
In addition to time available and experience level, there are several 
other factors that might lead one to use the analytical approach: the situation is static; the 
decision needs to be justified; internal disagreement (in the case of group decision 
making) needs to be resolved; an optimal solution is desired or necessary; a choice must 
be made from among several clearly defined options; or, a problem is particularly 
complex (Schmitt, 1995; Klein, 2003).   
ii. Intuitive Decision Making 
The intuitive approach is more appropriate for the vast majority of 
decisions faced by military leaders.  These decisions are made in fluid, rapidly changing 
conditions when time and uncertainty are critical factors (MCDP 6, 1997).  As stated in 
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the U.S. Army's 1954 edition of FM 100-5: Operations, signed by General Matthew B. 
Ridgway, "timeliness of decision is the essence of command in action" (Schmitt, 1988, p. 
19). 
Intuitive decision making is not always superior to analytical, 
however.  Since it relies extensively on experience, intuitive decision making is not 
reliable for inexperienced decision makers.  Incorrect associations or pattern recognition 
could lead to inappropriate or even dangerous responses (Row, 1999).  Leaders lacking 
the necessary experience can severely limit the applicability of intuitive decision making, 
despite its great appeal.  Having leaders in place with adequate experience to make 
intuitive decisions can be problematic for the Armed Forces (Athens, 1992).  
b) Where To From Here? 
Neither analysis nor intuition is sufficient alone (Klein, 2003).  While 
conceptually opposite, the two models are not exclusive in practice (Schmitt, 1995).  
Intuition helps one decide how to react to a situation, while analysis verifies one's 
intuitions to ensure they are not misleading (Klein, 2003).  The most effective decision 
maker is the one who can make good judgments by oscillating along a continuum 
between intuition and analysis (Paparone, 2001).   
The modern battlefield demands initiative and sound decision making at 
all levels.  Military leaders must make decisions of great consequence in the face of 
uncertainty, disorder, and stress.  Combat is time-competitive, and the side that 
consistently makes decisions faster gains a tremendous advantage.  Leaders must be 
prepared to excel under these conditions.  From the beginning, their training and 
education should foster initiative and improve decision making (MCDP 6, 1997). 
F. METHODS OF TEACHING DECISION-MAKING SKILLS 
It is clear that decision making is an important skill for military leaders.  Unless it 
is a skill that can be taught, however, then it would be a moot point with regard to the 
professional development of midshipmen at the Naval Academy.  Fortunately, research 




1. Create the Conditions 
The bold initiative required of all leaders on the modern battlefield is not born of 
itself.  Rather, a spirit of initiative is fostered in environments in which a conscious effort 
is made create the conditions that will allow initiative to flourish.  Such conditions must 
be endorsed by the most senior leadership and nurtured at every level in a command.  To 
gain the desired result, initiative must not merely be allowed, it must be demanded.  An 
institution must develop a predilection for tolerating mistakes of action but not those of 
inaction.  Only then will leaders at all levels express an eagerness to seek and accept 
responsibility (MCDP 6, 1997).   
a) Establish Parameters, Tolerate Mistakes 
The very first class that second lieutenants at the U.S. Marine Corps's 
Infantry Officer Course (IOC) receive is simply titled, "The Decision."  Newly 
designated infantry lieutenants are informed that their 10 weeks at IOC is a time to 
practice decision making, to be bold and make mistakes in the name of decisive action 
(IOC, 1999).  A critical element present here is an institutional commitment to tolerate 
mistakes of action, to encourage those who are willing to strive and occasionally fail 
rather than be content to sit back and allow others to make the difficult decisions.  
Mistakes of action are tolerated, whereas inaction and indecision are anathema for 
Marine officers. 
To be able to tolerate mistakes, an institution must first establish the 
parameters for what type of mistakes reasonably can be allowed.  Recklessness or an 
absence of good judgment is not acceptable simply because one desires to create the 
conditions for fostering initiative.  To do so would quickly result in imposition of a more 
restrictive environment and achieve a result opposite of that desired. 
Before establishing the parameters for what type of mistakes can be made 
in the name of creating decision-making opportunities, one must first identify and 
understand the decision requirements of a particular role or job.  This is the first step in 
Klein's Intuitive Skills Training Program (ISTP), to determine which judgments and 
decisions repeatedly arise in a particular profession or position (Klein, 2003).  Once an 
institution identifies what types of decisions are required to be made by its members, it 
can then begin to determine what type of mistakes are acceptable.  This step requires 
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prudence and good judgment, but it also demands a willingness on the part of leaders at 
every level to accept a degree of risk for the benefit of developing leaders with initiative. 
b) Make Expectations Known 
Having made a commitment to foster initiative and identify areas in which 
mistakes can be tolerated, an institution must then make known its expectations in regard 
to decision making.  In the case of military leaders, it must be made clear that indecision 
is not an option (Allen, 1993).  For example, prior to World War II at the German 
Kriegsakademie (which produced the forefathers of Maneuver Warfare), two of most 
important characteristics of a leader were said to be initiative and a willingness to accept 
responsibility; evasion or shifting of responsibility was to be avoided at all times 
(Wedemeyer, 1938). 
c) Micromanagement Stifles Initiative 
In the U.S. Armed Forces, the term "zero-defects mentality" is used to 
describe the belief that the leadership is unwilling to tolerate mistakes, regardless of their 
cause or circumstances.  The extent to which it exists at various levels of leadership is a 
matter of great debate, and certainly it would be inaccurate to suggest that a universal 
degree of zero-defects mentality pervades all levels across the Services.  The important 
point here is the detrimental effect such a mentality can have on initiative and decision 
making. 
An unwillingness to allow any mistakes whatsoever often leads to 
micromanagement.  This micromanagement is the manifestation of a lack of trust and not 
only curtails expectations of initiative, but actually makes taking initiative too risky for 
potential decision makers.  In the Armed Forces, this results in seniors who are too ready 
and willing to perform their subordinates' duties and over-supervise instead of letting 
them learn and grow.  Oftentimes, it also results in training schedules that account for 
every minute of a service member's time, thereby eliminating any opportunity for 
initiative (Glasgow, 1998). 
Service members trained in such environments lack the necessary skills 
and traits to implement the warfighting doctrine of Maneuver Warfare.  Trust and a 
willingness to tolerate mistakes are a must in creating leaders who will be both prepared 
and willing to demonstrate initiative and make decisions on the battlefield.  To better 
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prepare these leaders, they must be given responsibility and expected to act at every 
opportunity. 
2. Increase the Experience Base 
As a rule, experienced decision makers are better decision makers.  This is 
particularly true for intuitive decision making, which has been shown to be the model 
most frequently used by military leaders.  Situation assessment and pattern recognition 
are central to intuitive decision making and require a broad base of experience (Schmitt, 
1995).  Therefore, it makes sense that the way to improve intuitive skills is to strengthen 
one's experience base (Klein, 2003).   
This requirement for experience creates something of a predicament for those 
responsible for training and developing military decision makers.  It is one thing to 
acknowledge the value of experience, yet quite another to identify ways to accelerate the 
process of gaining experience, and therein lies the challenge.  And yet, the process must 
be accelerated.  In fact, the Marine Corps places so much importance on developing 
decision-making skills in its leaders that its doctrinal publication on warfighting states, 
"We should spare no effort to accelerate our decisionmaking ability" (MCDP 1, 1997, p. 
85).  The question then, is one of how leaders should be trained (Klein, 1996).  How can 
leaders develop the experience base needed to be effective decision makers? 
a) The Value of Practice 
Vegetius, a 4th Century Roman military advisor, said, "What is necessary 
to be performed in the heat of action should constantly be practiced in the leisure of 
peace" (Brewster, 2002, p. 3).  This has long been a maxim for military training, from 
seemingly simple tasks (e.g. reloading a rifle) to those that are much more complex (e.g. 
underway replenishment of a surface warship).  This same truism, however, is equally 
applicable to--and necessary for--decision making. 
Klein says that the "secret" for improving intuition is "practice, practice, 
practice" (2003, p. 26).  Research has consistently shown that decision making is a skill 
that improves with practice (Beach & Scott, 1989).  Experience and judgment are critical 
to effective decision making, and the only way to acquire these is through repeated 
practice (Schmitt, 1995).  Increased intuition, in particular, directly correlates to the 
amount and frequency of practice (Tritten, 1996).  Klein actually refers to intuitive skills 
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as being strengths that can be expanded through exercise; in other words, the more 
exercise, the stronger they get (2003).  Practice making decisions increases the number of 
patterns available for the brain to be able to analyze during times of crisis (Basic Officer 
Course, 2002). 
b) Real-Life Experience 
While combat provides the most instructive lessons on decisionmaking, 
tactical leaders cannot wait for war to begin their education.  We must be 
competent in our profession before our skills are called upon.  The lives of 
(those we lead) depend on it (MCDP 1-3, 1997, pp. 114-5).   
The most meaningful type of decision-making experience is real-life 
experience, but there are problems with that.  For one, many do not get the opportunities 
to accumulate enough real-life experience to develop expertise.  Also, as reflected by the 
previous quote, many cannot afford to wait until they are doing something for real to 
learn from their mistakes (Klein, 2003).  For military leaders, the cost of mistakes in 
combat is measured in the loss of life by those for whom they are responsible. 
c) Alternatives to Real-Life Experience 
Former Chief of Naval Operations and U.S. Navy legend, Admiral Arleigh 
A. "31 Knot" Burke, once said, "Nobody can actually duplicate the strain that a 
commander is under in making a decision in combat" (USNA, 2003, p. 155).  The 
accuracy of Admiral Burke's statement points to a dilemma faced by those responsible for 
the training and education of military leaders (MCDP 1-3, 1997; Klein, 2003).  
Fortunately, much can be done in training and education to develop decision-making 
skills, augment real-life experiences, and accelerate learning. 
i. Study Military History 
 Short of actual combat experiences, the study of military history 
can make a vital contribution to the development of judgment and insight (MCDP 1-3, 
1997).  Clausewitz's coup d'oeil, the intuitive ability to quickly and accurately assess a 
situation, comes from expert knowledge of war.  This expert knowledge comes in part 
from the study of military history, and enables one to recognize patterns, an essential skill 
for intuitive decision making (Allen, 1993).   
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 The appeal here is that professional reading is one of the most 
effective ways to nourish competence early in one's military career (Nye, 1986).  As a 
result, the more one studies military history, the better prepared one will be to lead in 
combat (Glasgow, 1998).  Another significant appeal is that study of military history 
requires relatively little by way of resources and supporting infrastructure. 
ii. Tactical Exercises 
 In many ways, developing decision-making skills is a form of 
mental conditioning.  As with learning in general, mental conditioning works best when it 
is experiential, that is, learning by doing (Klein, 2003).  In this regard, participating in 
tactical exercises can contribute to one's experience base in a very rich way.  The obvious 
drawback is that--unlike studying military history and some of the other methods 
presented here--planning and conducting tactical exercises require a significant amount of 
time and resources, to include equipment and training facilities. 
iii. War Games 
 The term "war games" is sometimes used to describe what was just 
presented as "tactical exercises," which entail personnel using weapons and equipment 
while conducting actual maneuvers on terrain.  For the purposes of this study--and 
consistent with the literature--the term "war games" refers to tactical decision games 
(commonly known as TDGs), map exercises, "sand-table" exercises, and even computer 
simulations.  They are another effective means of compiling the experience base needed 
to be a capable decision maker.  In all of these decision-making exercises, a tactical 
situation is briefed either orally or in writing, and that situation is visually depicted on a 
map, sand table, drawing, or some other similar means. 
 In terms of time and resources required, war games produce a 
tremendous return.  They are able to capture much of the essence of tough decisions 
without many of the costs or other overhead of more complicated simulations or 
exercises, and can be done in a shorter time, allowing greater frequency and repetition 
(Klein, 2003).  Because of this, war games have become particularly popular in the U.S. 
Marine Corps and Army.   
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 War games prepare military leaders to make difficult, real-life 
decisions.  They have proven to be an effective mechanism for developing individuals' 
abilities to make decisions under stress.  They enable leaders to make better decisions 
more rapidly, which is critical in the time-competitive arena of combat (Brewster, 2002). 
 While war games can be conducted alone, they are more effective 
in small groups, ideally 6-8 people (Klein, 2003, p. 43).  One benefit of doing war games 
in groups is the insight and feedback a seasoned facilitator can provide.  Another is that 
participants learn from one another's decision-making processes and innovative ideas.  
Critical analysis of decisions sharpens participants' decision-making skills.  Having to 
perform in the presence of others not only adds to the pressure, but is realistic as well. 
 Several common characteristics of war games make them most 
effective.  They should be kept simple and easy to run.  Total time generally should not 
exceed 30-50 minutes (Klein, 2003, p. 44).  Routine situations should be avoided; the less 
familiar the environment, the more creativity the participant must display (MCDP 1-3, 
1997).  Notional resources available to the decision maker (e.g. personnel and equipment) 
should be limited.  Information should be incomplete or uncertain.  Participants should be 
forced to make and communicate their decision within a stringent, challenging time limit 
(MCDP 6, 1997).  Generally it is better to call on people than to ask for volunteers 
(Klein, 2003).  There should be no "textbook" solution (Brewster, 2002; Klein, 2003; 
MCDP 1-3, 1997).  Solicit multiple solutions, but do not exhaust a situation completely; 
time available usually prohibits this, plus to do so would inhibit continued debate and 
discussion among the participants after the conclusion of the war game (Klein, 2003). 
iv. Duplicate the Conditions 
 An important goal in designing tactical exercises and war games is 
to create decision-making conditions that are as realistic as possible.  This is the second 
step in Klein's Intuitive Skills Training Program (the first step is to identify and 
understand decision requirements)(2003).  For people to be able to perform in a stressful 
environment, it is crucial to provide practice under conditions similar to those likely to be 
encountered in a combat setting.  Training that simulates novel or high-stress conditions 
has been successful in a variety of military applications, to include decision making.  
24 
Therefore, "realistic" training is a critical instructional strategy to prepare personnel to 
operate in stressful environments (Driskell, 1993).  Admittedly, tactical exercises are 
better at duplicating desired physical conditions, but war games very effectively replicate 
many of the non-physical conditions faced by military decision makers. 
 Research has shown that a phased approach to stress training is 
effective.  This approach allows the trainee to learn or master a desired task in a normal 
(i.e. non-stress) setting, and then phase-in stressors as training progresses.  This ensures 
that external stressors do not interfere with initial skill acquisition, but ensures that 
ultimately the trainee practices his or her skills in a realistic combat stress setting 
(Driskell, 1993).  With specific regard to decision-making training, this phased approach 
would call for some introduction to how decisions are made (i.e. the different models) 
and practice making decisions with limited stressors before throwing all the previously-
mentioned stressors that characterize war games at a novice decision maker.  This would 
ensure comprehension of the process and some opportunity to develop some confidence 
rather than be overwhelmed immediately. 
 Giving military leaders the opportunity to practice making tough 
decisions under challenging, realistic conditions is beneficial in several ways.  It helps 
prepare them to function effectively in varying environments, amid uncertainty and 
disorder, and with limited time (MCDP 6, 1997).  They learn to take decisive action in 
uncertain environments.  They come to understand and accept the fact that feeling 
"uncertain" will be their normal mental state on the battlefield, not the exceptional one 
(IOC, 1999).  Lastly, it teaches these decision makers that they can--and must--trust their 
intuition in stressful situations, as they will be required to do in real-life and combat 
situations (Tritten, 1996). 
3. The Importance of Feedback 
The previous section examined the importance of experience for effective 
decision making.  Merely having experience is not enough, however; experience must be 
turned into expertise (Klein, 2003, p. 52).  This is done by getting feedback on decisions, 
the third step in Klein's Intuitive Skills Training Program (first step is to identify and 
understand decision requirements, second step is to create realistic decision-making 
conditions)(2003).  No decision-making exercise should end without a discussion/critique 
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at the end to draw out the key lessons to be learned (Schmitt, 1995).  What the critique 
focuses on will significantly affect the quality of the feedback received. 
a) How Important is it to be Correct? 
 The purpose of critiquing a decision-making exercise is not to determine 
whether or not the "right" decision was made.  For one thing, there are no perfect 
solutions to the types of decisions military leaders face, so such a solution should not be 
demanded in training decision makers.  Additionally, mistakes are essential to the 
learning process (Klein, 2003).  Particularly in training novice decision makers, though, 
the correctness of the decision should not be at issue.  Instead, it should be stressed to 
young leaders that the right decision is to make any decision.  This will condition them to 
make decisions rapidly without concern for failure.  As this conditioning process 
continues, simply making a decision is no longer enough--credible decisions become 
expected.  In this context, they learn that although there are no single right decisions, 
some decisions are better than others (Allen, 1993).  
b) Focus on the Process 
Too often, decision-making critiques turn into debates over details and 
ignore what is truly important: gaining an understanding of why and how the decision 
was reached.  There is much more to be learned from feedback on the process than on the 
outcome (Klein, 2003).  The answer itself is less important than the rationale and thought 
process behind the answer (Brewster, 2002).  Put another way, the actual decision made 
is less important than the thinking that went into making it (Klein, 2003). 
The critique should focus on what the decision maker knew at the time of 
the decision, without the aid of hindsight (IOC, 1999).  This is necessary to properly 
evaluate the decision maker's assumptions, reasoning, and deductions.  It is also 
important to look at the decision made in the context that information available to the 
decision maker may have been vague or incomplete by design, in order to create 
uncertainty and doubt (MCDP 1-3, 1997). 
c) Significance of the Facilitator 
The person leading the critique has a tremendous influence on the quality 
of decision-making feedback that is or is not received.  Experienced decision makers can 
help others identify cues and patterns that were recognized and missed (Klein, 2003).  
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But it takes more than decision-making experience to be able to run a useful critique.  A 
good facilitator keeps the critique focused on the decision-making process, helps the 
participants see what they missed or misinterpreted, and is able to put it all in a light that 
makes the feedback both welcome and productive. 
4. It is Never Too Early to Start 
Military leaders do not have the luxury of relying solely on their real-life 
experience to make themselves expert decision makers.  Their first real-life experience 
may be one of great consequence, with the lives of their subordinates and noncombatants 
on the line.  To prepare for this "moment of truth," leaders should be introduced to 
decision-making early in their career.  They need to optimize their learning from studying 
military history, practice making decisions at every opportunity, and actively seek 
feedback on their decisions (Athens, 1992; Klein, 2003).   
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter is to review decision-making literature relevant to this 
research and present it in a concise but thorough manner.  The creation of an operational 
definition of "decision making" is central to this task, and is presented here.  The relevant 
literature is used to demonstrate the importance of decision-making skills in military 
leaders, examine the two main decision-making models, and identify ways in which 
decision-making skills can be taught. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how the research was conducted and data 
were collected.  The general framework of the methodology is three-fold: 1) identify the 
priority the Naval Academy places on decision making; 2) ask those who are primarily 
responsible for midshipmen’s professional development (i.e. the company officers) how 
well they think the Naval Academy develops decision-making skills in midshipmen; and 
3) ask the midshipmen how well they believe the Naval Academy prepares them to be 
decision makers.  A combination of interviews, surveys, and focus groups was used as 
deemed most appropriate for each source.  The nature of this research is primarily 
qualitative, but some quantitative data were collected and analyzed as well. 
B. IS DECISION MAKING A PRIORITY FOR THE NAVAL ACADEMY? 
The first step was to identify if, where, and how the Naval Academy--as an 
institution--has explicitly stated that developing midshipmen as decision makers is a 
priority.  This was accomplished in two ways.  First, mission statements, documents, and 
curricula descriptions were examined.  Additionally, senior leaders at the Naval Academy 
were interviewed to learn the importance they place on decision making as a skill in 
officers and what they believe the Naval Academy should be doing to train its 
midshipmen as decision makers. 
1. Research USNA Mission Statements 
The Naval Academy has a Strategic Plan (USNA Strategic Plan, 2004) that 
describes the Naval Academy’s purpose, mission, goals, and plans for action and 
direction.  The Strategic Plan was examined to learn if, and to what extent, decision-
making training is identified as a priority for the Naval Academy.  In addition to a 
mission statement for the Naval Academy, the Strategic Plan also includes a list of 
attributes USNA graduates are expected to possess.  Also, the Strategic Plan lays out 
short-term and long-term initiatives, described as tactical and strategic initiatives, 
respectively.  Of these initiatives, two were found to be related to decision making.   
Another step was to determine where and how decision making is presented to 
midshipmen in the curriculum at the Naval Academy.  To learn this, the Chair of the 
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Leadership, Ethics, and Law (LEL) Department pointed the author to the officer who is 
responsible for all Leadership instruction in LEL.  This officer explained the Naval 
Academy’s Professional Development Continuum, the concept that integrates all aspects 
of a midshipman’s professional development during his or her four years at the Naval 
Academy.  Included in this continuum are formal classes and practical experiences. 
2. Interview Senior USNA Leadership 
In order to determine whom to interview, one first has to have a rudimentary 
understanding of the Naval Academy's organization and the responsibilities of different 
leaders.  The officer primarily responsible to the Naval Academy Superintendent for 
midshipmen's professional development is the Commandant of Midshipmen.  The 
Commandant's sphere of influence basically reaches everything outside of the classroom.  
Professional development within the classroom falls under the Division of Professional 
Development.  Any classes related to decision making would be taught by the 
Leadership, Ethics, and Law (LEL) Department, which is a branch of the Division of 
Professional Development. 
During the course of this research, there was a change of leadership in the office 
of the Commandant of Midshipmen.  For purposes of continuity and completeness, both 
Commandants were interviewed to learn their views on developing midshipmen as 
decision makers at the Naval Academy.  The interview protocols are provided in 
Appendices A and B, respectively.  The author spoke with the Director of the 
Professional Development Division.  The LEL Chair was also interviewed, along with a 
USNA Distinguished Military Professor for Leadership (see Appendix C for interview 
protocol).  Lastly, the author discussed the ethical aspect of decision making with the 
Director of the Character Development Division.   
For each of the formal interviews, the author provided a proposed protocol in 
advance to the interviewees to make the most of the limited time available for interviews 
with these senior leaders.  The actual conduct of the interviews did not strictly follow the 
proposed protocol.  Interviewees added personal emphasis in different areas and the 
interviewer asked probing questions to seek amplification of some points.  Permission 
was granted by each interviewee to record his interview.  The tapes were later transcribed 
to facilitate data analysis. 
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C. WHAT DO THE COMPANY OFFICERS THINK? 
A survey was deemed to be the most appropriate means of collecting data from 
the company officers for several reasons.  For one, a complete sample (i.e. N = 30) was 
desired.  To interview all 30 company officers was considered to be unpractical, both in 
terms of time required and the difficulty in arranging times when each company officer 
would be able to sit down to devote time to this research.  The very busy schedules of the 
company officers likewise made it unpractical to try to convene focus groups.  Therefore, 
it was decided that a survey could gain the richest data with the least burden on the 
company officers.  The author received permission from the USNA Office of Institutional 
Research (IR) to issue the survey.  The company officer survey can be found in Appendix 
D. 
The survey was developed in conjunction with questions for focus groups that 
were to be conducted with selected midshipmen.  A point was made to include questions 
common to the company officer survey and midshipmen focus groups to enable 
comparison of the data collected.  The survey consisted of a ranking exercise, Likert-
scale questions with an opportunity for comments, and short-answer questions.  This 
design was intended to collect both qualitative and quantitative data.  Comments and 
short answers from all the company officer surveys were compared to identify recurring 
themes, and quantitative data were compared with corresponding data from the 
midshipmen focus groups.  The only demographic data solicited from the company 
officers were their service communities. 
For purposes of efficiency, the survey was initially sent out via E-mail to all 30 
company officers, with a brief explanation of the research and the contribution their 
responses would make.  Company officers have many demands on their time, which 
come from many different sources, all of which insist on being a top priority.  Taking this 
and the academic calendar into account, the author asked that the surveys be completed 
and returned prior to the end of the Fall semester, giving them 24 days.  Follow-on 
reminders via various media were issued as needed, and eventually all 30 surveys were 
submitted.    All surveys were completed as Word documents and returned via E-mail, 
with one exception, which was printed and responses were handwritten. 
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D. WHAT DO THE MIDSHIPMEN THINK? 
To identify what decision-making opportunities midshipmen have in the course of 
their four years at the Naval Academy, midshipmen had to be placed into categories that 
would represent different experiences.  Then a method had to be determined to best draw 
out the decision-making experiences and opportunities they encountered.  Focus groups 
were used for this research, and this section explains why they were used and how they 
were conducted.  
1. A Midshipman is a Midshipman is a Midshipman...? 
Although all midshipmen go through “the Naval Academy experience,” their 
experiences actually vary greatly.  With respect to leadership development, the most 
readily apparent leadership opportunities for midshipmen take place in Bancroft Hall.  
However, formal leadership positions and responsibilities in the Brigade of Midshipmen-
-albeit significant--are just one aspect of midshipmen’s lives.  The author wanted to 
examine different Naval Academy experiences and identify decision-making 
opportunities associated with each.  To achieve this, different categories of midshipmen 
were developed to identify similarities and differences among midshipmen. 
For the purposes of this study, a “striper” is defined as any midshipman with three 
or more stripes, typically company commanders and higher.  Conversely, a “non-striper” 
is defined as any midshipman with two stripes or less; these midshipmen are typically 
platoon commanders, squad leaders, or “midshipmen-in-ranks.”  Additionally, an 
“athlete” is defined as any varsity or junior-varsity athlete.  Since all midshipmen 
participate in some form of athletics while at the Naval Academy, this label separated 
“athletes” from “non-athletes,” who were defined as non-varsity/non-junior varsity 
athletes (i.e. midshipmen who participate in club sports or intramurals).   
With these definitions established, midshipmen were placed into one of three 
categories.  The first category was labeled “striper/non-athlete.”  The second was 
“athlete/non-striper,” and the third was “non-striper/non-athlete.”  Only midshipmen first 
class (i.e. seniors) were considered, since only they would have experienced the complete 
“four-class system” at the Naval Academy (the focus groups were conducted at the end of 
the Fall semester, so the midshipmen had completed three and one half years at the Naval 
Academy). 
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2. Why Focus Groups? 
Focus groups were considered to be the most viable means to collect data from 
midshipmen.  Because midshipmen also are extremely busy, and they are bombarded 
with surveys, the author was concerned about the quality of data that might be obtained 
through a survey.  By personally interacting with the midshipmen, the author expected to 
receive a greater commitment to the data solicited, resulting in richer data.  To minimize 
the inconvenience to the participants, the focus groups were designed to take less than an 
hour.  The author had to get permission from IR to conduct focus groups with 
midshipmen. 
To gain reliable data, two samples of each of the three established categories of 
midshipmen were sought, for a total of six focus groups.  A company officer solicited 
midshipmen nominations in accordance with the established criteria (i.e. first-class 
stripers/non-stripers, athletes/non-athletes) from all the company officers.  From the 
names provided, he then built six groups of six midshipmen per focus group.  The reason 
for this number of midshipmen per group was to try to achieve a sample that would be 
representative of the six battalions of midshipmen at the Naval Academy.  Of the six 
focus groups conducted, one had all six battalions represented, and the other five had five 
battalions represented; 17 of the 30 companies were represented in the focus groups.  The 
company officer developed a schedule for the focus groups to de-conflict with the 
participants’ very busy schedules.  He contacted them via E-mail, requesting they 
confirm that they could attend at the designated time.  Alternates were designated for 
each group and notified in the event a primary participant could not attend. 
Appendix E contains the focus group questions.  The first part is a worksheet with 
the same ranking exercise as the one found on the company officer survey, as well as 
common Likert-scale questions.   The second part lists the four discussion questions.  
Comments from these discussions were later compared across all the focus groups--and 
with company officer surveys--to identify recurring themes. 
3. Conduct of the Focus Groups 
The focus groups were conducted in a conference room in Bancroft Hall.  The 
author began by explaining this research to the midshipmen and the contribution their 
input would make to the research.  After thanking them for participating, the author 
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assured them of confidentiality, that their responses would in no way be identified with 
them individually.  The midshipmen were encouraged to be frank and honest.  To assist 
in this, and to create a relaxed atmosphere, the author pointed out that the participants 
would be commissioned and have left the Naval Academy by the time the author would 
begin his duties as a company officer.  The author did not tell them how or why they 
were chosen (i.e. in which category they fell) so as to not have their categorization 
influence their responses. 
On the walls of the conference room were posted two operational definitions, 
“decision making” and “gut wrenching decisions,” both of which can be found in 
Appendix E and will be further explained in Chapter IV.  After introducing these 
definitions, the participants completed a demographic worksheet (see Appendix F).  The 
purpose of this worksheet was to identify leadership experiences each midshipman had 
had over the course of four years at the Naval Academy.   
The author got the participants’ permission to record the discussion, for the same 
purpose as recording the interviews.  The participants were assigned numbers to enable 
the author to later match up responses with demographic worksheets (which were labeled 
with the corresponding numbers), and thereby match up their opinions with their 
background and experiences at the Naval Academy.  Participants were asked to begin 
each response with, “I am number 'x,' and I think...” To ensure that every participant 
responded to each of the discussion questions, the author varied the process of soliciting 
responses.  Specifically, sometimes volunteers went first and then the rest were asked if 
they had anything to add, and other times individuals were called on.  In addition to 
ensuring a response from everyone for each question, this also varied the order in which 
responses were given, in an attempt to minimize one person’s responses from potentially 
influencing all the others who followed. 
The focus groups were conducted as planned, with only a few minor glitches.  
Two midshipmen assigned to one of the "striper/non-athlete" focus groups were not 
stripers; they should have been in a "non-striper/non-athlete" group.  This is noted for 
two reasons.  First, their oral responses to the discussion questions might have differed if 
they were in a different group/category.  Second, because they were treated as "non-
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striper/non-athletes" in the data analysis, this affected the N for each category, which was 
intended to be 12.  Instead, there were 10 "striper/non-athletes," 12 "athlete/non-stripers," 
and 14 "non-striper/non-athletes."  Another midshipman, an "athlete/non-striper" missed 
his scheduled focus group but participated in a "non-striper/non-athlete" focus group; this 
could possibly have affected his oral responses for the same reason as the two 
midshipmen just mentioned.  Lastly, the oral responses to the last question for one of the 
focus groups ("athlete/non-striper") were unintentionally recorded over before they were 
transcribed; two of the six participants responded to an E-mail request asking that they E-
mail their answer to the author as best they could remember having answered it during 
the focus group; the effect of this loss is believed to be minimal since the overwhelming 
majority of the data was captured and analyzed. 
E. OTHER DATA 
In an effort to manage the scope of this research, data collection was primarily 
focused on the interviews of senior Naval Academy leadership, company officer surveys, 
and midshipmen focus groups.   In the course of the research, however, several areas 
central to the development of decision-making skills in Naval Academy midshipmen 
were uncovered.  In an effort to present the most comprehensive study possible within the 
constraints of this thesis, these areas were pursued. 
1. Midshipmen Performance Evaluations 
One way to determine whether or not midshipmen are being developed as 
decision makers at the Naval Academy is to find out if their decision making is evaluated.  
To do this, the author examined how midshipmen’s performance is evaluated to identify 
the extent to which their decision-making abilities and performance are considered.  The 
Naval Academy uses Navy fitness reports and evaluation reports.  The Marine Corps 
fitness report was also analyzed to compare it--relative to decision making--with the 
Navy evaluations. 
2. Sexual Assault and Decision Making 
An area in which the Naval Academy focuses on the decision-making process is 
with regard to sexual assault.  To gather data in this area, the author contacted the USNA 
Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) director.  The SAVI director provided the 
SAVI classroom presentations that are given to midshipmen. 
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3. USNA Honor System 
The Naval Academy's Honor System was mentioned several times by 
midshipmen during focus groups as being an area in which midshipmen have to make 
difficult decisions.  In following up on this, the Director of Character Development, 
suggested the author speak with the Ethics Advisor to the Commandant of Midshipmen, 
to discuss the decision-making opportunities for midshipmen involved with the Honor 
System process.  The Ethics Advisor explained the process, and further referred the 
author to the midshipman first class (1/C) who was the current Brigade of Midshipmen 
Honor Chair.  The author arranged with the Honor Chair to observe an Honor Board.  
The author also interviewed the Honor Chair about his billet, its responsibilities, and the 
nature of the decisions he has to make in the performance of his duties as Honor Chair. 
F. DATA ANALYSIS 
The data were analyzed at several levels.  At one level, the statements about the 
importance of decision making made by the senior leaders in their interviews with the 
author were compared with areas of the Strategic Plan that addressed decision making to 
see if they were in alignment.  These two sources of data were then compared with the 
responses from the company officers and midshipmen to see if there was convergence.   
Next, the responses from the company officers and midshipmen were compared 
with each other.  To facilitate this, the company officer survey and midshipmen focus 
groups were designed to have common questions.  These included a ranking exercise, 
four Likert-scale questions that reported relative ratings of agreement with statements 
presented to the respondents, and two short answer/discussion questions.  The ranking 
exercise and Likert-scale questions provided quantitative data, which were analyzed by 
computing frequencies (presented later in this thesis as histograms) and means.  The short 
answer/discussion questions provided qualitative data, and these were analyzed by 
comparing the responses to identify trends and areas of convergence and divergence. 
Lastly, the additional data collected from other sources were analyzed.  The 
midshipmen performance evaluation system was examined to learn if or how decision 
making was included, and then was compared to the Naval Academy's stated decision-
making objectives to determine if the performance evaluations contribute to achieving 
these goals.  Likewise, the SAVI Program was analyzed to learn whether or not it 
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contributes to achieving the Naval Academy's decision-making objectives.  Finally, the 
Honor System was examined to determine whether or not it achieves the same. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The methodology of this research was designed to determine what priority the 
senior leadership of the Naval Academy places on developing midshipmen as decision 
makers, and to assess how well the Naval Academy accomplishes this task.  All aspects 
of midshipmen’s experiences at the Naval Academy were taken into account.  A wide 
range of research methods was used to most effectively and completely collect data--both 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
(As an officer) you've got to make (life-and-death tactical) decisions in a 
split second.  How do you do that?  How do you handle it?...What's the 
training that you've had in advance and how well does that prepare you to 
act instinctively?  Because when you have only two seconds to make a 
decision, you can't go through a very long analysis (personal 
communication, February 10, 2004). 
    Captain Charles J. Leidig 
    Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to organize, present, and analyze the data collected 
for this research.  After explaining and acknowledging the limitations of the data, the data 
will be presented.  The data have been grouped into three main categories: 1) the 
importance the Naval Academy places on developing decision-making skills in 
midshipmen, 2) how midshipmen are taught decision making, and 3) opportunities 
midshipmen have to make decisions. 
B. LIMITATIONS OF DATA 
The first aspect in which the data are limited is the samples.  The author primarily 
sought data from three sources: the senior leadership at the Naval Academy, the company 
officers, and selected midshipmen.  The author had adequate access to senior leaders, and 
all four interviews requested were granted.  As for the company officers, all 30 completed 
the survey, so the sample of company officers was equal to the population (i.e. 100%).  
Regarding the midshipmen, the author was able to conduct focus groups with the 
requested number of midshipmen (i.e. 36) representing the three designated categories 
(stripers, athletes, and neither).  Because of the scope of the research and the choice to 
use focus groups, however, the sample of midshipmen was necessarily small (N = 36 in a 
population of 990 first-class midshipmen).  While the percentage of the population is 
low, the author's goal was to gain the richest data possible from a relatively small sample 
by creating a stratified random sample. 
The second limitation of the data concerns the extent to which the topic of the 
research may have affected the responses given by the participants.  This phenomenon, 
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known as reactivity, occurs when participants' responses are influenced by the demand 
characteristics of the data (i.e. influenced by what they believe the research is seeking).  
Care was taken in designing interview protocols, the company officer survey, and focus 
group protocols, not to make assertions or ask leading questions.  This is why, for 
example, the company officer survey had both Likert-scale and short-answer questions, 
and even the former provided the opportunity for additional comments.  Additionally, in 
the case of the company officers and midshipmen, anonymity was promised to the 
participants in an effort to encourage candidness and lessen the reactivity effect.   
For all three sample groups (senior leadership, company officers, and 
midshipmen), a minimal amount of information to introduce the research.  It was 
emphasized that the purpose of the research was simply to assess what the Naval 
Academy does to develop decision-making skills in midshipmen, with no indication 
given of what the author or anyone else might think the Naval Academy should or should 
not be doing in this area.  That said, the very fact that the research was being conducted 
may have caused some to deduce that a degree of importance of decision making was 
being inferred, and this may have influenced their responses. 
The three sample groups may have been influenced by the nature of the research 
to different degrees.  The senior leaders were probably least influenced because of their 
many years of experience and positions of authority.  The company officers were 
probably not influenced much because they have had several years of commissioned time 
and experience to shape their thoughts.  This, combined with the fact that they provided 
their data in the form of completing a survey (i.e. no face-to-face interaction with the 
author), probably minimized any reactivity bias.   
The last group--the midshipmen--likely was most influenced by the topic and the 
forum in which the data were solicited.  For one thing, they have the least amount of 
experience on which to base their responses.  Further, because of the nature of their 
environment, as officer candidates sitting in a focus group being led by a commissioned 
officer, their responses were probably the most influenced of the three groups of 
participants.  The bias expected is that in their responses they may have placed a greater 
importance on decision making than they otherwise might have assigned.  For example, 
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in the exercise in which they ranked the different USNA graduate attributes (presented 
later in this chapter), decision making might not have been ranked so highly if the 
midshipmen had been told that the purpose of the focus group had to do with another 
attribute (e.g. equal opportunity or effective communication).  This was taken into 
account by the author in selecting the method to collect data from midshipmen, and in 
spite of the potential drawbacks mentioned here, focus groups were still considered to be 
the best medium. 
The last limitation of the data concerns the nature of the data.  The company 
officer survey and midshipmen focus groups solicited opinions about the importance of 
decision making.  There was no metric or evaluation of decision-making effectiveness, 
however.  Nor did the scope of this research include collecting input from commanders in 
the Fleet regarding Naval Academy graduates' performance as decision makers.  It should 
be noted, however, that even that data would have been a matter of opinion, albeit 
opinions of experienced naval officers; decision making is difficult to measure in the 
Fleet just as it is at the Naval Academy. 
C. IMPORTANCE USNA PLACES ON DEVELOPING DECISION MAKING 
IN MIDSHIPMEN 
The extent to which developing decision-making skills in midshipmen is an 
important part of their development was examined in two ways.  The first is what is 
actually stated, both in what is written down in the form of mission statements and 
objectives, and by senior leaders in interviews.  The second way is equally, if not more 
important, than the first, and that is how much importance the company officers and 
midshipmen perceive the Naval Academy places on the development of decision-making 
skills.  This is provided by selected responses given in the company officer survey and 
midshipmen focus groups. 
1. Stated Importance of Decision Making 
In a large organization like the Naval Academy, there are many competing 
demands for limited resources such as time, personnel, infrastructure, and funding.  These 
resources must be properly allocated to best achieve an organization's goals.  To do this, 
the senior leadership of an organization must identify its priorities and then state them in 
some manner.  To determine what priority the senior leadership at the Naval Academy 
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places on the development of decision-making skills in midshipmen, the author examined 
the Naval Academy's Strategic Plan (USNA Strategic Plan, 2004) and interviewed 
several key senior leaders. 
a) USNA Strategic Plan 
The Naval Academy's Strategic Plan was first published in 1998 and was 
subsequently revised and published in 2001 and again in 2002.  The purpose of the plan 
is "to ensure the Naval Academy avoids mission drift and maintains the appropriate 
balance between academic, professional, and athletic programs."  It includes a mission 
statement, a vision statement, attributes of Naval Academy graduates, institutional focus 
areas, and numerous initiatives to achieve the Naval Academy's goals (USNA Strategic 
Plan, 2004).  The author examined the Strategic Plan to learn where and how decision 
making is addressed. 
i. Mission and Vision Statements 
A mission provides an organization with a sense of purpose.  It 
clarifies why it should be doing what it does.  It enables key decision makers to focus 
discussion on what is truly important.  A mission statement is a declaration of 
organizational purpose.  Mission statements vary in length, but are typically short 
(Bryson, 1995).  The foundation of the Naval Academy's Strategic Plan is the Naval 
Academy's mission statement, 
To develop midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and to imbue 
them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty in order to provide 
graduates who are dedicated to a career of naval service and have potential 
for future development in mind and character to assume the highest 
responsibilities of command, citizenship and government (USNA Strategic 
Plan, 2004). 
There is no mention of decision making in the Naval Academy's 
mission statement.  By Bryson's standard (1995)--which is commonly accepted--this is 
not surprising.  For an institution with as broad a charter as the Naval Academy, the 
mission statement would not be the appropriate place to address the development of 
midshipmen's decision-making skills.  Even several levels below, in the Division of 
Professional Development's mission statement, 
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(T)o prepare Midshipmen to be professional officers in the Naval and 
Marine Corps services. The courses offered by our academic departments 
-- Leadership, Ethics, & Law, and Seamanship & Navigation -- develop 
skills in the classroom environment.  The Department of Professional 
Programs provides the opportunity for Midshipmen to move out of the 
classroom and experience life at sea with operational fleets.  The staff and 
faculty are comprised of both military and civilian instructors providing a 
diversified learning environment for the Midshipmen (USNA Division of 
Professional Development, 2004) 
there is no mention of decision making.  Where, then, might it be found? 
From the mission statement, the Strategic Plan produces a vision 
statement, "(To) provide leaders of great character, competence, vision and drive to 
transform the Navy and Marine Corps and serve the nation in a century of promise and 
uncertainty" (USNA Strategic Plan, 2004).  At this level, there is still no explicit mention 
of decision making, but there are several elements that are closely related to decision 
making.  One is "character," which is an essential component of decision making.  At the 
Kriegsakademie prior to World War II, the Germans defined character as the ability of an 
officer to make a decision quickly under the conditions of combat and to take aggressive 
action to execute that decision (Allen, 1993).  Also mentioned in the vision statement is 
"competence," of which decision making is an indispensable component in a military 
leader (McBreen, 1998; Nye, 1986; Schmitt, 1988).  Lastly, the term "uncertainty" is 
intrinsic to military decision making and is found throughout the literature (Allen, 1993; 
Athens, 1992; Clausewitz, 1984; Klein, 2003; MCDP 1, 1997; Schmitt, 1988, 1995). 
ii. Graduate Attributes 
The Strategic Plan lists "Strategic Outcomes," which are described 
as the results the Naval Academy wants to produce in the institution and its graduates.  
Among these Strategic Outcomes are listed nine "Graduate Attributes" (these graduate 
attributes are not numbered or necessarily ranked in the Strategic Plan, but have been 
numbered here for ease of reference).  According to these, Naval Academy graduates are: 
1. Prepared to lead in combat 
2. Courageous leaders who take responsibility for their personal and 
professional decisions and actions 
3. Role models of ethical behavior and moral conduct 
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4. Exemplars of academic, technical and tactical competence 
5. Individuals with a passion and commitment to lifelong learning and 
physical fitness 
6. Highly effective communicators 
7. Leaders who recognize and value individual excellence regardless of 
gender or cultural and ethnic background 
8. Able to understand and integrate geopolitical complexities in their 
decision-making across the spectrum of military operations 
9. Patriots who epitomize the rich heritage, honor and traditions of the Navy, 
Marine Corps and our country (USNA Strategic Plan, 2004). 
In several of these attributes, the importance of decision making is 
explicit, in others it is implied.  In regard to the first attribute, the literature has shown 
that to lead in combat, one must be able to make decisions (Athens, 1992; MCDP 1, 
1997; MCDP 1-3, 1997; McBreen, 1998; Nye, 1986; Schmitt, 1988).  Therefore, if the 
Naval Academy wants to prepare its graduates to lead in combat, it can be deduced that 
graduates should be prepared as decision makers. 
The second attribute addresses both personal and professional 
decisions.  The need for leaders to accept responsibility for their decisions, and the 
courage this often requires, are two frequent themes in the literature (MCDP 1, 1997; 
MCDP 6, 1997; Schmitt, 1988; Wedemeyer, 1938).  The fourth attribute lists tactical 
competence, of which effective decision making is an integral part (MCDP 1-3, 1997; 
McBreen, 1998; Nye, 1986).  The eighth attribute recognizes the complexities of the 
decisions Naval Academy graduates will face in their service as commissioned officers.  
Of the nine attributes, four are explicitly or implicitly related to decision making. 
iii. Decision-Making Initiatives 
To achieve its goals, the Naval Academy developed 27 Strategic 
Initiatives and 16 Tactical Initiatives, grouped into 8 Institutional Focus Areas.  Of these 
initiatives, 2 are explicitly related to decision making.  Under the area of Academic 
Excellence, there is a Tactical Initiative entitled, "Assess Impact of USNA Culture on 
Critical Thinking and Decision-Making."  The initiative's purpose is to "identify ways to 
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present midshipmen with opportunities to think critically and make decisions."  The 
initiative description is, "1) Formalize definition of critical thinking and decision-making; 
and 2) Identify opportunities to include embedded critical thinking, decision-making and 
consequence critique in the daily Midshipmen routine."  The executive sponsor for this 
initiative is the Commandant of Midshipmen (USNA Strategic Plan, 2004). 
Under the area of Leadership and Professional Excellence, there is 
a Strategic Initiative entitled, "Decision Making/Mental Agility Practicum."  The 
initiative's purpose is to "improve the decision-making skills of all midshipmen through 
classroom discussion and practical lab exercises.  The initiative description is, "1) Create 
a training practicum with a practical professional focus on decision-making and mental 
agility; and 2) Include a combination of theoretical classroom training, computer 
simulations and an outdoor venue (envisioned at North Severn) that incorporates field 
experience."  The executive sponsor for this initiative is the Commandant of Midshipmen 
(USNA Strategic Plan, 2004). 
Each of these initiatives was introduced by Marine Colonel John 
R. Allen while he was the Commandant of Midshipmen.  As will be shown in the next 
section, Colonel Allen is a staunch proponent of decision-making training for 
midshipmen, believing that decision making is central to midshipmen's professional 
development in preparing them to serve as commissioned officers.  The degree to which 
these initiatives will be realized after Colonel Allen's September, 2003 departure remains 
to be seen. 
b) Interviews with Senior USNA Leaders 
The following senior leaders at the Naval Academy were interviewed for 
this thesis: Marine Colonel John R. Allen, Commandant of Midshipmen until September, 
2003; Navy Captain Charles J. Leidig, Commandant of Midshipmen since September, 
2003; Navy Captain Richard Thayer, Director of Professional Development Division; 
Navy Commander Lee Schonenberg, Chair of the LEL Department, with Marine Colonel 
Arthur J. Athens, Naval Academy Distinguished Professor of Leadership.  From these 
interviews, the author was able to identify the importance senior leaders at the Naval 
Academy place on developing decision-making skills in midshipmen.  
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i. What Should a Naval Academy Graduate be? 
This is one of the most fundamental questions the senior leadership 
at the Naval Academy has to answer.  What skills should a graduate possess?  How much 
time and resources should be spent on academics in the classroom compared to military 
training opportunities?  The Strategic Plan was devised to answer these questions.  The 
senior leaders interviewed for this research amplified the goals and objectives that are 
stated in the Strategic Plan. 
Colonel Allen believes that--first and foremost--a Naval Academy 
graduate should be a decision maker.  When asked about the relationship between 
leadership and decision making, he responded, "You cannot be a leader without being a 
decision maker." Colonel Allen explained that making decisions is the unique role of the 
officer on the battlefield--any battlefield: in the air, on the ground, on or under the sea.  
Therefore, he thinks the Naval Academy should create a graduate who has an absolute 
understanding and recognition that being an officer is about decision making (J.R. Allen, 
personal communication, July 30, 2003). 
For Colonel Allen, every aspect of an officer's development should 
contribute to his or her ability to make sound decisions.  According to the former 
Commandant, the instruction midshipmen at the Naval Academy receive in leadership, 
character, and ethics is unmatched anywhere in the country.  He believes the outcome of 
decision-making training at the Naval Academy should be a graduate--regardless of 
warfare specialty--who is predisposed to decide, at both the moral and intellectual level 
(J.R. Allen, personal communication, July 30, 2003). 
Captain Leidig, the officer who succeeded Colonel Allen as 
Commandant of Midshipmen, believes the test of a junior officer is when he or she is 
faced with a tough decision that involves honor and leadership.  To be a Naval Academy 
graduate, he says, 1) one must have honor, and 2) one must know how to lead.  Captain 
Leidig thinks of decision making as a subset and an important building block of honor 
and leadership; somebody who acts with honor and leadership has to be a decision maker 
to achieve his or her goals (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004).   
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Captain Leidig wants to graduate officers from the Naval Academy 
who will "act with honor instinctively."  This means that when confronted with a decision 
that requires an ethical or moral decision, one makes the right decision because one has 
the instinct to do it (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004).  Colonel 
Allen speaks of this same instinct as being a predisposition, and in the case of decision 
making, is the product of conditioning midshipmen to make decisions, to not only 
provide them with a pool of knowledge and values, but also to develop in them the ability 
to interrogate that pool when confronted with a decision (J.R. Allen, personal 
communication, July 30, 2003). 
Several themes arose from the interviews.  First, leadership and 
decision making are inseparable, and midshipmen must understand their obligation to be 
decision makers as officers.  Second, an officer's (and therefore a midshipman's) decision 
making must be rooted in character.  Third, honor must become instinctive for 
midshipmen so that they will be able to make the right decisions as officers.  Lastly, it is 
important to identify what types of decisions the senior leadership at the Naval Academy 
wants midshipmen to have to make as part of their professional development. 
ii. Does Anything Need to Change? 
Some might say that the Naval Academy produces officers and 
therefore produces decision makers.  They would point out that whether or not decision 
making is formally and explicitly taught, graduates have served this nation and led with 
distinction for more than a century and a half.  They would argue that, however it is that 
Naval Academy midshipmen are learning decision making, it must be good enough. 
The careers of the two Commandants are an interesting study in 
contrasts and similarities relative to leadership and decision making.  Colonel Allen has 
spent his entire professional life purposefully, systematically, and passionately studying 
decision making.  Captain Leidig, on the other hand, said, "I don't know of any place in 
my naval career that somebody tried to talk to me about decision making at a theoretical 
level."  In fact, he suggested that at the academic or theoretical level, he may not have 
any decision-making expertise (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 
2004).  And yet, like Colonel Allen, Captain Leidig is an expert decision maker. 
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Although Captain Leidig may not have what he would describe as 
an academic background in decision making, in his discussion of decision making with 
the author, he raised many of the same elements found in decision-making literature: 
process input (i.e. assess the situation) and recognize patterns (Allen, 1993; Klein, 1989, 
2003; MCDP 1-3, 1997; Schmitt, 1995); there are no perfect solutions in tactics (MCDP 
1, 1997; Schmitt, 1988); military decision makers cannot wait for complete information 
(Klein, 2003; MCDP 1, 1997; Schmitt, 1995); the utility of scenario-based training 
(Brewster, 2002; Klein, 2003; MCDP 1-3, 1997; Schmitt, 1988; Wedemeyer, 1938); the 
importance of feedback (Brewster, 2002; Klein, 1989, 2003; Schmitt, 1995); and examine 
the thought process rather than just the decision made (Allen, 1993; Brewster, 2002; 
Klein, 1989, 2003, MCDP 1-3, 1997). 
How is it that these two Naval Academy graduates--who went on 
to serve in different services for more than two and a half decades, and who had such 
different decision-making educations--could both end up expert decision makers?  In the 
case of Captain Leidig, it was gained through experience (i.e. implicit); in the case of 
Colonel Allen, it was through both experience (implicit) and study (explicit).  The 
question might be asked, then, whether or not anything needs to be done differently. 
As the literature makes clear, military leaders often do not have the 
luxury of gaining the necessary experience over time before they are confronted with 
decisions that have great consequences (MCDP 1-3, 1997; Klein, 2003), and that 
everything possible should be done to accelerate the process (MCDP 1, 1997).  A former 
commander of a nuclear submarine, Captain Leidig--a product of an implicit process--is 
an expert decision maker.  The literature shows, however, that an explicit process of 
developing decision-making expertise would result in better decision makers earlier in 
their commissioned service, rather than wait to gain experiences as they come along 
(Brewster, 2002; Klein, 1997, 2003; MCDP 1-3, 1997; Nye, 1986; Schmitt, 1995).  As a 
post-command submarine officer serving as the Commandant of Midshipmen, Captain 
Leidig is an example of how the implicit process of learning decision making can be a 
success.  The argument for the explicit process, however, is that rather than wait for the 
Captain Leidigs to rise to the top, there are things the Naval Academy can do to produce 
more Captain Leidigs and propel them to decision-making expertise faster. 
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In this light, Colonel Allen believes the Naval Academy needs to 
spend more time crafting the imperative nature, the urgency, of the need to develop 
decision-making skills.  He says that the Naval Academy has to "paint the picture of the 
imperative for decision making so clearly to the midshipmen that they are just nervous at 
any given time as to whether or not they are doing enough to prepare themselves...to 
make decisions" (J.R. Allen, personal communication, July 30, 2003).  That imperative 
has never been stronger than it is today.  During the Cold War, it may have been true that 
junior officers were not expected--or even allowed--to make independent decisions, but 
today's threat and military operations require an unprecedented degree of independent 
decision making and flexibility (Ruggero, 2001). 
Colonel Allen's vision for the Naval Academy, in terms of 
developing decision-making skills in midshipmen, is to have an institutional commitment 
to creating decision makers.  He envisions an environment for decision making, a culture 
of decision making that permeates all aspects of a midshipman's life (i.e. Bancroft Hall, 
academics, and athletics).  Leaders at the Naval Academy must resist the temptation to 
believe that decision making can only occur in the Division of Professional Development.  
His desired outcome is to take all the individual efforts currently underway in leadership, 
character, and ethics that have such positive, albeit non-integrated, effects on midshipmen 
and combine them to explicitly produce capable decision makers (J.R. Allen, personal 
communication, July 30, 2003). 
Captain Leidig agrees that an area in which the Naval Academy 
could do better would be to combine these separate efforts under a single aegis.  In 
pursuit of this, the Naval Academy has formed a Leadership Task Force to do a 
comprehensive assessment of how leadership is taught and experienced at the Naval 
Academy.  Captain Leidig is not certain that the arrows would necessarily converge on 
decision making, but he acknowledges the important role decision making plays in 
developing honor and leadership.  He also agrees with Colonel Athens, the Distinguished 
Leadership Professor, that leadership experiences alone do not necessarily equate to 
better decision makers (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004; A.J. 
Athens, personal communication, July 29, 2003). 
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Captain Leidig sees other shortcomings in the way midshipmen 
presently are developed relative to decision making.  Colonel Athens suggested to the 
author that the Naval Academy curriculum prepares midshipmen for administrative 
leadership decisions, but not tactical decisions (A.J. Athens, personal communication, 
July 29, 2003).  Captain Leidig also has noted the absence of tactics in decision-making 
training at the Naval Academy.  In the ethical decisions he has observed midshipmen 
discuss in Character Development Seminars, he says the situations are very real and very 
ethical, but they are not tactical.  He believes midshipmen should also be exposed to 
"tactical ethical scenarios" like the type a Navy pilot would encounter in rapidly closing 
on a high-value target only to discover there are non-combatants on the objective as well 
(C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004). 
Another problem Captain Leidig sees with decision making at the 
Naval Academy is that too often decisions are made by officers instead of midshipmen.  
He attributes this in part to a lack of trust on the part of the officers.  As a result, 
midshipmen have been trained to seek approval of an officer when making a decision.  
One of the more prominent problems with this is that if a midshipman has a decision 
approved by an officer, then that midshipman does not have to take responsibility for the 
consequences of that decision (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004). 
iii. What Should be Done? 
As previously mentioned, the common debate among senior 
leaders at the Naval Academy is not so much whether or not midshipmen should be 
trained in decision making, but rather how decision making should be taught.  Captain 
Leidig said that if one wants to teach decision making at the Naval Academy, then the 
question one must ask is, "What is it (we) want (midshipmen) to make decisions about?"  
He believes it is important that decision-making training be related to professional skills.  
The Division of Professional Development focuses on core competencies Naval 
Academy graduate should possess.  In Captain Leidig's opinion, the way to generate 
decision-making opportunities is to focus on core competencies and see what decision-
making can be taught or extracted (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 
2004). 
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Colonel Allen believes the challenge at the Naval Academy is to 
depict the universal requirement for making decisions--regardless of service community--
and develop a universal approach to teaching how to make decisions.  He thinks the 
Naval Academy should create intellectual processes that both create the awareness for the 
need for decision making, and the intellectual and moral processes to facilitate decision 
making.  He envisions "creating a culture that calls constantly for decisions, and then 
judges the decisions on--not the rightness or wrongness--but the consequences, and then 
give feedback to the decision maker on how he or she could have done better."  The 
Naval Academy should be shaped in a way that confronts midshipmen with making 
decisions every day, in all aspects of life (J.R. Allen, personal communication, July 30, 
2003). 
Although Captain Leidig recognizes that there is probably some 
decision-making theory that could be taught, he believes--as per his experience as a 
submarine officer--experiential learning is the most effective way to learn decision 
making.  The training done on the Naval Academy's Yard Patrol (YP) boats is an area rife 
with potential for decision-making opportunities, he says.  Presently, the YP training is 
done in a very rote manner.  Midshipmen have to demonstrate a set of skills, but no one 
sits down with them and talks about the decisions that have to be made underway.  The 
instruction does not go far enough to teach the midshipmen decision making (C.J. Leidig, 
personal communication, February 10, 2004). 
One example Captain Leidig cited is the "man overboard" drill 
done on the YPs.  Beyond mastering the procedure, midshipmen could be confronted 
with a number of scenarios that require decision making.  For example, the midshipman 
performing the drill could be told by a controller that the YP's rudder has ceased to work 
properly, or that an engine has failed at a critical time.  This would test a midshipman's 
ability to react to something different.  It would combine tactics, academics, and require 
creativity.  Although there is not enough time or YPs for all 4000 midshipmen to 
experience this first-hand, many could learn by observing one midshipman in action and 
then participate in the critique (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004). 
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Another opportunity for decision-making training lies with the 
completion of the new "full-bridge" ship simulator in Luce Hall.  Much as aircraft 
simulators do for pilots, this simulator is designed to duplicate the conditions on the 
bridge of a Navy ship.  Captain Leidig believes this simulator will give the Naval 
Academy the ability to run midshipmen through countless realistic and challenging 
decision-making scenarios (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004).   
Still another area with great potential for decision-making training 
is the Saturday Morning Training midshipmen conduct, says Colonel Allen.  This weekly 
training is mandatory for fourth-class midshipmen, and is normally conducted by 
upperclass midshipmen.  Too often, Colonel Allen hears officers and midshipmen 
complain about the poor quality of Saturday Morning Training.  He attributes this to 
midshipmen not being given enough guidance on how to conduct training.  Colonel Allen 
would like to see Saturday Morning Training be designated as a decision-making and 
leadership laboratory (J.R. Allen, personal communication, July 30, 2003). 
As the Director of the Division of Professional Development, 
Captain Thayer is constantly seeking decision-making opportunities for midshipmen, 
especially for ways to complement the theory learned in the classroom.  His goal is to 
find ways to get midshipmen into unfamiliar environments and get them to think 
rationally.  He finds it difficult to replicate the conditions of combat decision-making at 
the Naval Academy, and so the staff in Professional Development tries to do as much as 
it can with Summer Training Programs, but even that is very artificial, Captain Thayer 
says.  In addition to training on YPs, Vice Admiral Rodney Rempt, the Superintendent of 
the Naval Academy, has stated very emphatically that he believes sailing can provide 
superb experiential leadership training, full of decision making with consequences.  For 
the Naval Academy truly to be a "leadership laboratory," Captain Thayer believes that 
midshipmen must be allowed to err, and that Summer Training Programs like sailing are 
opportunities to achieve this (R. Thayer, personal communication, March 30, 2004). 
c) Summary of Stated Importance of Decision Making 
The importance the Naval Academy places on decision making is 
articulated both in the Strategic Plan and in the words of its senior leaders.  Of the nine 
Graduate Attributes in the Strategic Plan, four (i.e. nearly half) address decision making.  
51 
The senior leadership wants graduates who understand their obligation as officers to 
make decisions, and to have the moral, intellectual, and ethical foundations to make the 
right decisions.  The senior leaders want to take greater advantage of existing 
opportunities and create an environment in which midshipmen are confronted with 
decisions in all aspects (professional, athletic, academic) and get feedback on their 
decision-making processes.  The desired endstate is expressed by Captain Thayer: "We 
want officers, regardless of (service) community, to be able to make decisions" (R. 
Thayer, personal communication, March 30, 2004). 
2. Perceived Importance of Decision Making 
What is said to be important by the senior leadership in an organization is not 
always what is perceived to be important by those who carry out policy or by those who 
are the object of policy.  To find out to what extent the senior leaders' vision and goals 
related to the development of decision-making skills in Naval Academy midshipmen are 
being realized, the author collected data from company officers and midshipmen.  The 
data from the company officers were garnered via survey and from the midshipmen in 
focus groups conducted by the author. 
a) Graduate Attribute Ranking Exercise 
The Graduate Attributes listed in the Strategic Plan are not necessarily 
listed in order of importance; at least they are not presented as being such.  For this 
research, the author asked both the company officers and the focus-group midshipmen to 
rank the attributes "in the order of importance (they) place upon (each attribute) as being 
necessary for a USNA graduate" (see Appendices D & E).  To facilitate the ranking 
exercise, the author converted the sentences explaining the attributes in the Strategic Plan 
to "bullets," or short, concise phrases.  In this conversion process, the author also 
managed to consolidate the attributes from nine sentences into seven bullets without 
losing the spirit of the original.  This was done to ease the ranking exercise; ranking 
seven attributes seemed cumbersome enough, with nine being rather unwieldy. 
Both the company officers and the midshipmen ranked "Capable Decision 
Maker" second only to "Person of Character" (see Table 1).  When one takes into account 
that character is fundamental to decision making as well as all other aspects of leadership, 
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these responses demonstrate that both company officers and midshipmen share the senior 
leadership's belief that decision making is very important for military leaders. 
Table 1. Relative Importance Rankings of Seven USNA Graduate Attributes 
 
Company Officer Rankings of 
Seven USNA Graduate Attributes
1. Person of Character
2. Capable Decision Maker
3. Effective Communicator
4. Committed to Equal Opportunity
5. Physically Fit
6. Geopolitically Astute
7. High Academic GPA
Midshipmen Rankings of 
Seven USNA Graduate Attributes
1. Person of Character




6. Committed to Equal Opportunity
7. High Academic GPA  
Table 2 shows how "Capable Decision Maker" was ranked (one through 
seven) by company officers and midshipmen.  Of the company officers, 21 of 30 (or 
70%) ranked "Capable Decision Maker" first or second (there was one outlier who ranked 
it sixth).  Of the midshipmen, 29 of 36 (or 80.6%) ranked it first or second.  Interestingly, 
10 midshipmen (27.8%) ranked "Capable Decision Maker" ahead of "Person of 
Character," compared to only 3 company officers (10%).  This can probably be attributed 
to midshipmen's responses being more greatly biased by the demand characteristics of the 
data, as addressed previously in the discussion of limitations of the data.  Nonetheless, 
both the company officers and the midshipmen rank the same three attributes in the same 
order at the top of the list--Person of Character, Capable Decision Maker, and Effective 
Communicator--all of which are closely related constructs, and therefore any possible 
reactivity on the part of the midshipmen does not detract from the significance of the high 
ranking assigned to "Capable Decision Maker." 
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Table 2. Relative Importance Rankings of "Capable Decision Maker" Among Seven 







b) Should Midshipmen be Taught Decision Making? 
In producing commissioned officers, the leadership at the Naval Academy 
teaches the midshipmen as much as possible with the time and resources available.  There 
are countless skills, techniques, and bits of knowledge that would be useful to 
midshipmen.  Within the constraints of time and resources, however, decisions must be 
made about priorities.  What must midshipmen know?  The leadership defines these 
things that midshipmen must know as "core competencies" (C.J. Leidig, personal 
communication, February 10, 2004).   
In light of these competing demands for time and resources, company 
officers and midshipmen were asked the extent to which they agree with the statement, 
"It is important that midshipmen's decision-making skills are developed while at the 
Naval Academy" (see Appendices D & E).  A Likert scale was used for the responses, 
with a scale of "1" (strongly disagree) to "5" (strongly agree).  Figure 2 presents the 
company officers' and midshipmen's responses. 
Ranking of "Capable 
Decision Maker" Among 








1st      3 (10.0)    10 (27.8) 
2nd     18 (60.0)    19 (52.8) 
3rd      8 (26.7)     7 (19.4) 
4th      0   (0)     0   (0) 
5th      0   (0)     0   (0) 
6th      1  (3.3)     0   (0) 
7th      0   (0)     0   (0) 






















































































Figure 2. Agreement Ratings That it is Important to Develop Decision-Making Skills in 
Midshipmen 
 
Figure 2 shows that all 30 company officers (100%) either agree or 
strongly agree with this statement.  Of 36 midshipmen, 34 (or 94.4%) either agree or 
strongly agree (see Figure 2).  Of the midshipmen sampled, one disagreed and another 
strongly disagreed.  In reviewing all of the responses of these two midshipmen--both of 
whom are in the "striper/non-athlete" category--it is possible that the one who strongly 
disagreed may have misunderstood the Likert scale and inverted his responses.  Even if 
this is not the case, the overwhelming majority of midshipmen, regardless of category 
(striper, athlete, neither), agree that it is important to develop decision-making skills in 
midshipmen at the Naval Academy, as do all of the company officers. 
In addition to the Likert-scale response, the company officers were given 
the opportunity to make additional comments concerning the importance of teaching 
decision making to midshipmen.  Samples of these comments can be found in Appendix 
G.  In sum, however, they said that the Fleet expects the Naval Academy to teach 
midshipmen how to make the right decisions; that early development of decision-making 
skills is important; that the Naval Academy provides a controlled environment that 
should be conducive to decision-making development; and that not only should decision-
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making opportunities be emphasized to midshipmen, but midshipmen should not be 
allowed to circumvent such opportunities (see Appendix G). 
C) Do Midshipmen Understand the Importance of Decision Making? 
The responses given in the Graduate Attribute ranking exercise (see 
Tables 1 & 2) and the previous question (see Figure 2) demonstrate the importance 
midshipmen place on decision making.  To get the company officers' perspective on the 
midshipmen, they were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement, 
"Midshipmen understand the importance of developing decision-making skills to prepare 











































Figure 3. Agreement Ratings That Midshipmen Understand the Importance of Decision-
Making Skills to Prepare to be Officers 
There is a sizeable drop-off between the opinions expressed by the 
midshipmen and the company officers on this point.  Whereas 94.4% of midshipmen said 
they believe it is important that they develop decision-making skills while at the Naval 
Academy (see Figure 2), only 50% (15 of 30) of the company officers agree or strongly 
agree that the midshipmen understand the importance of decision making; 30% of the 
company officers (9 of 30) either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement (see 
Figure 3).   
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This could be a case of "they don't know what they don't know."  As 
applied here, this expression would mean that the company officers, who have served in 
the Fleet as officers and have seen what will be required of the midshipmen upon 
commissioning, are less confident the midshipmen "get it" than the midshipmen are 
themselves.  Several comments by the company officers support this interpretation.  The 
company officers said that some midshipmen "get it," but many do not, and likely will 
not until after they are commissioned; that midshipmen do not have a good understanding 
of the consequences that will be associated with the decisions they will make as officers; 
and that training is not presented to midshipmen in terms of decision making.  One 
company officer said the following: 
Midshipmen do not have enough life experience to understand the burden 
of responsibility...It is not until they get into the Fleet and actually see the 
ramifications of their good and bad decisions that they really "learn" and 
"understand" what we are trying to teach them here.  Until then, we are 
just building a foundation of character and judgment that can be later 
applied (see Appendix H). 
This comment is very closely aligned with a comment Captain Leidig 
made in his interview with the author.  He was discussing his focus on honor and 
leadership and was not convinced that this would necessarily produce expert decision 
makers.  What he hopes to achieve at a minimum, however, is to get midshipmen to "act 
with honor instinctively" and "lead from the front with confidence," and at least then the 
Fleet will have a product which it can take to the next level of decision-making expertise 
(C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004). 
d) Midshipmen Performance Evaluations 
In addition to asking the senior leadership, company officers, and 
midshipmen what importance they attach to decision making, another indicator is how 
midshipmen's performance is evaluated.  One would expect that if decision making is 
considered to be an important skill for midshipmen, then they would be evaluated on how 
well they make decisions and would receive feedback on their performance.  Detailed 
guidance on whom to evaluate, what, when, and how to evaluate, and who does the 
evaluating is found in the Commandant's instruction, "Midshipman Aptitude Evaluation 
and Counseling System" (Commandant of Midshipmen, 2003). 
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Midshipmen are supposed to receive feedback on their performance on a 
regular basis in the form of counseling.  This counseling is normally verbal, and can be 
given by upperclass midshipmen in the chain of command or by a commissioned officer 
(the company officer for most midshipmen).  Twice a year, midshipmen receive a written 
evaluation.  Third-Class (3/C) and Fourth-Class (4/C) midshipmen (i.e. sophomores and 
freshmen) receive the same "Evaluation Report" that enlisted sailors--First-Class (1/C) 
Petty Officers and below--receive in the Navy (see Appendix I).  1/C and Second-Class 
(2/C) midshipmen (i.e. seniors and juniors) receive the same "Fitness Report" that chief 
petty officers (CPOs) and officers receive in the Navy (see Appendix J)(Commandant of 
Midshipmen, 2003). 
The Navy Evaluation Report does not list "decision making" as a 
performance trait, nor is the term "decision making" used anywhere in the report.  There 
are several areas in which decision making is inferred, however.  A midshipman could be 
marked "below standards" under "Professional Knowledge," if he or she is "unable to 
apply knowledge to solve routine problems."  To receive a satisfactory mark in "Personal 
Job Accomplishment/Initiative," a midshipman must "willingly accept responsibility" 
(see Appendix I), which has been identified as an important aspect of decision making in 
the literature (MCDP 1, 1997; MCDP 6, 1997; Schmitt, 1988; Wedemeyer, 1938) and is 
cited in the Graduate Attributes of the Naval Academy's Strategic Plan (USNA Strategic 
Plan, 2004). 
The Navy Fitness Report does not list "decision making" as a performance 
trait either.  As in the Evaluation Report, any reference to decision making in the Fitness 
Report is inferred.  For example, to receive the highest rating for "Professional 
Expertise," a midshipman must be "sought after to solve difficult problems" (see 
Appendix J).  Problem solving and decision making are not one and the same, however.  
Therefore, it can be said that midshipmen are not explicitly evaluated on their ability to 
make decisions, in spite of the stated and perceived importance of decision making by all 
involved (i.e. senior leaders, company officers, and midshipmen). 
By contrast, the Marine Corps Fitness Report--used for enlisted Marines, 
sergeant and above, and officers--does explicitly evaluate decision making.  Under 
58 
Section G, "Intellect and Wisdom," there is a trait tilted, "Decision-Making Ability."  It is 
described as: 
Visible and timely problem solution.  Contributing elements are judgment 
and decisiveness.  Decisions reflect the balance between an optimal 
solution and a satisfactory, workable solution that generates tempo.  
Decisions are made within the context of the commander's established 
intent and the goal of mission accomplishment.  Anticipation, mental 
agility, intuition, and success are inherent. 
To receive a satisfactory mark, a Marine must "make sound decisions leading to mission 
accomplishment, actively collect and evaluate information and weigh alternatives to 
achieve timely results, confidently approach problems, and accept responsibility for 
outcomes" (see Appendix K). 
In the case of decision making, the Marine Corps fitness report provides a 
good example of ends and means that contribute to one another.  The Marine Corps's 
preeminent doctrinal publication, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1 (MCDP 1): 
Warfighting (1997), asserts that Marines must be decision makers.  To support its 
warfighting philosophy, the Marine Corps requires timeliness, decisiveness, "good 
enough" solutions, tempo, mission accomplishment, intuition, confidence, and acceptance 
of responsibility (MCDP 1, 1997).  That is the desired endstate.  As a means of achieving 
that endstate, Marines are evaluated on exactly these traits, all of which are encompassed 
under "decision-making ability" on the Marine Corps fitness report (see Appendix K). 
The Navy reports do not accomplish the same thing for the Naval 
Academy.  The Naval Academy has stated the desired endstate, capable decision makers 
(USNA Strategic Plan, 2004), but one of the key means--the Naval Academy's evaluation 
system--does not contribute to this endstate.  Just as decision-making ability is inferred in 
the Navy's evaluation system, so is the development of decision-making skills in 
midshipmen.  It is an implicit process, one left largely to chance.  As Colonel Allen put it: 
It "happens."  It is not an explicit outcome.  We are teaching character 
development, ethics, and leadership, but the outcome is not an explicit 
analysis of decisions, the outcome does not create an inherent, intentional 
requirement to make decisions, with the obligatory after-action 
requirement to provide feedback (J.R. Allen, personal communication, 
July 30, 2003). 
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D. HOW ARE MIDSHIPMEN TAUGHT DECISION MAKING? 
With the importance of decision making having been both articulated and 
understood, it is time to look at where and how decision making is actually taught at the 
Naval Academy.  The challenge is determining what the Naval Academy wants 
midshipmen to know about decision making, and to what extent that instruction should be 
explicit or implicit.  The Naval Academy's Division of Professional Development 
(ProDev) is primarily responsible for decision-making instruction and training, and this 
section examines what it teaches and how.  Additionally, the work of the USNA 
Leadership Task Force will be reviewed to identify how its findings might relate to 
decision making.  Lastly, an example of decision-making training outside of ProDev, the 
Sexual Assault and Victim Intervention (SAVI) Program, will be addressed. 
1. The Challenge 
Naval Academy graduates go on to serve in a wide range of assignments that 
include diverse responsibilities and expectations.  This makes it exceedingly difficult for 
the Naval Academy to determine what its graduates need to know about decision making.  
A brief summary of these post-commissioning opportunities will make this point clear. 
Naval Academy graduates are commissioned either as ensigns in the Navy or 
second lieutenants in the Marine Corps.  All physically qualified graduates are 
commissioned into the unrestricted line of the Navy or Marine Corps (USNA Catalog, 
2003)  In the last ten years, these unrestricted line officers, at whom the curriculum is 
directed, have comprised over 93% of graduating classes (L. Mallory, personal 
communication, January 29, 2004).  The rest go into restricted line and staff corps 
specialties such as intelligence, medicine, and supply (USNA Catalog, 2003). 
Some graduates specialize in surface warfare, with assignments on ships ranging 
from minesweepers to guided missile cruisers. A new surface warfare ensign typically 
leads 12 to 50 enlisted sailors and directs a portion of the ship’s equipment and 
operations.  Other graduates enter the submarine service, with duty in nuclear-powered 
attack and ballistic missile submarines.  A submarine junior officer leads 10 to 20 men 
and has responsibilities in vital areas of engineering, weapons, or communications.  
Graduates who enter naval aviation fly a variety of aircraft from helicopters and shore-
based patrol planes to supersonic, aircraft carrier-based jet fighters; naval flight officers 
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serve as bombardiers, navigators, radar and electronic intercept officers and 
antisubmarine warfare systems specialists.  A small number of graduates enter Special 
Operations (Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Mine Countermeasures, Operational Diving 
and Salvage, and Explosive Ordnance Management) or Special Warfare [Sea, Air, and 
Land (SEAL) units].  Those graduates who enter the Marine Corps may be platoon 
commanders in infantry, armor, and artillery units on the ground or serve in Marine Air 
(USNA Catalog, 2003).  These potential assignments span a wide range of decision-
making responsibilities and latitude and make it plain to see what a challenge it is for the 
Naval Academy to determine what its graduates should know about decision making. 
2. Explicit versus Implicit 
Not only must it be determined what graduates need to know about decision 
making, that is, what should be taught, but also how it should be taught.  This goes back 
to what was discussed previously: is it sufficient for midshipmen to implicitly learn some 
decision making along the way during four years at the Naval Academy, or will that 
result in an officer who is inadequately prepared for the decision-making challenges he or 
she will face as a junior officer?  And if an implicit proficiency gained over the course of 
one’s service was sufficient in the past, will it necessarily continue to be so in the present 
and future? 
Regardless of service community, the Global War on Terror is fundamentally 
different than the Cold War, and junior officers are called upon to make decisions that 
will not only affect the lives of those they lead, but could also have strategic effect on 
policy.  The Tactical Action Officer (TAO) on a Naval vessel with a small craft--
potentially laden with explosives--approaching at a high rate of speed faces the same 
critical, split-second requirement for a decision as does the pilot who identifies non-
combatants on a high-value target or the platoon commander who is taking fire from a 
mosque or a hospital.  Does not the Naval Academy have an obligation to, as Colonel 
Allen put it, not only provide midshipmen with a pool of knowledge, but also--through 
repeated decision-making experiences--give them the ability to interrogate that 
knowledge when confronted with a decision (J.R. Allen, personal communication, July 
30, 2003)?  The following section will demonstrate how little explicit decision-making 
instruction and training take place at the Naval Academy.  
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3. Professional Development Continuum 
The Division of Professional Development’s mission is to prepare midshipmen to 
be professional officers to serve in the Navy or Marine Corps (USNA Division of 
Professional Development, 2004).  In a command brief given June 11, 2003, ProDev 
presented its mantra as “preparing midshipmen to excel in the Fleet” (USNA Division of 
Professional Development, 2003).  It accomplishes this through two complementary 
means.  The first is by providing academic instruction through the Department of 
Leadership, Ethics, and Law (LEL) and the Department of Seamanship and Navigation.  
The second is by giving midshipmen experiential leadership opportunities through the 
Department of Professional Programs (USNA Division of Professional Development, 
2004).  Both areas were examined for decision-making instruction and opportunities. 
a) Academic Instruction 
To find out what midshipmen are taught about decision making in the 
classroom, the author spoke with the officer responsible for all Leadership instruction in 
LEL.  This officer explained the continuum of Leadership instruction midshipmen 
receive during their four years at the Naval Academy.  She also gave the author copies of 
the Leadership textbooks midshipmen use, Leadership course descriptions, and lesson 
plans, all of which were examined in detail.   
In each of their four years, midshipmen have a class in leadership, ethics, 
or law.  Their first year, they have NL112 Leadership and Human Behavior.  Of 29 class 
sessions, half of one session is devoted to decision making.  In the chapter, “How We 
Make Choices--The Way the Mind Thinks,” decision making is presented along with 
problem solving.  They are not presented as one in the same; rather, “although every 
problem-solving process involves a decision (deciding on a solution), not all decisions 
involve a problem” (Deputy & Waesche, 2003, p.43).  This lesson presents a list of five 
steps for thinking critically through a complex decision.  There is no mention at all of the 
different decision-making models (analytical and intuitive), of the types of decisions with 
which military leaders are typically faced, or of the leader’s decision-making obligations. 
In the next three years, midshipmen receive an ethics class (NE203 Moral 
Reasoning for Naval Leaders), another leadership class (NL302 Leadership: Theory and 
Application), and a law class (NL400 Law for the Junior Officer).  None of these classes 
62 
includes any explicit instruction on decision making.  In the course of four years at the 
Naval Academy, midshipmen receive one half of one class period of instruction on 
decision making, which equates to about 25 minutes. 
b) Experiential Learning 
Summer training programs are administered through the Department of 
Professional Programs.  The purpose of these programs is to provide midshipmen with 
leadership (to include decision-making) opportunities and experiences beyond the 
classroom and Bancroft Hall.  The summer training covers a 12-week period.  Each 
midshipman is required to participate in at least six weeks of training, though most 
participate in at least eight.  Midshipmen are assigned to a cruise block that is 3-4 weeks 
long, then may choose from a number of elective blocks that range from 3-5 weeks 
(USNA Division of Professional Development, 2003).   
The summer training opportunities are broken down by class year.  The 
cruise blocks range from YP cruises for third-class (3/C) midshipmen to surface, aviation, 
and submarine cruises for upperclass.  Leadership opportunities in the elective blocks 
include billets as squad leaders for rising high school seniors attending Summer Seminar, 
off-shore sailing, and training cadres for the Naval Academy Primary School and for 
Plebe Summer.  
Each of the professional programs is designed to give midshipmen 
exposure to the Fleet and learn more about the opportunities that exist for them in 
different service communities.  The nature of the training progresses from 
trainee/follower to trainer/leader as the midshipmen move up in class.  The summer 
training program is intended to give midshipmen opportunities that will augment the 
training and education they receive during the academic year at the Naval Academy.  
With regard to decision making, however, there are no stated goals or objectives to be 
achieved.  Much like their professional development at the Naval Academy during the 
academic year, any decision-making development midshipmen receive during summer 
training is implied and at times even incidental.  
4. USNA Leadership Task Force 
Colonel Allen and Captain Leidig both talked about the need to achieve a greater 
synthesis of the different programs and efforts that contribute to midshipmen’s 
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professional development.  Each recognizes the great things that are done everyday at the 
Naval Academy, but also believes that improvements can and must be made.  One 
significant initiative to help in this is the work of the current Leadership Task Force. 
The Leadership Task Force is a comprehensive effort undertaken to explore every 
aspect of a midshipman’s experience at the Naval Academy and then identify as many 
leadership opportunities as possible.  The first step will be to identify and categorize 
these leadership opportunities, and then the task force will attempt to qualify each.  Based 
on metrics to be established, each leadership opportunity identified will be qualified as an 
extensive, moderate, or limited opportunity for midshipmen to lead.  The intent is to 
assist company officers and others involved in midshipmen's professional development to 
better guide midshipmen toward leadership opportunities from which the officer believes 
a particular midshipman can most benefit (J.J. Thomas, personal communication, 
February 19, 2004).  The scope of the task force is leadership, so the results will not be 
limited to decision-making opportunities.  However, if one accepts Colonel Allen's view 
that leadership and decision making are inseparable, then the findings of the task force 
will do much to identify and qualify decision-making opportunities for midshipmen. 
5. SAVI Training 
Decision-making training for midshipmen should not be limited to tactics.  
Captain Leidig considers decision making to be a critical building block for his two focal 
points, honor and leadership (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004).  
Colonel Allen said that leaders' decisions must rest upon their moral foundations.  He 
believes time should be spent at the Naval Academy "to build the habit for decision 
making that is character-based."  Decision-making training at the Naval Academy should 
create the intellectual and moral processes to facilitate this character-based decision 
making (J.R. Allen, personal communication, July 30, 2003).  One way the Naval 
Academy works toward this is through the Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) 
Program. 
The SAVI Program ties together decision making, leadership, honor, character, 
and duty.  The Naval Academy has an officer assigned as the SAVI Program Director.  
This officer gives briefs that carry midshipmen through notional scenarios that result in 
sexual assault.  The goals of these briefs are to impress upon midshipmen that sexual 
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assault is a leadership issue and to give them some tools to help prevent it.  One of the 
main themes of the program is that there are patterns of behavior that can be recognized 
leading up to a sexual assault.  Just as in tactical decision making, one important way to 
make people better decision makers is to increase the number of patterns they can 
recognize (Allen, 1993; Klein, 2003; MCDP 1-3, 1997; Schmitt, 1995).  This will help 
them more quickly and accurately assess a situation and make an effective decision in a 
timely manner. 
Another important way that the SAVI Program develops decision making in 
midshipmen is that it does not simply focus on the decision made.  Instead, in the SAVI 
training midshipmen receive, the entire decision-making process is analyzed (Klein, 
2003).  Questions are asked like, “What cues/indicators were missed?” and, “Why was 
this form of behavior interpreted the way it was?”  The facilitator goes back and walks 
midshipmen through the process step-by-step, pointing out flaws in the decisions made 
along the way.  The SAVI Program tries to give midshipmen the tools they will need to 
help them make the right decisions if faced with these situations.  The decisions 
midshipmen are faced with regarding sexual assault may not be tactical, but they are 
rooted in character, honor, and leadership, all of which are traits upon which the Naval 
Academy places paramount importance (USNA Strategic Plan, 2004; J.R. Allen, personal 
communication, July 30, 2003; C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004). 
E. DECISION-MAKING OPPORTUNITIES FOR MIDSHIPMEN 
The Naval Academy provides a wide range of leadership opportunities for 
midshipmen.  To learn how these leadership opportunities translate to decision-making 
opportunities, company officers and midshipmen were asked a number of questions about 
the types of decisions midshipmen typically make.  They were also asked whether or not 
they believe decision-making opportunities for midshipmen are adequate, and they gave 
recommendations on how to increase midshipmen’s decision-making opportunities.  
1. Wide-Ranging Leadership Opportunities 
By design, opportunities abound at the Naval Academy for midshipmen to study, 
observe, and practice leadership.  Many call it a “leadership laboratory” (R. Thayer, 
personal communication, March 30, 2004).  The very nature of the Brigade of 
Midshipmen and the leadership billets that midshipmen rotate through serve the purpose 
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of giving them the opportunity for practical application of the leadership skills, 
techniques, and theories they learn.  But leadership opportunities extend far beyond 
billets in the brigade. 
Athletics provide leadership opportunities for young men and women at colleges 
and universities across the country, and the Naval Academy is no exception.  The 
difference, however, is that the leadership demonstrated on Naval Academy athletic 
teams is done within the context of the Naval Academy’s mission, to develop 
midshipmen morally, mentally and physically and to imbue them with the highest ideals 
of duty, honor and loyalty (USNA Strategic Plan, 2004).  Another difference is 
participation in some level of athletics (i.e. varsity, club, or intramural) is compulsory for 
all midshipmen, which not only contributes to physical fitness but also creates many 
leadership positions outside the brigade. 
Another area of leadership opportunities for midshipmen is Extracurricular 
Activities (e.g. Debate Team, Silent Drill Team, and others), or ECAs.   Like Club 
Sports, ECAs have a minimal support structure.  They are largely run by club and ECA 
officers, which are midshipmen.  Without the support such as the Naval Academy 
Athletic Association provides for varsity sports, the midshipmen officers of these clubs 
and ECAs are much more involved in matters such as scheduling, travel, budgets, and so 
forth, than their varsity-athlete counterparts. 
Leadership opportunities during the academic year--within the Brigade of 
Midshipmen, athletics, and ECAs--are augmented during the summer by ProDev's 
Professional Programs, commonly known as Summer Training.  All of these activities in 
and out of Bancroft Hall provide midshipmen with an abundance of opportunities to 
practice leadership throughout the year.  But just as the Leadership Task Force is 
attempting to qualify leadership opportunities, this research sought to learn more about 
the types of decisions midshipmen are making in the "leadership laboratory" that is the 
Naval Academy. 
2. What Kind of Decisions Should Midshipmen be Making? 
This the question Captain Leidig asked when discussing teaching decision making 
to midshipmen (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004).  For the 
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purpose of providing company officers and midshipmen a context for their responses, the 
author developed an operational definition of decision making for the survey and focus 
groups.  Company officers and midshipmen described the types of decisions the latter 
typically make.  These were compared with the types of decisions officers typically 
make, and then it was asked whether or not midshipmen are being adequately prepared to 
make such decisions.  The USNA Honor System receives special attention here because it 
stands out among midshipmen's decision-making opportunities. 
a) Operational Definition of Decision Making 
Midshipmen make decisions every day.  Not all decisions are equal, 
however, particularly in regard to whether or not a particular decision contributes to a 
midshipman's professional development.  For the purposes of this research, company 
officers and midshipmen were provided with the following definition of decision making: 
Decision making is the process of identifying essential factors, developing 
options, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each, and selecting 
a solution.  For the purposes of this survey, decision making is confined to 
the performance of one's leadership responsibilities, military or otherwise 
(see Appendices D & E). 
The first half of this definition provides a classic definition of the 
analytical decision making (Klein, 2003; Schmitt, 1995).  This definition of decision 
making was used because it is what is commonly understood when one thinks of decision 
making.  It was not the author's intent to involve the company officers and midshipmen in 
a debate over the pros and cons of analytical and intuitive decision making.  The second 
half of the definition defines the scope of the type of decision making this research 
addresses--"leadership decisions"--as defined in Chapter II. 
b) Types of Decisions Midshipmen Make 
Company officers and midshipmen were asked what type of decisions 
midshipmen get to make.  Selected responses from company officers can be found in 
Appendix L, and from midshipmen in Appendix M.  A summary of their responses 
follows. 
Company officers believe that most decisions midshipmen get to make are 
personal decisions (i.e. decisions that only affect themselves).  Some said that stripers 
were an exception to this because their decisions could affect the unit they command.  
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This is not the case for all stripers, however; decision-making opportunities vary from 
company to company, and for some stripers, any "decision" that will affect the unit is 
really just a recommendation to an officer who has to concur before the decision can be 
executed.  Midshipmen's entire lives are strictly governed by pervasive regulations, and 
so they make personal decisions about whether or not to follow those regulations, say the 
company officers. 
As expected, midshipmen's responses varied somewhat depending on their 
category (i.e. striper, athlete, or neither).  Stripers have to make a lot of decisions about 
priorities; usually these concern competing demands made on their time by their 
leadership billets and by academics.  They agree that decision-making latitude varies 
from company to company, but believe they generally operate within clearly demarcated 
and stringently constraining boundaries.  Their perception is that they are "guided" or 
assisted in making the "right" decisions by officers who have decided in their minds what 
is the right decision.   
One striper who was a staff officer on a regimental staff expressed his 
opinion that not only are the midshipmen severely restricted in the decisions they can 
make,  
(B)ut even the company officers don’t have the ability to make decisions.  
When it comes right down to it, everything has to be blessed by the 
signature of the Commandant, and from there down I see a box has been 
set, and then there’s no leeway.  You can’t go outside that box without 
permission from the Commandant.  Even the battalion officers are kind of 
tied up by the fact that they need to get approval from the Commandant to 
do things (see Appendix M). 
Captain Leidig addressed his concern that so much of the decision-making authority at 
the Naval Academy lay with the officers, and he expressed a desire to push this down to 
midshipmen wherever appropriate and possible (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, 
February 10, 2004).   
It should be noted that the focus groups were conducted less than three 
months after Captain Leidig assumed his duties as Commandant, and during that time 
much of the senior leadership's attention and efforts dealt with recovering from the 
devastating damage Hurricane Isabel inflicted on the Naval Academy.  Therefore it 
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cannot be determined whether the opinion expressed by this midshipman would change 
over time as a result of Captain Leidig's desire to make changes in this area, or if the very 
nature of the structure and mission of the Naval Academy will always result in some 
midshipmen who think they do not have enough decision-making authority. 
Athletes, too, have to make decisions about priorities.  Just as academics 
compete with time for stripers to devote to their leadership billets, so to do academics 
compete with the time midshipmen can devote to their sport.  At different times during 
the course of their time at the Naval Academy, many athletes face the decision whether or 
not to continue with their sport due to so many other demands on their time.  Lastly, 
athletes have to decide the extent to which they want to involve themselves in the brigade 
since they are given a number of excusals that can often result in very limited 
participation in the daily routine of non-varsity athlete midshipmen. 
The third category of midshipmen, those who are neither stripers nor 
varsity athletes, does not think the first-class midshipmen get much chance to lead or 
decide.  They think the "right" answer is predetermined by officers.  They believe that 
company officers micromanage, and that everything is so structured that there is little 
room for creative leadership.  However, one midshipman who had spent a lot of time 
with the Command Seamanship & Navigation Training Squadron (CSNTS) as a boat 
skipper experienced a much different environment: 
I felt like...there were real decisions that affected (others), like we are 
crossing a channel and there's this shipping bearing down on us, strong 
winds, almost gale force, lightning all around, it's dark, you can't see the 
buoys, you are trying not to hit anything...and I had officers on 
board...who would just quietly watch me.  I've got a youngster crew that's 
scared, so I have to calm them down and keep the ship straight.  So I think 
on that cruise there was a lot of decision making, where there were 
actually consequences, where people could get hurt and bad things could 
happen (see Appendix M). 
This midshipman is neither a striper nor a varsity athlete, yet his 
experiences as a CSNTS skipper gave him the opportunity to lead and make important 
decisions that affect others.  This example demonstrates the fact that there are many 
decision-making opportunities for midshipmen at the Naval Academy, and the best ones 
are not always necessarily found in the most obvious places (e.g. leadership billets in the 
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brigade).  It also helps to explain why the Superintendent is so interested in launching a 
"sailing renaissance" at the Naval Academy, because he strongly believes that sailing is 
an excellent means for midshipmen to learn and practice leadership and--as this example 
shows--decision-making (A.J. Athens personal communication, March 15, 2004). 
c) Types of Decisions Officers Make 
In conjunction with learning what kinds of decisions midshipmen typically 
make, the author wanted to compare these with the decisions they can expect to face as 
officers.  Colonel Athens raised the notion of the "gut-wrenching decision" (A.J. Athens, 
personal communication, November 25, 2003), which the author defined as "a decision 
that causes a person great anguish and is very difficult to make because the costs of the 
decision will be very significant for those affected" (see Appendix E).  Junior officers 
frequently have to make such decisions in the performance of their duties, be it a second 
lieutenant sending a squad of Marines to near-certain death against a machinegun bunker 
or an ensign not recommending a petty officer first class for promotion, essentially 
ending that sailor's Navy career. 
As the Commandant of Midshipmen, Colonel Allen often found in 
conducting Honor or Conduct adjudications that midshipmen had never had to make any 
hard decisions (J.R. Allen, personal communication, July 30, 2003).  Captain Leidig's 
experience has been similar.  He has had numerous midshipmen stand in front of him 
after committing an Honor offense and tell him, "I really thought I was an honorable 
person...and I found myself in this really tough situation and I crumbled.  I cracked.  And 
I was embarrassed that I crumbled, and I don't know why I did" (C.J. Leidig, personal 
communication, February 10, 2004).   
To learn more about tough decisions midshipmen have to make, the author 
asked midshipmen how often, if ever, they have had to make "gut-wrenching" decisions 
related to their leadership positions, and which ones they might have faced.  The stripers 
generally agreed that they do not make such decisions in the performance of their duties 
because, as one midshipman company commander put it, "the big stuff just flies right 
over us" (see Appendix N).  In other words, midshipmen believe that any decisions of 
consequence are "taken away" from them.  From the midshipmen's responses, three other 
themes arose. 
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i) Which Comes First, Honor or Loyalty? 
"Don't bilge a shipmate."  Anyone who has had any contact with 
the Naval Academy is familiar with this mantra.  For midshipmen, it runs much deeper 
than a mere slogan--it embodies the principles of teamwork and loyalty that are so 
important in their profession of arms.  In its purest form, "Don't bilge a shipmate" means 
that midshipmen will not try to get ahead or make themselves look good in the eyes of 
their seniors at the expense of another midshipman.  In practical terms, it can cause 
midshipmen great personal anguish and confusion as they simultaneously attempt to 
uphold the Naval Academy's Honor Concept, which states in part, "Midshipmen are 
persons of integrity: They stand for that which is right.  They tell the truth and ensure that 
the full truth is known. They do not lie" (USNA Character Development, 2004). 
As midshipmen wrestle with the internal conflict between honor 
and loyalty, they find themselves faced with difficult, sometimes what they consider to be 
gut-wrenching, decisions.  As one midshipman put it,  
If you witness an Honor offense that is done by a friend of yours...what do 
you do?  I mean, obviously, there is the "letter of the law"--what you 
should do--versus not bilging a shipmate, which is pounded into your head 
from day one (see Appendix N). 
Other midshipmen mentioned how they struggle with "telling the whole truth," for 
example implicating a classmate after one has been caught in an offense.  While these 
decisions seldom occur under positive circumstances, they are difficult decisions 
nonetheless, and in a sense contribute to a midshipman's preparation for the tough 
decisions he or she will face as an officer. 
ii) Accountability and Punishment 
Holding peers accountable for their transgressions is another area 
in which midshipmen can experience internal anguish over decisions that must be made.  
Some company officers allow their midshipman company commanders to assign 
punishments for minor offenses.  One such company commander said,  
As company commander...I've gotten to handle a lot of the minor offenses, 
and have (had) to pay a high price with (my) peers...that is the closest I've 
ever come to anything I would even remotely consider to be gut-
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wrenching, to look someone in the eye and have to decide what that 
punishment is (see Appendix N). 
In addition to stripers, other midshipmen have had to make 
difficult decisions while standing duty.  Midshipmen on watch have to deal with fellow 
midshipmen who return to Bancroft Hall drunk and unfit for duty (and sometimes 
underage), or after curfew, and the midshipman on watch has to decide whether or not to 
"do the right thing" and hold a shipmate accountable, knowing the if they do, the offender 
will be punished for his or her transgression. 
iii) The Example are Midshipmen Shown 
The Naval Academy wants midshipmen to be able to look to the 
officers for the example of what to do and how to act in every way.  In the case of 
making difficult decisions, midshipmen are not encouraged by what they see in many of 
the officers around them.  One midshipman battalion commander said,  
I've stood watch with officers who will not make a decision on their own, 
but will execute the "letter of the law" for every specific decision, if you 
can call it a decision...They are not making a decision, they are an 
automaton, simply looking up regulations.  There's no such thing as the 
"spirit of the law."  I've had them say..."I don't want to do this, but that's 
the regulation--I have to," and to me, that's just, number one, it's the most 
disgusting form of leadership I've ever seen, and number two, that's what 
happens when you are not taught what responsibility is and what decision 
making is" (see Appendix N). 
This midshipman and others mentioned what they perceive to be a 
lack of a "gray area," where everything is either black or white.  The result, as they see it, 
is that officers and midshipmen alike are not trusted to make decisions, but rather are 
expected to follow the regulations exactly as written.  This apparent attempt to reduce to 
decisions to a series of procedures is not unique to the Naval Academy.  Many 
organizations take refuge in procedures.  Supervisors play it safe by reducing tasks to 
procedures.  This makes it easier for new workers to carry out their responsibilities.  It 
also supports accountability by letting managers verify if the procedures are followed 
(Klein, 2003).  Unfortunately, it also inhibits judgment and decision making, and as seen 
by the midshipmen's responses, erodes their confidence in their senior leadership. 
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d) Are Midshipmen Making the Right Kind of Decisions? 
The Naval Academy's senior leadership, company officers, and 
midshipmen agree on the type of decisions officers must be able to make.  There is much 
less agreement, however, on whether or not the Naval Academy is adequately preparing 
midshipmen to make these types of decisions.  This is caused in part by the divergent 
expectations the different services and communities have concerning a junior officer's 
responsibilities and his or her ability to make decisions. 
i. Time Pressure and Uncertainty 
Officers not only frequently have to make gut-wrenching 
decisions, but--particularly in combat or real-world operations--must make decisions 
quickly and with limited information (Allen, 1993; Athens, 1992; Clausewitz, 1984; 
Klein, 2003; MCDP 1, 1997; Schmitt, 1988).  Effective training for tactical decision 
making includes time pressure, uncertainty, fog, and friction (A.J. Athens, personal 
communication, July 29, 2003).  And in light of these challenging conditions, 
commanders are expected to "make perfect decisions with imperfect information" (C.J. 
Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004). 
Company officers and midshipmen were asked to what extent they 
agreed with the statement, "An officer must be able to make decisions under time 
pressure and uncertainty" (see Appendices D & E).  Figure 4 shows nearly unanimous 
agreement among both company officers and midshipmen.  Of the company officers, 27 
of 30 (90%) strongly agreed and 2 more agreed, meaning 96.7% either agreed or strongly 
agreed.  Of the midshipmen asked, 34 of 36 (94.4%) strongly agreed and 1 other agreed, 
for a total of 97.7% who either agreed or strongly agreed (see Figure 4).  Selected 
























































































Figure 4. Agreement Ratings That Officers Must be Able to Make Decisions Under Time 
Pressure and Uncertainty 
 
ii. Are Midshipmen Prepared? 
Although all involved can agree on the types of decisions 
midshipmen will have to make once they are commissioned as officers, there is less 
agreement on whether or not the Naval Academy is adequately preparing midshipmen to 
be able to make such decisions.  When asked if they agreed that "the types of decisions 
midshipmen make prepare them for the types of decisions they will make as officers," 
only 12 of 30 company officers (40%) agreed or strongly agreed while 14 of 30 (46.7%) 












































Figure 5. Agreement Ratings That The Types of Decisions Midshipmen Make Prepare 
Them for The Types of Decisions They Will Make as Officers 
 
Of the company officers who were satisfied with the decision-
making preparation midshipmen receive, several noted that any decisions midshipmen 
make--trivial, personal, gut-wrenching, or otherwise--will help them as officers.  Many 
others, however, expressed concern that midshipmen do not make the connection 
between the ability to get the little things right now and being able to get the big things 
right later.  More than one company officer said they battle the belief some midshipmen 
have that they can go through their time at the Naval Academy as they please, and then 
magically be able to "flip the switch" and be able to lead once they get commissioned 
(see Appendix P). 
A number of company officers expressed the opinion that the 
Naval Academy "spoon feeds" midshipmen, and does not allow them to make any 
decisions of consequence.  One company officer said,  
We don’t even allow them to make decisions about paying for a haircut or 
taking out the trash, much less anything that is truly important.  I think 
graduation is a real eye opener for the kind of...decisions they will have to 
make (see Appendix P). 
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Just as midshipmen expressed their perception that all the important decisions are taken 
away from them (see Appendix N), several company officers echoed the same opinion.  
As one company officer put it, "Many decisions that require significant thought are often 
made FOR midshipmen instead of BY midshipmen" (see Appendix O). 
Another trend that appeared in the company officers' responses is 
that a lack of tolerance for mistakes eliminates potential quality decision-making 
opportunities for midshipmen.  Instead of midshipmen being allowed to make mistakes 
and learn from them, leaders at the Naval Academy "are so concerned with getting 
everything right the first time that company officers just tend to pass on the word about 
what should be done" (see Appendix P).  Or put another way, "We don’t give them 
enough leeway to screw-up and learn from their mistakes.  USNA is a zero tolerance 
command is every aspect of their lives" (see Appendix P).  Additional company officer 
comments can be found in Appendix P. 
iii. Expectations of a Junior Officer 
The split among the company officers over how well midshipmen 
are being prepared for their decision-making responsibilities can be explained in part by 
differences in what is expected of junior officers (and in this case, Naval Academy 
graduates).  At one level, this difference exists between services.  One indicator is the 
way the Navy and Marine Corps evaluate performance.  As previously addressed, the 
Marine Corps explicitly evaluates decision making and the Navy does not (see 
Appendices I, J, & K).  Another indicator is what can--and cannot--be found in each 
service's professional journal. 
In the Marine Corps Gazette, much like the U.S. Army's Military 
Review, one can find numerous articles that discuss the importance of decision-making 
and ways to train decision makers.  There is no such discussion of decision making in the 
Naval Institute's Proceedings.  Instead, one finds articles that discuss concepts like "Total 
Information Dominance" and "Network-Centric Warfare," where the focus is on 
technology instead on the human decision maker (Zimm, 1999).  This is despite the fact 
that investigations into the 1988 mistaken-identity shootdown of an Iranian airbus by the 
USS Vincennes referred to human errors, mistakes, confusion, and distortions of 
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information made under the stress of combat (Gruner, 1990).  Human factors like fear, 
tension, psychological fatigue, and the fog of war existed on the bridge of the Vincennes 
that day, and yet they receive scant attention by the Navy in training decision makers.  
The nature of this difference between the topics of discussion in the Gazette and 
Proceedings is largely due to the battlefield environments of decision makers in the 
Marine Corps--where a leader has much more autonomy--and the Navy, where decision 
making tends to be much more centralized.  This distinction was acknowledged by both 
Commandants of Midshipmen interviewed and by a former editor of Proceedings (J.R. 
Allen, personal communication, July 30, 2003; C.J. Leidig, personal communication, 
February 10, 2004; J.A. Barber, personal communication, January 22, 2004). 
At another level, this difference in decision-making autonomy and 
expectations exists within the Navy itself.  An ensign on the bridge of a ship or a 
weapons officer on a nuclear submarine operate in very different decision-making 
environments than a Navy pilot or a SEAL platoon commander.  All this goes back to the 
challenge the Naval Academy faces in trying to determine what its graduates need to 
know in terms of decision making (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 
2004; A.J. Athens, personal communication, July 29, 2003).  The imperative of the need 
to produce decisions makers, however, has been shown time and again in places like the 
port of Aden (October, 2000 terrorist attack on the USS Cole), the mountains of 
Afghanistan, and the urban streets of Iraq. 
e) The USNA Honor System 
A number of midshipmen cited the Naval Academy's Honor System as the 
only genuine example of midshipmen making difficult decisions of potentially great 
consequence (see Appendix N).  To gather more information about the Honor System, 
the author interviewed the Ethics Advisor to the Commandant of Midshipmen and the 
Honor Chair, who is the midshipman responsible for administering the Honor System.  
Some background of the Honor System is provided, as well as who participates in it and 
in what capacity, and how the process works. 
i. Background and Purpose 
The Honor Concept charges midshipmen to maintain the highest 
standards of personal integrity.  The emphasis is placed on "doing what is right" rather 
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than simply not breaking the rules.  An Honor Treatise, developed by a midshipman 
working group in 1994, is premised upon a "thou shalt" rather than a "thou shalt not" 
principle (USNA Character Development, 2004). 
The Honor System is an administrative process that has no 
equivalent in the Fleet.  The Commandant's Ethics Advisor calls the Honor System "the 
most important aspect of the Naval Academy."  The midshipmen who administer it are 
given a great deal of independence, and this is by design.  The intent of the instruction 
(USNA Instruction 1610.3F, 2001) is to empower midshipmen.  According to the 
Commandant's Ethics Advisor, stripers might make decisions, but not the type of 
decisions midshipmen make in the Honor System; here, midshipmen "face dilemmas and 
grapple with moral decisions" (J. Modisette, personal communication, February 20, 
2004). 
ii. Midshipmen Own the Honor Concept 
The Honor System is completely administered by midshipmen.  
The Brigade Honor Staff is headed by a first-class midshipman who is the Brigade Honor 
Chair.  The Commandant's Ethics Advisor calls this midshipman "the most powerful, 
most independent midshipman decision maker" at the Naval Academy, because his 
decisions are allowed to stand (J. Modisette, personal communication, February 20, 
2004).  The Brigade Honor Chair is the single person who decides whether an Honor 
allegation--be it made by a midshipman or an officer--will be referred for the appropriate 
level of counseling or proceed to an Honor Board where a guilty finding could result in a 
midshipman's separation from the Naval Academy.  The Brigade Honor Chair told the 
author that his billet is not one in which one "makes many friends."  In the daily 
performance of his duties, however, he strives "to be morally consistent and do what is 
best for the brigade" (Brigade Honor Chair, personal communication, April 16, 2004). 
On the occasions a Brigade Honor Board is convened, the board is 
comprised entirely of midshipmen.  This board of midshipmen and no one else will 
decide whether or not a midshipman is guilty of the alleged Honor offense, no matter 
how senior the accuser or witnesses may be.  The only other body at the Naval Academy 
that has similar authority are Academic Boards, but those are administered by the most 
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senior members of the Naval Academy leadership, to include the Superintendent, 
Commandant, and Academic Dean. 
An Honor Board consists of 9 midshipmen, none of whom is junior 
to the accused.  A computer program generates a random sample of 20 midshipmen to be 
screened to sit on each board.  To be seated on the board, midshipmen must respond in 
the affirmative to 3 questions: Can they cast an unbiased vote in the case of the accused?  
Can they vote in light of the punishment the accused may receive (i.e. separation)?  And, 
do they have faith in the Honor System?   
iii. The Process 
In the course of this research, the author had the opportunity to 
observe an Honor Board.  As this Honor Board convened, the Honor Chair directed the 
board members that their task was to conduct a professional, non-adversarial, unbiased 
board.  He reminded them to separate their emotions from their decisions.  Throughout 
the board--which lasted more than seven hours--the Honor Chair could challenge 
questions, and he continually had to make decisions about what to allow and not allow to 
be introduced.  Each of these decisions had potentially profound impact on the outcome 
of the board, and all eyes in the room repeatedly found their way to the Honor Chair as he 
had to make one difficult decision after another, with all present intensely aware of the 
magnitude of each decision that weighed on the Honor Chair and him alone.  The Honor 
Chair's performance was one that demanded strength of character and moral endurance.  
Without question, this is one midshipman whose experiences at the Naval Academy will 
have uniquely prepared him for the decision-making responsibilities he will face as a 
commissioned officer. 
The Honor Chair is not the only one faced with difficult decisions 
in the Honor System, however.  At the end of the proceedings, the nine members of the 
board cast a secret, written vote.  A supermajority (i.e. at least six votes) is necessary for 
a finding of "guilty."  In casting their votes, each of these nine midshipmen is acutely 
aware of the potential consequences of a guilty finding, and yet each is equally aware of 
their obligation to uphold the Honor Concept.  If the midshipmen on an Honor Board find 
the accused not guilty, no officer at the Naval Academy can overturn their decision.  If 
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found guilty, then the accused reports to the Commandant of Midshipmen for 
adjudication, where--in the process of assigning punishment--the Commandant very 
much focuses on the flaws in the decision-making process of the accused that resulted in 
an Honor offense (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004). 
3. Are These Opportunities Adequate? 
Haven taken an in-depth look at the types of decisions midshipmen typically get 
to make at the Naval Academy, the next question to be answered is whether or not this 
will produce the desired result: capable decision makers.  Company officers and 
midshipmen were asked whether or not they believe midshipmen have adequate 
opportunities to make decisions.  As for results, the midshipmen were asked if they 
believe their decision-making skills have improved while at the Naval Academy, and 
then--along with the company officers--they were asked if they think midshipmen leave 
the Naval Academy adequately prepared to be effective decision-makers as officers. 
a) Do Midshipmen Have Adequate Opportunities for Decision Making? 
Company officers and midshipmen were both asked this question about 
decision-making opportunities.  The company officers were basically split, whereas the 
midshipmen were of one voice--regardless of category--and it was a strong voice at that.  
Selected responses from company officers can be found in Appendix Q, and from 
midshipmen in Appendix R.  On a second question--whether or not the Naval Academy 
devotes adequate time and resources to decision-making development, the company 
officers and midshipmen answered in relatively the same manner. 
i. Are the Opportunities There? 
The issue for the company officers was whether micromanagement 
was a legitimate inhibitor for midshipmen's decision-making opportunities or merely a 
smoke-screen behind which midshipmen readily hid so they would not have to put in the 
effort necessary to seize decision-making opportunities.  One company officer said that 
"Mid Regs (are) too huge to possibly know and enforce. Instead of leadership, there is a 
cookbook approach to how the brigade stripers run things...The striper duties are mapped 
out to be excessively rigid."  But another countered with, "Much of their life is structured, 
however, midshipmen have incredibly wide latitude in making decisions.  They usually 
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forego the opportunity to do so, however, out of laziness or their favorite: cynicism" (see 
Appendix Q).   
Nearly all the company officers spoke to either micromanagement 
or the appropriate degree of presence of officers.  One, however, pointed his finger in a 
different direction altogether.  He said,  
(The Naval Academy's) curriculum limits (decision-making) 
opportunities.  At West Point, they bring all 4,000 cadets back from 
Christmas leave a week early and do what they call a military 
intercessional.  They focus solely on solving combat scenarios (using 
computer simulations and field exercises)....We could do this, too. We 
could put YPs in the water and use the new facilities in Luce (Hall) to 
simulate "fleet battle problems" (see Appendix Q). 
With the exception of one outlier who said he believes the 
decision-making opportunities are there to be taken, the midshipmen were all in 
agreement.  They believe that they hear one thing from the officers--that they want 
midshipmen to make decisions and accept responsibility for those decisions--but see 
something entirely different.  What they see is an environment in which every aspect of 
their lives is burdened with regulations and no one--not midshipmen, officers, or faculty--
is willing to "step outside the box" no matter how much sense it would appear to make to 
do so.  One midshipman was so frustrated by their inability to demonstrate initiative and 
common sense that he said, "You can put chimpanzees through the Naval Academy...and 
as long as you don't deviate too far from the standard, you really don't need to make any 
decisions, you just conform with what we've been presented" (see Appendix R). 
In this environment, several stripers expressed a willingness to 
make decisions that exceed their authority because they believed it was the right decision 
to make.  All of these instances involved granting a subordinate permission to take care 
of some personal business that otherwise would have had to wait until a time that, in their 
minds, would have caused undue inconvenience for their subordinates.  These 
midshipmen acknowledged that they knew at the time of their decision that they were 
exceeding their established authority and were willing to accept the risk of "getting 
burned" in the name of "taking care of their people" (see Appendix R). 
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The issue of trust was raised again here.  Midshipmen do not feel 
trusted by the officers to make decisions.  Further, they believe the Naval Academy is a 
place where the leadership is afraid to allow mistakes.  They believe company officers 
are too quick to step in and "shape" a midshipman's decision, preventing that midshipman 
from possibly making a mistake and learning from it.  This is frustrating to many of the 
midshipmen because they believe one of the important purposes their time at the Naval 
Academy is supposed to serve is to provide them with an environment where they can 
try, fail, and learn without lives or other high stakes being on the line (see Appendix R). 
In some ways, however, several midshipmen believe that all these 
constraints are actually helping them to form realistic expectations about what they will 
experience in the Fleet.  One midshipman said, 
I think we have ample opportunity to make... decisions every day, within 
(a) created structure.  And I think that also reflects the Fleet, because as 
we move out in the Fleet as junior officers, we are going to be making 
decisions within a confining box that has been set up by our superiors.  
And so in that sense, I think that this place really does prepare (us) to 
make decisions (see Appendix R). 
Other midshipmen talked about the limited decision-making opportunities for junior 
officers they witnessed while on summer training cruises. 
ii. Does the Naval Academy Devote Enough Time and Resources 
to Decision Making? 
Figure 6 represents the extent to which company officers and 
midshipmen agree that the Naval Academy devotes enough time and resources to 
decision making.  Although 14 of 36 midshipmen (41.7%) disagreed, nearly 20% (7 of 
36, or 19.5%) agreed or strongly agreed.  This latter number was somewhat of a surprise, 
based on the overwhelmingly negative responses from the midshipmen on the previous 






















































































Figure 6. Agreement Ratings That Sufficient Time and Resources are Devoted to 
Developing Decision-Making Skills in Midshipmen at the Naval Academy 
 
Just as they were split on the previous question, company officers 
could not form a consensus on this statement either.  Nearly half (14 of 30, or 46.7%) 
disagreed, but 9 of 30 (30%) agreed.  Selected comments by the company officers on this 
statement can be found in Appendix S.  Among these, some observed that training and 
education at the Naval Academy usually stops short of discussing decision making, just 
as Captain Leidig cited in his example of the rote "man overboard" drills conducted by 
midshipmen on the YPs (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, February 10, 2004).  
Another company officer noted the decision-making analysis that went on in SAVI 
training, but pointed out that sexual assault was but one of many areas in which 
midshipmen need decision-making training (see Appendix S). 
With risk comes opportunity.  Willingness to accept risk is an 
element of the moral courage necessary for command.  Military leaders must have the 
moral courage to make bold decisions and accept the necessary degree of risk (Schmitt, 
1988).  This willingness to accept risk to create decision-making opportunities for 
midshipmen largely seems to have been absent at the Naval Academy, as expressed by 
one company officer: 
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Every day is filled with opportunities for midshipmen to actively make 
decisions...however, it must be used appropriately.  As they are still 
developing, they will make novice mistakes.  We must accept the risk 
associated with these mistakes and incorporate them into the decision-
making process.  If they are not given the opportunity to try, we are not 
developing their decision-making abilities.  Instead, we are merely 
exercising their ability to follow orders within strict guidelines (see 
Appendix S). 
b) Do Midshipmen’s Decision-Making Skills Improve While at the 
Naval Academy? 
The focus of the questions and discussion up to this point has been on 
whether or not the Naval Academy does enough to develop midshipmen as decision 
makers, and the data have been largely negative.  In one sense, this is to be expected.  
After all, what is "good enough" when preparing combat leaders?  This can actually be an 
encouraging sign that company officers and midshipmen are not satisfied that enough is 
being done to prepare midshipmen to make decisions that may carry great consequences 
with them. 
To get a different perspective, midshipmen were asked the extent to which 
they agree that their decision-making skills have improved while they have been at the 
Naval Academy.  Their responses are shown in Figure 7.  At first glance, there would 
appear to be some dissonance between their responses to this statement compared to 
earlier responses: 26 of 36 midshipmen (72.3%) agree or strongly agree that their 
decision-making skills have improved, and only 3 of 36 (8.4%) disagree or strongly 














































Figure 7. Agreement Ratings That Midshipmen's Decision-Making Skills Have Improved 
While at the Naval Academy 
 
Why is there such a shift in the data?  The answer may be that although 
midshipmen are not where they want to be in regard to decision-making skills, they have 
improved nonetheless from when they first arrived at the Naval Academy.  Most 
midshipmen are not saying the Naval Academy has made them worse decision makers 
(although a couple did, along with a couple of company officers), but rather that the 
opportunity to become even better decision makers is far from being fully realized.  
Colonel Allen said the same thing.  He thinks the Naval Academy is doing far better in 
many areas than it was when he was graduated 28 years ago, but he is equally convinced 
that--with the proper focus and application--the Naval Academy can bring its 
midshipmen to even greater levels of excellence (J.R. Allen, personal communication, 
July 30, 2003). 
One last comment on these data.  The midshipmen completed these Likert-
scale questions at the beginning of the focus groups, before the discussion questions.  It 
was during the ensuing discussion that the midshipmen really started to develop and 
express their thoughts on decision making, often times passionately.  It might have been 
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interesting to see how midshipmen might have answered the Likert-scale questions if 
they were done after the discussion rather than before, or if they had been given the 
opportunity to go back over their answers at the end and make changes if they so wished. 
c) Does the Naval Academy Adequately Prepare Midshipmen to be 
Decision Makers? 
Back to the question of adequacy, or "what is good enough?"  In light of 
the fact that midshipmen believe their decision-making skills have improved while at the 
Naval Academy, do company officers and midshipmen believe the Naval Academy has 
adequately prepared midshipmen to be effective decision makers as officer?  As 
represented in Figure 8, midshipmen agree that it has more than the company officers do.  
Only 4 of 36 midshipmen (11.1%) disagree, whereas 14 of 30 company officers (46.6%) 
either disagree or strongly disagree.  It is worthy of note that nearly half of the 
midshipmen (17 of 36, or 47.2%) neither agree nor disagree.  This would make sense 
since they have not experienced what decision-making demands will be made of them, 
and therefore they are not sure whether or not they are adequately prepared to face what 
challenges lie ahead.  It does not bode well, however, that of the ones who have 
experienced this--the company officers--less than 1 in 3 (9 of 30, or 30%) agree that the 





















































































Figure 8. Agreement Ratings That the Naval Academy Adequately Prepares Midshipmen 
to be Effective Decision Makers as Officers 
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4. Recommendations to Increase Decision-Making Opportunities 
The company officers and midshipmen alike were not at a loss to provide 
recommendations on ways to increase decision-making opportunities for midshipmen.  
This is a positive sign because the Navy and Marine Corps need leaders who are able to 
take the crucially important step beyond identifying deficiencies, which is to identify 
proposed solutions and improvements.  The other good news is that several of these 
recommendations are already under consideration by various working groups and 
committees.  Some recommendations would require new facilities (e.g. a Leadership 
Reaction Course) or a significant modification to the current curriculum that may be 
unachievable in the near term (e.g. a military intercessional or additional military training 
during the academic year).  Others would require patience and a willingness to accept 
risk (e.g. reducing Mid Regs or granting the midshipmen more decision-making 
autonomy).  Selected responses from the company officers can be found in Appendix U, 
and from midshipmen in Appendix V.  A summary of their recommendations follows, in 
list format. 
a) Company Officer Recommendations 
• A graduated scale of Conduct offenses 
• Make the institution communicate through the midshipmen-in-
charge instead of through company officers and senior enlisted 
leaders 
• Be willing to accept mistakes 
• Have a consistent policy for dealing with extremely poor decision 
making 
• Have company officers step back and give midshipmen more room 
to make decisions 
• Have selected 2/C midshipmen "shadow" 1/C midshipmen billet 
holders to increase observation of decision making 
• Formalize decision-making training in ProDev 
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• Incorporate community-specific decision-making training into 
Capstone courses 
• Be less concerned with brigade-wide consistency and give 
companies more latitude 
b) Midshipmen Recommendations 
• Have company officers solicit midshipman billet holders' 
opinions/decisions before announcing his or her own 
• Reduce the number of rules and regulations 
• Push decision-making authority down to midshipmen wherever 
possible 
• Encourage officers to trust midshipmen to make decisions 
• Allow midshipmen to make mistakes and then help them learn 
from those mistakes 
• Enable midshipmen to recover from mistakes 
• Do not reward company officers for micromanaging midshipmen 
• Give midshipmen goals and then back off and allow them to try to 
achieve those goals 
• Increase emphasis on evaluating billet holders on the performance 
of their units 
• Determine decisions in which the institution can afford to allow 
midshipman to err 
• Do not be afraid to allow midshipmen to try and fail 
Of course none of these recommendations will succeed or last long 
without an institutional commitment to the importance of allowing midshipmen to make 
decisions.  Some of these recommendations may look simple on paper, but can be much 
more difficult to implement, particularly when dealing with issues like trust, accepting 
risk, and tolerating failure.  Other recommendations--like reducing the emphasis for 
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brigade-wide uniformity--are double-edged swords that would invariably result in 
legitimate concerns and dissatisfaction in other important areas.  While no one of these 
recommendations will provide the final solution, however, they can provoke debate and 
lend to increased attention being paid to fostering opportunities for midshipmen to make 
decisions. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Naval Academy's senior leadership has stated the importance of developing 
decision-makings skills in midshipmen to prepare them to be officers, and the company 
officers and midshipmen understand this importance.  There are a number of ways in 
which midshipmen presently learn and practice decision making, but they are generally 
considered to be inadequate and not explicit enough.  Senior leaders, company officers, 
and midshipmen alike have ideas about ways to increase and improve decision-making 
opportunities for midshipmen, and many of these ideas have been presented here.  The 
next step would be to systematically evaluate which of these can and should be 
implemented, and do so within the context of an institution that is willing to accept risk 
and tolerate mistakes in the name of preparing midshipmen for the decision-making 
challenges they will face as officers. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
(Some military men) accept that the...process of making sound judgments 
is at the heart of military competency, and they study and practice the 
thinking and decision-making process in a conscientious manner (Nye, 
1986, p. 8). 
A. OVERVIEW 
The above quote, from Roger Nye's military leadership classic, The Challenge of 
Command, speaks to the issue of whether the development of decision-making expertise 
should be an explicit process or one that "just happens" (i.e. an implicit process).  In this 
chapter, this and other issues pertaining to military decision making in the literature are 
summarized.  Findings of this research are condensed and presented, followed by 
recommendations to the leadership of the Naval Academy pertaining to the findings.  
Lastly, recommendations for further research are proposed. 
B. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
To tie the findings of this thesis back to the initial objectives, the research 
questions are revisited here.  Next follows a very concise synopsis of the literature.  Then, 
to support the subsequent recommendations, the findings of the research are reported. 
1. Research Questions 
The methodology of the research was designed to answer the primary research 
question of this study: What does the U.S. Naval Academy do to develop decision-
making skills in its midshipmen?  A number of secondary questions were addressed as 
well: (1) Why are decision-making skills important for military leaders? (2) What are the 
different decision-making models? (3) How can decision-making skills be taught or 
developed? (4) Has the Naval Academy stated anywhere that it places substantial 
emphasis on the importance of developing decision-making skills in its midshipmen, and 
if so, where? (5) To what extent do those responsible for the midshipmen's professional 
development perceive this importance? (6) What opportunities do midshipmen have to 
develop decision-making skills? (7) To what extent do midshipmen believe the Naval 
Academy is developing them as decision makers, and how is this done? 
Of the secondary research questions, the first three were answered by the 
literature and presented in Chapter II.  The fourth was answered by examining the Naval 
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Academy's Strategic Plan and interviewing senior leaders at the Naval Academy.  The 
fifth question was answered by a survey completed by the company officers.  This 
company officer survey plus focus groups conducted with midshipmen answered the 
sixth question, and these same focus groups answered the last secondary research 
question. 
2. Decision-Making Literature 
In combat, the responsibility for making decisions is the domain of the 
commander and no one else (Schmitt, 1988).  The decisions officers must make are often 
difficult and are of great consequence; military decision makers must deal with the 
knowledge that their decisions may send those they lead to their deaths (Allen, 1993).  As 
difficult as these decisions may be, it is the officer's obligation to make them nonetheless, 
and for this he or she will need strength of character and moral courage (MCDP 1-3, 
1997; Schmitt, 1988). 
The Cold War is over.  Today's world requires leaders at all levels who can act 
decisively without doubt or hesitation.  The lower the level of command, the faster the 
decision-making cycle must be (MCDP 6, 1997).  Today, rapid decision making is a 
force protection issue (e.g. October, 2000 terrorist attack on USS Cole).  It is also a 
Maneuver Warfare issue; having capable decision makers at every level enables 
decentralized execution, which generates tempo and enables a force to overwhelm an 
enemy that relies on centralized decision making (MCDP 1, 1997). 
Decision making is a skill that can be taught (Allen, 1993; Klein, 2003).  With the 
operational environment in which newly-commissioned officers find themselves today, 
the Navy and Marine Corps cannot afford to rely on an implicit process of developing 
decision-making expertise that requires years of experience to obtain (MCDP 1-3, 1997; 
Klein, 2003).  The process of gaining the experience necessary to be an effective decision 
maker can be accelerated through the process of studying military history and conducting 
decision-making exercises (Allen, 1993; MCDP 1-3, 1997; Wedemeyer, 1938).  Frequent 
decision-making opportunities improve one's decision-making abilities (Klein, 2003); 
from a decision-making perspective, breadth of experience is more important than detail 




This research determined the importance the Naval Academy assigns to decision 
making.  Having established that importance, the author learned how the Naval Academy 
teaches decision-making.  In the course of the research, micromanagement and excessive 
regulations were identified as significant obstacles to decision-making opportunities for 
midshipmen.  Lastly, company officers are in a position to have the greatest impact--
positive or negative--on developing decision-making skills in midshipmen. 
a) All Agree on Importance of Decision Making 
An examination of the Naval Academy's Strategic Plan and interviews 
with senior leaders confirmed that decision making is an essential skill for midshipmen to 
develop.  Company officers and midshipmen communicated the importance they place on 
decision making in a number of ways.  They both rank "Capable Decision Maker" second 
only to "Person of Character" among seven USNA Graduate Attributes (see Table 1).  
Their near-unanimous endorsement of decision making as an important trait for officers 
can also be found in Figures 2 & 4 and Appendices G & O. 
b) "It Just Happens" 
Despite this universal agreement that midshipmen should be developed as 
decision makers, the Naval Academy has no explicit plan on how to achieve this end.  As 
Colonel Allen put it, "it just happens" (J.R. Allen, personal communication, July 30, 
2003).  As for formal instruction, midshipmen receive one half of one class period, or 25 
minutes, of decision-making instruction in the course of their four years at the Naval 
Academy; the rest just happens (or perhaps does not).  In light of the stated importance of 
decision making previously established, one would have to describe this as woefully 
inadequate. 
c) Micromanagement and Excessive Regulations 
To create an environment in which midshipmen are eager to make 
decisions and prepared to accept responsibility for the consequences, there must exist an 
atmosphere of trust and tolerance for mistakes.  This atmosphere does not exist at the 
Naval Academy.  Instead, midshipmen are generally micromanaged and, as a rule, 
decisions of consequence are taken away from them.  This is the situation as described by 
midshipmen and company officers alike (see Appendices L, M, N, P, Q, R, & T).  
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Company officers and midshipmen believe that Midshipmen Regulations (Mid Regs) are 
excessively burdensome and in an effort to meticulously account for every conceivable 
eventuality, opportunity for judgment and decision making are effectively eliminated.  
Instead of decision makers, midshipmen--and even company officers--are mere executors 
of an exhaustingly encompassing script. 
d) We Do Not Train the Way We Fight 
The predictable result of the environment described is that midshipmen do 
not get much opportunity to make decisions of consequence.  Instead, decisions made by 
midshipmen are largely relegated to personal decisions, that is, decisions that affect no 
one but themselves (a notable and significant exception to this is the USNA Honor 
System).  Even those who hold leadership positions--stripers--do not get to make many 
decisions that can be likened to the type they will be required to make as commissioned 
officers.  With few exceptions, "decisions" made by midshipmen can be more accurately 
described as "recommendations" since they most often require the endorsement of an 
officer.  Midshipmen believe company officers are too quick to intervene and provide the 
"right" answer rather than allow midshipmen to make mistakes from which they can 
learn.  This oppressive "safety net" likely will not be there for them once midshipmen are 
commissioned, and it would seem to do them a disservice to prevent them from learning 
these lessons in an environment that is supposed to be a "leadership laboratory" (see 
Appendices L, M, & N). 
e) The Role of the Company Officer 
More than anyone else, the company officer is uniquely positioned to have 
an enormous effect on midshipmen's decision-making development.  They have the most 
direct and frequent interaction with midshipmen, and the ones who demonstrate trust and 
a willingness to allow midshipmen to try and maybe even fail were lauded by their 
midshipmen.  In sharp contrast, the company officers who are quick to step in and 
provide midshipmen with "the answer" were resented by their midshipmen (see 
Appendices M, N, R, & V).  On the company officers' part, many feel handcuffed by Mid 
Regs, by an institutional insistence that things be done absolutely correctly the first time, 
and by measures designed to achieve brigade-wide uniformity that severely restrict 
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company officers' latitude and ability to develop their midshipmen (see Appendices L, P, 
Q, T, & U). 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this research was to assess what the Naval Academy does to 
develop decision-making skills in its midshipmen.  By applying the decision-making 
literature to the findings presented here, the author has come up with a number of 
recommendations that would assist the Naval Academy leadership in realizing its vision 
of producing officers who are effective decision makers.  Some recommendations would 
require precious time and resources, but most are made with the goal that the Naval 
Academy be able to more effectively develop decision-making skills in midshipmen 
without adding to the existing curriculum. 
1. Make an Institutional Commitment to Decision Making 
The Navy and Marine Corps include courage and commitment among their core 
values; any effort to develop midshipmen as decision makers would require both.  To 
begin the journey toward becoming expert decision makers, midshipmen need more than 
theory--they need opportunity.  They need the opportunity to practice making decisions, 
and practice invariably involves failure.  Failure involves risk, and risk demands courage.  
The specter of failure requires perseverance and commitment. 
The Naval Academy need not accept imprudent risks to create decision-making 
opportunities for midshipmen.  But to identify and commit to areas in which the 
institution can tolerate mistakes in the name of professional development would be a 
demonstration of trust and moral courage the midshipmen need to see from their leaders 
and role models.  Such a commitment would call for an end to micromanagement, 
liberating those officers who want to empower their midshipmen and challenging those 
who find comfort and refuge in leading by regulations. 
2. Develop a Plan 
Once the institution makes clear its commitment to developing decision-making 
skills in midshipmen, it must develop and communicate a plan to achieve its desired 
endstate.  The senior leadership's desire that midshipmen be allowed to make decisions--
and mistakes--should be communicated to all those who contribute to midshipmen 
development: company officers, faculty, coaches, and so forth.  The goal would be to 
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progress beyond an environment that merely allows midshipmen to make decisions and 
becomes one that demands decisions of midshipmen.  Decision-making opportunities 
should not just be available to midshipmen, they must be made inescapable for 
midshipmen. 
3. Formalize Decision-Making Instruction 
The decision-making Tactical Initiative in the Naval Academy's Strategic Plan 
calls for a formalized definition of decision making and identifying opportunities to 
include embedded decision making in the daily midshipmen routine (USNA Strategic 
Plan, 2004).  This addresses Captain Leidig's desire to identify what type of decisions the 
Naval Academy wants midshipmen to be making and then to extract decision-making 
opportunities from existing training and education (C.J. Leidig, personal communication, 
February 10, 2004).  The decision-making Strategic Initiative looks to combine 
theoretical classroom training with computer simulations and some sort of outdoor, 
hands-on, practical application (USNA Strategic Plan, 2004). 
The literature review in this study points out a number of methods for developing 
decision-making skills in midshipmen.  For example, Klein has developed a three-step 
Intuitive Skills Training Program (2003).  The first step is to identify the decision 
requirements of a particular job or billet.  As applied to the Naval Academy, this would 
mean identifying the decisions the senior leadership wants midshipmen to be making.  
The next step is to duplicate the conditions in which those decisions would have to be 
made.  The literature review presents a number of ways in which this can be done.  In 
addition to discussing historical examples of combat decisions and conducting decision-
making games, two other prominent ways this could be done at the Naval Academy 
include fully utilizing the new simulator in Luce Hall and constructing a Leadership 
Reaction Course--similar to the one at the Marine Corps's Officer Candidate School in 
Quantico--at North Severn, as envisioned in the Strategic Initiative (USNA Strategic 
Plan, 2004).  The third step in Klein's ISTP, and one that is absolutely critical, is to 
incorporate feedback in all decision-making training (Klein, 2003). 
Concerning what midshipmen should be taught about decision making in the 
classroom, the author suggests the following: 1) the role of the officer as a decision 
maker and the importance of decision-making skills in officers; 2) the two primary 
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decision-making models, analytical and intuitive; 3) ways to develop decision-making 
skills; and, 4) the imperative that they develop themselves as decision makers.  Including 
this in NL112 (Leadership and Human Behavior) would communicate to midshipmen 
early on what will be expected of them as decision makers.  To make room in the NL112 
curriculum for increased decision-making instruction, the curriculum should be 
reevaluated in accordance with the high priority the senior leadership of the Naval 
Academy places on decision making. 
4. Evaluate Midshipmen on Decision Making 
Having formalized decision-making training, which would include identifying 
decision-making expectations of midshipmen, they should then be evaluated on their 
decision-making performance.  Not only will this facilitate midshipmen seeking 
opportunities to make decisions and improve at it, but it will force the evaluators to give 
midshipmen feedback.  Feedback is an absolutely essential piece of decision-making 
training and must not be neglected (Allen, 1993; Klein, 2003; MCDP 1-3, 1997; Schmitt, 
1995).  Even though the Navy evaluation report and fitness report the Naval Academy 
uses do not evaluate decision making, it could be made a mandatory comment, and the 
Marine Corps fitness report could be used as a reference for how to frame the evaluation 
of decision making (see Appendix K).  To do this would require instructions for the 
evaluators so they would know how to give feedback on decision making, but this 
investment would continue to pay off long after midshipmen leave the Naval Academy. 
5. Reevaluate Midshipmen Regulations 
It was not the intent of this research to take on the Midshipmen Regulations (Mid 
Regs).  That said, Mid Regs was a ubiquitous variable in the process of assessing the 
decision-making opportunities midshipmen have.  Company officers and midshipmen 
alike were adamant that Mid Regs almost entirely eliminates the need for--or even the 
tolerance for--judgment and decision making (see Appendices M, N, Q, R, & V).  
Although the issue of Mid Regs transcends the scope of this research many times over, 
the author nonetheless recommends that the leadership of the Naval Academy reevaluates 
Mid Regs to determine whether or not it is having the desired effect on producing officers 
who are willing to and capable of making decisions. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
As with any research, this thesis necessarily left avenues not fully pursued and 
questions unanswered.  In this light, the author has four recommendations for further 
research.  The first recommendation concerns the sample.  This thesis managed to get 
views from within the Naval Academy about how well midshipmen are being developed 
as decision makers.  What would be useful to know, however, is what do those outside 
the Naval Academy think about how well USNA is doing in this regard?  Specifically, 
commanders in the Fleet and in the Marine Corps could be asked how satisfied they are 
with Naval Academy graduates' decision-making abilities.  They could be asked how 
Naval Academy graduates compare in this regard to other officers in their commands 
who were commissioned via other sources.  Included, as well, in this sample could be 
post-command officers who are presently stationed at the Naval Academy.  This 
information would be useful to the Naval Academy, even if the findings were that there is 
no significant difference concerning decision-making abilities between Naval Academy 
graduates and non-graduates. 
A second area this thesis did not cover is what is taught at the different follow-on 
schools regarding decision making.  This information could be useful to the Naval 
Academy in determining what should be taught here to ensure that the "final product" 
that hits the Fleet is a capable decision maker.  The third recommendation would be to 
investigate what the other service academies teach their cadets about decision making so 
that the Naval Academy could make comparisons and choose to adopt aspects and 
techniques it might deem useful.  Lastly, the USNA Leadership Task Force's final report 
should be carefully examined to learn what findings apply to developing midshipmen as 
decision makers. 
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APPENDIX A: COMMANDANT OF MIDSHIPMEN INTERVIEW 
PROTOCOL (COLONEL ALLEN) 
Today I would like to discuss the topic of decision making (DM) as it relates to the 
culture and curriculum at the Naval Academy.   
 
1) Would you begin by explaining what you consider to be the relationship between 
leadership and DM?  Are they distinct or inter-related? 
 
2) You frequently use the term "a bias for decision making."  Please explain what you 
mean by a leader possessing "a bias for decision making?" 
 
3) How, and to what extent, does the Naval Academy currently develop decision makers?  
How does the overall process work?  Is the process adequate?  Why or why not? 
 
4) Can you provide concrete examples of the strengths and weaknesses of DM outcomes 
here at the Naval Academy? 
 
5) How is the environment IRT DM different here at the Naval Academy than elsewhere 
(e.g. the Fleet)?  Why? 
 
6) What has been done here in the past to develop decision makers?  How and when has 
the curriculum changed?  Why did it change?  Has it changed for the better or worse? 
 
7) Are you aware of anything that is done differently at the other service academies that 
we might want to adopt here at the Naval Academy?  Avoid?  Do you have any points of 
contact there?  
 
8) What are your goals and priorities with regard to DM opportunities at the Naval 
Academy?  What changes would you make?  How important is this DM initiative 
compared to others?  Would you increase DM opportunities at the expense of other 
subjects?   
 
9) What do you envision IRT a timeline for implementing any initiative?  Resources 
available?  Constraints and restraints? 
 
10) What/whom do you consider to be the obstacles to successful implementation of any 
initiative?  Is there a justification for/defense of the status quo?  What?  By whom?  
Why?  What needs to be done to overcome these obstacles? 
 
11) Whom do you deem to be the critical players in any initiative?  With whom will I 
need to work closely?  Would you support forming a focus group(s)? 
 
12) Would you support/endorse a survey of attitudes and opinions from various people 
within the institution and Naval service (e.g. midshipmen, company and battalion 
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officers, faculty, alumni, commanders in the Fleet) about how the present culture at the 
Naval Academy affects DM? 
 
13) How would you define success, i.e. mission accomplishment?  What would be the 
indicators of success?  Should they be evaluated formally? 
 
14) Is there any literature you would recommend that would contribute to my research? 
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APPENDIX B: COMMANDANT OF MIDSHIPMEN INTERVIEW 
PROTOCOL (CAPTAIN LEIDIG) 
1. Is it important for junior officers in the Navy and Marine Corps to be able to make 
decisions?  Do the requirements vary among the service communities?  If so, how? 
 
2. What is the Naval Academy's role in developing decision-making skills in its 
midshipmen?  How well does it accomplish this? 
 
3. Is it a priority for the Naval Academy to develop decision-making skills in its 
midshipmen?  If so, how does this manifest itself in time and resources devoted to 
developing these skills? 
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APPENDIX C: DIRECTOR OF LEL INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
1) Would each of you explain what your billet is and how it is related to developing 
decision makers at the Naval Academy? 
 
2) What does the Naval Academy presently do to develop midshipmen's decision making 
abilities and provide practical application opportunities? 
 
3) Would you say that the curriculum is rooted in any particular decision-making model 
(e.g. analytical, intuitive, etc.)? 
 
4) What are the goals of the curriculum?  What direction have you received, and from 
whom? 
 
5) What are the measures of effectiveness? 
 
6) Do you think the Naval Academy is accomplishing its goals?  Why or why not? 
 
7) What do you think detracts from fully achieving the objectives (e.g. challenges of 
leading peers, overbearing company officers, exacting midshipmen regulations, etc.)? 
 
8) From your perspective, is risk aversion a contributor?  If so, how significant is it?  
Why does it exist?  What are its roots?  How can it be overcome? 
 
9) What is your road map for developing decision makers at the Naval Academy?  Do 
you have any initiatives being considered or underway? 
 
10) Within the next 45 days or so, the Naval Academy will have a new Superintendent 
and a new Commandant of Midshipmen.  Do you have any indications or expectations 
about how this may affect your present curriculum or potential initiatives? 
 
11) Would you interested in forming a focus group to incorporate my research with your 
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APPENDIX D: COMPANY OFFICER SURVEY 
Operational definition of decision making 
 
Decision making is the process of identifying essential factors, developing 
options, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each, and selecting a solution.  
For the purposes of this survey, decision making is confined to the performance of one's 
leadership responsibilities, military or otherwise. 
 
Part I. Rank the following attributes in the order of importance you place upon them as 
being necessary for a USNA graduate (1 = most important, 7 = least important; no ties, 
please): 
 
____ Effective communicator 
____ High academic GPA 
____ Physically fit 
____ Committed to Equal Opportunity 
____ Capable decision maker 
____ Geopolitically astute 
____ Person of character 
 
Part II. Use the following scale to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the 
following statements (space is provided for optional comments after each statement). 
 
   (1)  (2)         (3)                 (4)    (5) 
Strongly    Disagree    Neither agree    Agree         Strongly 
disagree                       nor disagree                         agree 
 
 
1. ____ It is important that midshipmen's decision-making skills are developed while at 
the Naval Academy. 





2. ____ Midshipmen understand the importance of developing decision-making skills to 






3. ____ The types of decisions midshipmen make prepare them for the types of decisions 






4. ____ Sufficient time and resources are devoted to developing decision-making skills in 












6. ____ The Naval Academy adequately prepares midshipmen to be effective decision 







Part III. Short answers 
 













3. What recommendations do you have on how to give midshipmen more opportunities to 






Part IV. Please indicate your service community. 
 
____ Surface Warfare 
____ Naval Aviation 
____ Submarine 
____ SpecOps/SpecWar 
____ Marine Ground 
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APPENDIX E: MIDSHIPMEN FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONS 
Rank the following attributes in the order of importance you place upon them as being 
necessary for a USNA graduate (1 = most important, 7 = least important; no ties, please): 
 
____ Effective communicator 
____ High academic GPA 
____ Physically fit 
____ Committed to Equal Opportunity 
____ Capable decision maker 
____ Geopolitically astute 
____ Person of character 
 
 
Use the following scale to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following 
statements. 
 
  (1)  (2)                (3)                (4)          (5) 
Strongly    Disagree    Neither agree    Agree    Strongly 
disagree                       nor disagree                    agree 
 
 
1. ____ It is important that midshipmen are developed as decision makers while at the 
Naval Academy. 
 
2. ____ Sufficient time and resources are devoted to developing decision-making skills in 
midshipmen at the Naval Academy. 
 
3. ____ My decision-making skills have improved while at the Naval Academy. 
 
4. ____ An officer must be able to make decisions under time pressure and uncertainty. 
 
5. ____ The Naval Academy has adequately prepared me to be an effective decision 
maker as an officer. 
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Operational definition of decision making 
 
    Decision making is the process of identifying essential factors, developing options, 
weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each, and selecting a solution.  For the 
purposes of this survey, decision making is confined to the performance of one's 
leadership responsibilities, military or otherwise. 
 
Operational definition of a "gut-wrenching" decision 
 
        A "gut-wrenching" decision is a decision that causes a person great anguish and is 
very difficult to make because the costs of the decision will be very significant for those 
affected. 
 
Focus Group Questions 
 
1. What types of decisions do midshipmen get to make? 
 
2. How often, if ever, do midshipmen have to make "gut-wrenching" decisions related to 
their leadership position?  With what type of "gut-wrenching" decisions are they faced? 
 
3. Do midshipmen have adequate opportunities to make decisions?  If not, what limits 
these opportunities? 
 
4. What recommendations do you have on how to give midshipmen more opportunities to 





APPENDIX F: MIDSHIPMEN FOCUS GROUP DEMOGRAPHIC 
WORKSHEET 
1. Gender: Male / Female  (circle one) 
 
2. PRESENT Leadership position(s): 
   a. Within the Brigade 
         -Billet title: ______________________ 
     -Number of stripes: _____ 
 
   b. Sports 
         -Name of sport(s): ____________________ 
    -Level (varsity, JV, club, intramural, other): 
     _________________ 
    -Leadership position: ____________________ 
    -Number of stripes: _____ 
    
   c. Extracurricular activity (ECA) 
    -Name of ECA: _________________ 
    -Leadership position: ___________________ 
 




3. PAST Leadership positions, if any, by year:  
 
2/C year 
   a. Within the Brigade 
    -Billet title: ______________________ 
 
   b. Sports 
    -Name of sport: ____________________ 
    -Level of sport (varsity, JV, club, intramural,  
     other): _________________ 
    -Leadership position: ____________________ 
 
   c. Extracurricular activity (ECA) 
    -Name of ECA: _________________ 
    -Leadership position: ___________________ 
 
   d. Other (example: Plebe Detail): 
 
 
Youngster year (3/C) 
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   a. Within the Brigade 
    -Billet title: ______________________ 
     
   b. Sports 
    -Name of sport: ____________________ 
    -Level of sport (varsity, JV, club, intramural,  
     other): _________________ 
    -Leadership position: ____________________ 
 
   c. Extracurricular activity (ECA) 
    -Name of ECA: _________________ 
    -Leadership position: ___________________ 
 
   d. Other (example: Summer Seminar): 
 
 
       
Plebe year (4/C) 
   a. Within the Brigade 
    -Billet title: ______________________ 
     
   b. Sports 
    -Name of sport: ____________________ 
    -Level of sport (varsity, JV, club, intramural,  
     other): _________________ 
    -Leadership position: ____________________ 
 
   c. Extracurricular activity (ECA) 
    -Name of ECA: _________________ 
    -Leadership position: ___________________ 
 
   d. Other: 
 
 
    
4. Sports played while at USNA (please indicate level, i.e. varsity, JV, club, intramurals, 
other): 
 
   a. 1/C year _________________________________________ 
 
   b. 2/C year _________________________________________ 
 
   c. Youngster year ___________________________________ 
 
   d. Plebe year _______________________________________ 
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5. Approximate Military ranking: 
 
6. Approximate Academic ranking: 
 
7. Approximate Order of Merit: 
 
 
8. Top 3 choices for Service Assignment: 1. 
 
           2. 
 
           3. 
 
 
9. Prior enlisted: Y/N 
 If yes, branch of service: ______________ 
         number of years: ____ 
         rating/MOS: __________ 





10. Family members in the Service: Y/N 
 If yes, who: _____________ 
         branch of service: ______________ 
         number of years: ____ 
         rating/MOS: __________ 
         highest rank/rate achieved: ______________ 
 
 If more than one: 
 
         who: _____________ 
         branch of service: ______________ 
         number of years: ____ 
         rating/MOS: __________ 
         highest rank/rate achieved: ______________ 
 
         who: _____________ 
         branch of service: ______________ 
         number of years: ____ 
         rating/MOS: __________ 
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APPENDIX G: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT MIDSHIPMEN'S 
DECISION-MAKING SKILLS ARE DEVELOPED WHILE AT THE 
NAVAL ACADEMY (COMPANY OFFICER RESPONSES) 
This is the time they learn to make decisions both large and small...the 
expectation is that we are training them to make the correct decisions in 
the Fleet when no one is looking. 
Early development is vital for any trait that is important...(the Naval 
Academy offers) opportunities to make decisions in a controlled 
environment. 
If they do not develop (decision-making skills) while a midshipman, it is 
likely they will not develop after USNA either. 
 (Midshipmen) need to thoroughly understand the concept (of decision 
making)...the problem is that midshipmen choose to avoid many of the 
(decision-making) opportunities.  We need to emphasize the opportunities 
as well as make them inescapable. 
 (Yes,) however, there is a distinct cultural difference between the USN 
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APPENDIX H: MIDSHIPMEN UNDERSTAND THE IMPORTANCE 
OF DEVELOPING DECISION-MAKING SKILLS TO PREPARE 
THEM TO BE OFFICERS (COMPANY OFFICER RESPONSES) 
They don't always understand the decisions they make with the 
consequences that occur. 
I don't think some of these (midshipmen) REALLY understand that they 
are going to be officers until they actually get to the Fleet. 
The average midshipman does not understand this...for the most part, 
stripers do. 
 (Midshipmen) do not grasp just how important (decision making) will be 
once they graduate. 
There is a large division...(of) midshipmen who "get it"...and those 
midshipmen who have a hard time understanding the desired endstate of 
USNA. 
Their training is never explained to them in terms of decision-making. 
They don't have an understanding of (the importance of decision making) 
at all. 
Midshipmen do not have enough life experience to understand the burden 
of responsibility...It is not until they get into the Fleet and actually see the 
ramifications of their good and bad decisions that they really "learn" and 
"understand" what we are trying to teach them here.  Until then, we are 
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APPENDIX L: WHAT TYPES OF DECISIONS DO MIDSHIPMEN 
GET TO MAKE? (COMPANY OFFICER RESPONSES) 
 (Non-1/C) mostly make simple decisions about time management issues--
do I do my homework, workout, go on liberty, sleep, etc. 
Most midshipmen's biggest "pressure" decisions probably occur when 
faced with whether or not to break a regulation (underage drinking, 
usurping privileges, etc). 
The entire spectrum of decision making is covered here...That includes life 
long decisions like service selection all the way down to correcting a 
shipmate for having his book bag slung over his shoulder. 
We don’t need to spend a lot of effort on teaching them how to balance 
their own budget or do their laundry, etc. We need to engage their minds 
in solving the problems they will face in combat situations. 
They make numerous decisions every day, e.g. Do they say anything to 
their peers or subordinates about violations of Mid Regs/Uniform 
Regs/Conduct Unbecoming that they witness?  Do they do they decide to 
do the right thing?  Do they decide to work a little harder vice cutting a 
corner? 
We don’t even trust them to wear a coat if it is cold out, that has to be 
dictated to them.  Plebe Summer was ridiculous.  There had to be 
Officer/Senior Enlisted Leader (SEL) presence every waking moment to 
ensure the detailers weren’t screwing up.  We didn’t ever give them the 
opportunity to make a decision about what was/wasn’t the right thing to 
do, because we had to be standing over them the entire time.  I think this 
weakened them horribly in their capacity to make good decisions... The 
way we do business is crippling (them)... We are too afraid of taking the 
responsibility if they do screw up. 
It differs from company to company, battalion to battalion, and class to 
class. 
The only aspect that is advertised as "for the midshipmen and by the 
midshipmen” is the Honor process.  Otherwise, every aspect of their lives 
is governed by regulations. 
The biggest one they make on a daily basis would involve Conduct. 
Whether or not to obey a rule or whether or not it is worth it to hold a 
shipmate accountable. 
Very low impact decisions for the most part. 
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Primarily ones that the consequences only have impact on themselves. 
My company commander owns and runs the company, making every 
decision. If it is something I have to decide, I make him decide and give 
me the justification--I have only overruled him once or twice (based on 
experience, not his judgment). 
Stripers get thrust into a more officer-like position where they make 
decisions which affect the rest of their unit. 
Midshipmen make very few important FINAL decisions that impact 
others.  Often their decisions are truly recommendations to others, unless 
the decision only impacts them. 
Depends on the billet and depends on the attitude. We tend to put the good 
ones in important billets...others can and do avoid these situations. The 
key is forcing them into billets where decisions will be made, and 
supervising the decisions they make...In many ways, the bad ones need 
this experience the most. 
 (Midshipmen) make lots of decisions on ball fields. 
Varsity captains learn to make decisions under pressure. 
Most practical application occurs during summer training blocks. 
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APPENDIX M: WHAT TYPES OF DECISIONS DO MIDSHIPMEN 
GET TO MAKE? (MIDSHIPMEN RESPONSES) 
1. Striper/Non-Athletes 
There are a lot of priority decisions to make...and a lot of them involve 
whether or not to work on academics or do something else. 
As far as military leadership...I would say that as a general rule 
midshipmen get to make very few decisions.  Mostly (our) hands are tied, 
(we) have to talk to (our) company officer.  I was a company commander, 
and as far as giving out "overnights" to people who had done stuff well, or 
enacting some kind of company policy or something like that, stuff that 
demonstrated our leadership, my hands, as far as being a leader, were 
completely tied by the company officer. 
 (We are only) able to make decisions within a box that’s been created for 
us, but even the company officers don’t have the ability to make decisions.  
When it comes right down to it, everything has to be blessed by the 
signature of the Commandant, and from there down I see a box has been 
set, and then there’s no leeway.  You can’t go outside that box without 
permission from the Commandant.  Even the battalion officers are kind of 
tied up by the fact that they need to get approval from the Commandant to 
do things. 
Pretty much the only decisions that midshipmen get to make are those 
most directly affecting their own personal lives, and so I would go on the 
disappointed side of the Academy, in terms of (midshipmen) are not really 
given a chance to see any kind of consequences other than their own 
personal decisions. 
We're kind of guided into what decisions we need to be making without 
actually taking the time to think about it, (and) saying "this is what I want 
and this is when I want it," and then seeing the consequences of that 
decision.  Many times I make a decision and I am stopped by my company 
officer before I get to see the consequences of it because "we are not 
allowed to do that." 
As a company commander...my company officer allows me to make a lot 
of decisions.  As long as I can come to him with some justification for 
why I want to do a particular thing, he'll let me try it, and he'll let me take 
it through its course to see what happens... but a lot of it depends, I guess, 
on the company officer, because I was given a lot of rein, as long as I had 
a coherent, logical thought process about why I wanted to take a particular 
course of action, my company officer would let me do it. 
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I believe that, also as a company commander, I was given a lot of rein to 
make decisions.  I think I was making more decisions than other company 
commanders because our company officer really stood back and let me do 
it. 
 (As a company commander,) I think the majority of the job was just 
implementing other people's decisions from higher up, just implementing 
their policies and making things happen that way, and not (much) critical 
decision making. 
 (As a regimental adjutant, I was) mostly implementing other people's 
policies, and really I didn't have the opportunity to, really, make many 
decisions and, they didn't have to with anything to do at the Naval 
Academy.  I would say the majority of my decisions have been made 
while not at the Naval Academy.  You know, on leave or on liberty or 
cruises, where we are given more leniency to make decisions, make good 
decisions, make bad decisions. 
I'm prior enlisted, and I would say that as an E-4 in the Navy I had more 
control over what decisions I made than as a firstie officer candidate. 
2. Athlete/Non-Stripers 
I think a lot of decisions we make as midshipmen are based on academics, 
especially when it comes to crunch time, 6-week exams, 12-week exams, 
you've got to weigh sometimes what's more important...so I think that 
midshipmen here don't make too many military decisions, but instead, 
they mostly make academic decisions. 
As athletes...we have to balance...extra time that we want to spend on a 
sport...(with some sports) there's a lot of opportunity to put in extra work 
after practice, and you have to decide what's more important...your 
position on the team or your academic standing. 
A lot of times one of the first big decisions people make when they come 
here is whether to continue the sport that they've done pretty much their 
entire lives...they have to decide whether they want to continue with it, or 
whether they want to just focus on academics.  And that continues on, all 
four years, and I think the decision becomes harder and harder. 
Another decision is how involved (we) are going to be, within the brigade. 
3. Non-striper/Non-athletes 
One of the biggest decisions I have to make on a regular basis was what to 
give people as punishment, as the (company) Conduct officer.  That was 
pretty intense and important, because, how much do you want to make 
someone suffer for what they did? 
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This year I was a squad leader, so I had to make decisions like how to run 
the squad...the attitude to have at tables, kind of small (decisions), but 
important too.  The previous time, before firstie year, I wasn't forced to 
make any real decisions.  I wasn't in charge of much, I was the platoon 
sergeant last year, but ...previous to this year, there weren't many decisions 
to make. 
The average midshipman doesn't make a whole lot of professional or 
personal decisions that aren't already kind of predetermined as to what the 
right decision would be.  There is an atmosphere or an indication that we 
are making the decisions by ourselves, but in reality, if it doesn't come 
inside of the decision that someone higher up has already made, then it's 
the wrong decision. 
 (As the company Conduct officer,) I got to make the decision (about the 
punishment to assign), but when the one of the company officers or the 
senior enlisted leaders saw whatever I chose to give them and didn't like it, 
then the decision was wrong.  I had to make all my decisions based on the 
guidelines that they wanted.  So my decision wasn't really my decision.  It 
was more a matter of, "here's a list of things, here's the problem, (now) 
match them up."  So leeway is very, very tight. 
 (Whenever we make a decision,) we still need to go check with someone, 
we don't want to be the top person holding the responsibility...instead of us 
making decisions about what we feel is right, we try to make decisions 
that we think other people feel is right, or what they are saying is correct. 
For the most part, any kind of leadership you have over anyone else 
almost falls under management, because they put so much structure 
around it... they have set up so many things already, the structure, that it 
kind of hinders your creativity, or your leadership skills, instead of 
fostering them. 
I spent a lot of time on CSNTS, being a skipper, (and) I felt like...there 
were real decisions that affected (others), like we are crossing a channel 
and there's this shipping bearing down on us, strong winds, almost gale 
force, lightning all around, it's dark, you can't see the buoys, you are trying 
not to hit anything...and I had officers on board...who would just quietly 
watch me.  I've got a youngster crew that's scared, so I have to calm them 
down and keep the ship straight.  So I think on that cruise there was a lot 
of decision making, where there were actually consequences, where 
people could get hurt and bad things could happen. 
I also think there are moral decisions.  How many times have we seen 
someone do something that doesn't meet the standard, and (we) have to 
decide whether or not (we) are going to say anything, and all too often 
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midshipmen let stuff go by because they don't want to be that guy who 
calls someone out. 
There's a lot of micromanagement at the company officer level, I feel.  It's 
supposed to be the firstie leadership positions (that) run their company the 
way they want to run it, and the company officer should just be in a 
supervisor role and not be making decisions for them, and I guess that's 
the main thing that has bothered me over my 4 years here. 
I agree that on summer training we get to do some more realistic 
decisions, but as far as the ones they let us do in (Bancroft) Hall, I think a 
lot of them are minute and childish and they don't give us enough chance 
to really try to grow as leaders, as far as decision making, and really feel 
the repercussions. 
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APPENDIX N: HOW OFTEN, IF EVER, DO MIDSHIPMEN HAVE 
TO MAKE "GUT-WRENCHING" DECISIONS RELATED TO 
THEIR LEADERSHIP POSITION?  WITH WHAT TYPE OF "GUT-
WRENCHING" DECISIONS ARE THEY FACED? (MIDSHIPMEN 
RESPONSES) 
1. Striper/Non-athletes 
The only really gut-wrenching decisions that I’ve observed are decisions 
that pertained to the Honor concept, and observing violations and how you 
may or may not turn someone in for what might be an honor violation.  
Or, it goes to Conduct, too, to a lesser degree, and I think the reason they 
are difficult or gut-wrenching decisions is because there is an underlying 
mistrust of the Conduct system and the Honor system at the Academy.  I 
think that if people trusted the system, they would be more willing to put 
forth cases, knowing that the outcome would be the right outcome, and 
that it would be a reasonable outcome, but since midshipmen don’t really 
trust the Conduct and Honor system, it becomes a gut-wrenching decision 
because our inclination is to take care of it ourselves, without going to the 
officer chain of command, if we can.  Because once we put it on the 
Honor or on the Conduct side of the house, it is now out of our hands, and 
we have to have faith in the system, and I think we’ve lost our faith.  
That’s really the only gut-wrenching decisions that I can think of at the 
Academy. 
The big stuff just flies right over us.  So probably no gut-wrenching 
decisions I've had to make. 
One exception...and that's sitting on Aptitude boards.  Or when 
midshipmen get a chance to sit on an Honor board.  I think that those are 
pretty much the only chances...where you actually see a midshipman 
making a decision with some consequence...But, I also believe...that if it 
hadn't gone the way the highest ranking officer on the board wanted it to, 
it would been overridden. 
Last week I was in a Conduct hearing with the Commandant for two 3/C 
midshipmen who were put up for separation, and I think I kind of went 
through the process of thinking about what I was going to say, when they 
went to the chain of command, and how that was going to affect whether 
or not they were going to stay here, and I think the conclusion I came to 
was, it didn't really matter what I was going to say, the Commandant was 
going to do what the Commandant was going to do, based on more of 
what my senior enlisted and company officer had to say than particularly 
what I had to say, so I think that's an example of where we don't really get 
to have much of a say in what actually happens. 
130 
I think a lot of it also depends on the position you have within the brigade.  
As company commander...I've gotten to handle a lot of the minor offenses, 
and have (had) to pay a high price with (my) peers...Now, in some other 
companies, the company officer might say, "this is what they are getting 
and that's it," but I was given the ability to assign the punishment that I 
thought fit, as long as I had some reasonable justification to support them.  
I think in that sense that is the closest I've ever come to anything I would 
even remotely consider to be gut-wrenching, to look someone in the eye 
and have to decide what that punishment is. 
A part of (the fact that midshipmen do not make have to make difficult 
decisions) is based on the way our lives are here, the fact that for the most 
part, we really don't have to do much thinking, and our days are pretty 
much planned out from start to finish. 
I've stood watch with officers who will not make a decision on their own, 
but will execute the "letter of the law" for every specific decision, if you 
can call it a decision...they are not making a decision, they are an 
automaton, simply looking up regulations.  There's no such thing as the 
"spirit of the law."  I've had them say..."I don't want to do this, but that's 
the regulation--I have to," and to me, that's just, number one, it's the most 
disgusting form of leadership I've ever seen, and number two, that's what 
happens when you are not taught what responsibility is and what decision 
making is. 
2. Athlete/Non-stripers 
I think that that depends particularly on leadership responsibilities.  I am 
sure that the Honor Chair faces, probably, one or two (gut-wrenching 
decisions) a day because (of) the decisions that Honor Boards make. 
I am not personally faced with these kinds of decisions too much, just as a 
platoon commander.   The worst thing I have to worry about is, maybe 
somebody marching a couple of tours because they didn't make it to 
formation. 
CDO is a pretty stressful job on Saturday night.  They have to make 
decisions about what to do about situations that develop on deck.  That's 
probably a good opportunity for making gut-wrenching decisions. 
I would have to say that the majority of my gut-wrenching decisions have 
been away from (Bancroft) Hall...personal ones. 
If you witness an Honor offense that is done by a friend of yours...what do 
you do?  I mean, obviously, there is the "letter of the law"--what you 
should do--versus not bilging a shipmate, which is pounded into your head 
from day one. 
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3. Non-striper/Non-athletes 
I don’t think any real gut-wrenching decisions are made at the leadership 
level.  I think we only make them at the personal level, like service 
selection, (or) like (if) you’re in trouble with a bunch of guys, there's 
going to be pressure on you to turn in your friends, stuff like that...such as 
loyalty...I think that's the most gut-wrenching stuff. 
I haven’t really had to make any gut-wrenching decisions in my leadership 
positions.  I’ve had to make--I don’t know about gut-wrenching--but 
pretty tough decisions...while standing watch, as far as holding people 
accountable when they don’t show up on time, or if they go out and they 
are drinking and come back late. 
I think that (sitting on an Honor Board) is probably the only time that 
midshipmen, in any way, will make a gut-wrenching decision, because in 
every other circumstance...(any decision that affects others) will either be 
approved or disapproved by the company officer...But the Honor Concept 
is truly midshipmen-run. 
Looking back, I don't think I've ever really had a gut-wrenching decision. 
I was a company XO this (past) summer for Plebe Summer, and we faced 
something that could have been a gut-wrenching decision.  We had a plebe 
that really wasn't cutting it in any facet, in any way, shape or form, and we 
thought we would have the power, or capability to send her to a higher 
level to be considered to leave this place, but after the first couple of steps, 
we were told, "it's not your choice."  I mean, it doesn't matter that even 
though you are the one leading her, you are the one training her, the 
Admissions Board has said that she is capable of getting through here, so 
it's not your business.  They took the gut-wrenching decision from us... 
when the time came...to make the decision of leadership, it was taken 
(from us).  We were informed that it was not our decision. 
I think a lot of the gut-wrenching decisions have to do with frying 
somebody...I think especially it becomes apparent when you are a firstie 
and you are dealing with your classmates, and the problem is, they are all 
your friends, right?  But you've got a job to do, so...you just have to find 
that fine line. 
I think during finals, during finals week, and right before papers are due, 
people feel tempted to cheat, to take the easy way out, to pretty much 
make their life easier.  I think that's a gut-wrenching decision a lot of 
people make. 
I think once you get in a situation where you are confronted with what 
you've done, like maybe a Conduct offense you've committed, and it's 
time to 'fess up, and maybe there (are) parts that you just don't want to 
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mention, that maybe nobody will find out, or trying to cover somebody up 
because someone else will get in trouble, so not mention it.  Do you tell 
the whole truth, or do you just take that chance?...it doesn't make it easier 
just to leave some parts out because it's a lie of omission and you want to 
be accountable, ...it's kind of gut-wrenching...do you hurt your friends 
or...(do you uphold your) personal honor? 
I have never seen (officers) make a gut-wrenching decision away from 
what the rules are...so that's the example we are seeing here.  Pick up the 
book, read the book...there's your gut-wrenching decision process right 
there...It's a cop out. 
The Academy as a whole seems to think there's a lack of a gray area...(but) 
there (are) always gray areas.  We try to make things so black and white 
here, I think it's a bad way for us to go about doing things, because there 
are certain circumstances where you shouldn't have to follow exactly the 
"letter of the law."  There are extenuating circumstances, and we try to 
pretend there are not, and I don't agree with that...I don't see why we do it 
that way.  (They) pretty much (remove judgment from the equation). 
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APPENDIX O: AN OFFICER MUST BE ABLE TO MAKE 
DECISIONS UNDER TIME PRESSURE AND UNCERTAINTY 
(COMPANY OFFICER RESPONSES) 
This is a given.  Hence the reason for the institution (i.e. develop them 
morally, mentally, and physically so they can make the correct decision). 
I agree strongly but he or she must also know what decisions can wait.  
Everything at USNA is labeled “important and urgent.”  (As an officer,) 
you have to weed out the real important and urgent things. 
This defines one of the basic responsibilities of officers. 
Get the plans for the (Marine Corps) OCS leadership reaction course and 
build it on Hospital Point. That’s one tangible tool for teaching this. 
Officers must be able to analyze the situation and make an appropriate 
decision in a short span of time.  While the initial decision may not be the 
perfect solution, a decision and course of action now is normally far better 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
135 
APPENDIX P: THE TYPES OF DECISIONS MIDSHIPMEN MAKE 
PREPARE THEM FOR THE TYPES OF DECISIONS THEY WILL 
MAKE AS OFFICERS (COMPANY OFFICER RESPONSES) 
It doesn’t matter.  Any decision they make is a good one...I think any 
decision they make is helping them learn. 
Good decision making does not automatically happen in May 
[commissioning].  It is a process that takes time.  Some may only need 
plebe summer to know how to make good decisions while others need all 
four years. 
Some don’t understand that failing to pay attention to minor stuff trains 
the mind to fail to pay attention to the big things later. 
We don’t even allow them to make decisions about paying for a haircut or 
taking out the trash, much less anything that is truly important.  I think 
graduation is a real eye opener for the kind of...decisions they will have to 
make. 
While we stress the importance of this “crucial” aspect of midshipmen 
development, we often undermine this effort by “spoon feeding” 
midshipmen.  Many decisions that require significant thought are often 
made FOR midshipmen instead of BY midshipmen...often important 
decision-making processes...are DICTATED TO midshipmen by the 
officers/SELs instead of the midshipmen chain of command. 
The large decisions are made by commissioned officers and Senior 
Enlisted Leaders.  Anything of consequence is taken from midshipmen. 
Midshipmen lead a sheltered life compared to what they will experience 
upon graduation. The system makes a lot of decisions for them, that 
although are minor, would be a way for them to take more responsibility 
for themselves and make decisions that affect them. 
Many seem to feel that they can just “turn on” the officer-like qualities 
once they leave...and (they) figure they’ll be good officers once they 
leave. Trying to dispel the myth that people change once they leave is one 
of a (company officer's) hardest jobs. 
The scope and magnitude of the decisions (midshipmen make) pale in 
comparison with choices in the Fleet. 
We don’t give them enough leeway to screw-up and learn from their 
mistakes.  USNA is a zero tolerance command is every aspect of their 
lives. 
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Not so sure the “type” of decision is the same, but making any decision, 
and executing it, is good preparation for the Fleet. 
 (I) say over and over, we need to place (midshipmen) into situations 
where they are allowed to make decisions. I try and do that with my own 
(billet holders). I even let bad decisions be made. But we are so concerned 
with getting everything right the first time that company officers just tend 
to pass on the word about what should be done, rather than watching 
something play out. The midshipmen then carry out their orders, vice 
allowing them to make a call. If you are not careful, the officer will just 
tend to make decisions for the midshipmen, and (midshipmen) are simply 
passing word or executing orders. 
 (Midshipmen) most often execute what the commissioned officers order.  
We don’t really let them develop their skills. Often, the midshipmen 
operate in an environment of fear of punishment for making the “wrong” 
choice. 
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APPENDIX Q: DO MIDSHIPMEN HAVE ADEQUATE 
OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE DECISIONS? (COMPANY OFFICER 
RESPONSES) 
 (The Naval Academy's) curriculum limits (decision-making) 
opportunities.  At West Point, they bring all 4,000 cadets back from 
Christmas leave a week early and do what they call a military 
intercessional.  They focus solely on solving combat scenarios (using 
computer simulations and field exercises)....We could do this, too. We 
could put YPs in the water and use the new facilities in Luce to simulate 
“fleet battle problems.” 
Only the stripers do, but it’s generally under a lot of oversight and I 
believe the Administration is very resistant to allowing them to make 
mistakes (and thereby learn from their mistakes).  We micromanage the 
midshipmen way too much. 
Yes, they do but midshipmen would prefer to believe that company 
officers, senior enlisted leaders, the battalion officers and Commandant 
make all the decisions for them because of Midshipmen Regulations (Mid 
Regs). 
A very limited number (such as the company and battalion commanders) 
may get to make “real” decisions that impact others, primarily because we 
hold so much power/decision-making ability at upper levels. 
Yes and no.  The greatest limits are their maturity level and the culture 
within the brigade that characterizes certain actions.  Most mids are 
unwilling to make a hard choice that might characterize them as a “Joe” or 
a "Yes man." So there are adequate opportunities, the question is do mids 
take them? 
Mid Regs (are) too huge to possibly know and enforce. Instead of 
leadership, there is a cookbook approach to how the brigade stripers run 
things...The striper duties are mapped out to be excessively rigid. 
Much of their life is structured, however, midshipmen have incredibly 
wide latitude in making decisions.  They usually forego the opportunity to 
do so, however, out of laziness or their favorite: cynicism. 
They have plenty of opportunities. Sometimes this decision making is 
hampered by a perception of micromanagement by the officer chain of 
command. While this perception has some truth and merit, the 
opportunities afforded remain adequate. 
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I believe that they do not have adequate opportunities. They are limited by 
the constant and persistent presence of officers. They are painfully aware 
that they have a safety net, and therefore don't put the time and energy into 
decision-making that they should. 
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APPENDIX R: DO MIDSHIPMEN HAVE ADEQUATE 
OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE DECISIONS? (MIDSHIPMEN 
RESPONSES) 
1. Striper/Non-athletes 
Sometimes (when) Conduct is involved in a situation, the squad leader has 
to speak on a subordinate’s behalf, maybe at an adjudication...(and) 
you’ve got a lot of pressure coming from the company officer (about) 
what you are supposed to say about (your) subordinates... I think company 
officers sometimes step in and tailor our decisions, and not let a person 
decide on their own. 
I think we have ample opportunity to make... decisions every day, within 
(a) created structure.  And I think that also reflects the Fleet, because as 
we move out in the Fleet as junior officers, we are going to be making 
decisions within a confining box that has been set up by our superiors.  
And so in that sense, I think that this place really does prepare (us) to 
make decisions. 
I don’t think we make any substantial decisions.  I can’t decide that 
tomorrow we are not going to have formation or something like that.  But 
after doing a Fleet cruise this summer, it’s not like the ensigns or the 
LTJGs who are at their squadron...they didn’t make substantial decisions.  
They still led within their divisions, but it was mostly through personal 
example.  So I guess that’s kind of what’s to be expected, I mean, I don’t 
expect make sweeping changes on a daily basis, but if you can get 
accustomed to making the small decisions that matter on a personal level 
to the small groups you are interacting with, then I think that’s probably 
the best lesson you can take away from this place. 
Sometimes I’ll give someone permission that I cannot technically give 
them, but I’ll authorize them to do it, knowing that if they get caught, I’ll 
get hammered for it, but I’ve got the risk to take. 
You can put chimpanzees through the Naval Academy...and as long as you 
don't deviate too far from the standard, you really don't need to make any 
decisions, you just conform with what we've been presented with. 
I think the problem is that there's too much red tape in everything that 
happens around here... and it just becomes an environment where nobody 
really wants to go outside the rules, because there are so many rules, and 
it's just like you've got a robot, going through daily activities, and no one 
actually makes...decisions and sees the consequences of them. 
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This isn't just limited to midshipmen...teachers aren't given a decision 
whether or not they want to give a final exam. 
What we see as midshipmen a lot of times is that people are afraid to make 
decisions because of the consequences that would happen if they made the 
wrong ones.  And...I am talking about the senior leadership, whether it's in 
the faculty, or officers...they are afraid of having to answer to (higher)...to 
go outside the box and do something that they think is right, that they can 
justify in their own minds...That is the kind of the example we are shown, 
the model we are going to follow: "Oops, I can't make a decision, I've got 
to check with the guy in front of me." 
Something I find kind of interesting is that they want us to make decisions 
and they want us to be accountable for those decisions, and yet the fact 
that we are so restricted in what we can do almost contradicts that. 
As many decisions as they can remove, they will remove.  That's my 
understanding after four years here. 
2. Athlete/Non-stripers 
I don't know if there are any...decisions we have to make, anything that 
really forces us to analyze how to go through this, makes us go through 
the decision-making process, or if we just sit down and make (the 
decision) according to a policy they have already seen. 
I think (there is a) very minimal amount of decision-making opportunities 
because I think that...the people who are in charge of the Academy are too 
afraid for a midshipman make a mistake, and have them learn from it, 
because if they make that mistake, then they might make the Academy 
look bad in the eyes of the public, and then they are going to have to do all 
this explaining.  But I think it would be good for midshipmen to make 
mistakes and make the decisions, do it here, under this...environment 
where people's lives won't be at stake, instead of making bad decisions 
when they get out to the Fleet...(and) I think that's bad because this is the 
perfect place for us to actually be in charge...so if you are a company 
commander you are making decisions instead of having the company 
officer standing there saying, "no, don't do that."  I feel like the company 
officer should be there to guide them after they have made their mistake, 
and show them maybe where they saw that they went wrong. 
Our decisions are usually to follow what has been imposed us or not to, 
because almost every aspect of our lives has some kind of policy or 
regulation dictated what the proper way is...I think there are some aspects 
that (this is) good...because when you get out to the Fleet, you are going to 
have to be dealing with policies that are scripted and already imposed. 
141 
They've pretty much eliminated a lot of gray area with Mid Regs and 
things like that, and I think that takes away (from decision-making 
opportunities). 
They began this semester by taking a lot of things out of the 1/C's 
hands...and even when we stepped up, we lost the opportunities to make 
some decisions and create some of our own policies, and we want to 
practice...this should be our time to practice making decisions, but it 
appears that they think that midshipmen in the past haven't been able to 
handle it, so the next class has it taken out of their hands. 
They should give midshipmen as much control as possible, and then...we'll 
make mistakes now, but we'll also learn the lessons, (and) maybe look 
closer at the consequences than if we hadn't (tried and failed). 
We should definitely get a chance to make our mistakes and learn.  I mean 
this is a learning institution, but I think that a lot of officers have forgotten 
about that, but we are hear to learn and mistakes and...just because you 
make a mistake doesn't mean down and out.  But if you make a mistake it 
seems like you are done for the rest of the time you are here... We need to 
learn (from our mistakes), and I don't think we are given a chance to do 
that. 
3. Non-striper/Non-athletes 
I would definitely say "'no" in almost every aspect because from the most 
menial little task to a big decision, the decision has already been made, 
and you are pretty much told what it is. 
I think that what limits it is really a lack of trust from the officers to 
midshipmen. 
I think there's a lack of trust.  I mean, you talk to everyone around here 
and we say we "run the brigade."  I'm not sure how true that is...we try to 
run something, but as soon as we come up with a decision that might be 
even slightly contrary to the norm or contrary to what a company officer 
or a battalion officer might want, well, our decision gets nixed. 
I'd say absolutely not, and my inability to make decisions has turned me 
into an extremely pessimistic person about the Academy...The 
micromanagement from the officers down on the midshipmen is 
incredible.  We really don't have the ability to make decisions. 
The first-class year they will tell you, "you are going to be a junior officer, 
we are going to treat you like a junior officer," but that's not what happens.  
We are given the same privileges, rights, and decision-making 
opportunities as a plebe. 
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I think the administration handcuffs people with the regulations. 
The more structure you have, the less decisions you have to make. 
I think we are all forced to make decisions every day, the opportunity is 
there, it’s just that you have to take it. 
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APPENDIX S: SUFFICIENT TIME AND RESOURCES ARE 
DEVOTED TO DEVELOPING DECISION-MAKING SKILLS IN 
MIDSHIPMEN AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY (COMPANY OFFICER 
RESPONSES) 
I think we miss the mark as a staff.  We want to talk about honor and 
character, and we do...a lot, but we miss the discussion of how to make a 
decision.  All of a midshipman’s problems are the result of bad decisions, 
not bad luck. 
Absolutely not.  We spend a lot of time in the academic setting developing 
every midshipman’s critical thinking stills, but we hardly ever create 
scenarios where they can utilize them to solve problems related to their 
future military duties. 
Right now they are starting “decision making analysis training” but that is 
centered around sexual assault prevention.  Not that that isn’t important, 
but it is one issue of many that needs to be addressed. 
Every day is filled with opportunities for midshipmen to actively make 
decisions...however, it must be used appropriately.  As they are still 
developing, they will make novice mistakes.  We must accept the risk 
associated with these mistakes and incorporate them into the decision-
making process.  If they are not given the opportunity to try, we are not 
developing their decision-making abilities.  Instead, we are merely 
exercising their ability to follow orders within strict guidelines. 
Midshipmen receive the most amount of time and attention from COs and 
SELs regarding decision-making when they are in a leadership position 
and have a lot of interaction with the officers and SELs.  Otherwise, 
midshipmen may receive very little decision-making training prior to 
graduation. 
The framework for decision making exists within the chain of command 
for the brigade, however, the brigade consistently demonstrates that they 
are unwilling to make some of the easy decisions... 
The resources are present but there is minimal time and attention devoted 
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APPENDIX T: THE NAVAL ACADEMY ADEQUATELY 
PREPARES MIDSHIPMEN TO BE EFFECTIVE DECISION 
MAKERS AS OFFICERS (COMPANY OFFICER RESPONSES) 
I’ll agree, because we obviously have been graduating great officers for 
over 150 years.  I think this can improve, however.  Adequately, yes, but 
not much more.  Most of the learning occurs (on-the-job). 
The rigors of the overall system may prepare them due to the time 
constraints on a Mids time, but I don’t feel that we actively go after 
decision making. 
Adequately is the key word: Yes, we adequately prepare midshipmen in a 
lot of categories, but should that be our benchmark? 
Often times, junior (officers) at USNA are forced to impose strict 
guidelines instead of allowing for active midshipmen growth.  It differs 
from company to company and from battalion to battalion, largely in part 
by the mentality of the officers in charge.   
     The more opportunities the midshipmen have to autonomously run 
their companies within the regulations, the more opportunities they have 
to develop.  The more they have their lives dictated and their actions 
strictly regulated by outside forces, the less development they have as 
decision makers. 
There is too much pressure, placed on Battalion Officers, Company 
Officers, and Senior Enlisted Leaders to avoid mistakes.  Therefore, many 
decisions are taken away from midshipmen.  In these cases, midshipmen 
are “guided.”  Additionally, many of the civilians on the yard go through 
the Company Officer / SEL chain rather than the midshipman (chain-of-
command).  This forces Company Officers and SELs to take actions best 
left to midshipmen. 
Midshipmen don’t have much time that isn’t scheduled...Therefore, 
they don’t put much time into considering decisions.  They make quick 
decisions and pray for the best.  When things turn out poorly, they punt 
and look to the Company Officers and SELs for assistance. 
I feel I was better prepared having gone through the USNA process...due 
to the increased number of decisions a (Naval Academy) midshipman is 
forced to make as compared to ROTC or other...programs. 
I believe that the midshipmen are badly micromanaged at USNA...(which 
is) a clear sign to them that they are not trusted by the leadership to grow 
and learn...Midshipmen should be allowed more responsibility in general, 
and should be allowed to make the decisions that affect the brigade. Only 
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then will they truly understand the concepts of accountability and 
responsibility. 
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APPENDIX U: RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO GIVE 
MIDSHIPMEN MORE OPPORTUNITIES TO PREPARE TO BE 
DECISION MAKERS AS OFFICERS (COMPANY OFFICER 
RESPONSES) 
We have too many rules in the Conduct system, and the only choices are 
major or minor.  I know (this) is under review.  I recommend a more 
graduated scale and fewer rules.  This places the onus of decision making 
squarely on the individual mid.  A more graduated scale also allows more 
midshipmen to handle less serious problems on a lower level. 
Give them more control, but hold them accountable when they make bad 
decisions.  That would require the institution to do a few things: 1) 
Communicate with the midshipmen, not the staff; 2) Be willing to allow 
more time for things to occur; 3) Be willing to accept error/failure along 
the way; and 4) Have a consistent process for addressing failure/bad 
decision making.  We don’t have a lot of that right now. 
1) Establish a leadership reaction course on Hospital Point or at the Naval 
Station; 2) Institute a military intercessional either between semesters or at 
the conclusion of the academic year. 
More liberty, remove pre-paid services, remove trash services.  Allow 
greater room for failure, but once certain lines (specific single action, 
numerous lesser offenses, or total demerits) are crossed, 
dismissal/separation is necessary to uphold the standards of the Brigade 
and Navy. 
 (The) officer staff needs to take several steps back and give them more 
rope.  This is a training environment.  If they make a mistake here, no one 
dies.  It is a lesson learned so that they make the right decision later when 
the stakes are higher. 
Give them the responsibility and the accountability for tasks (don’t have 
the battalion/company officers listed as OIC, list the Battalion Commander 
for instance).  Company officers should be mentoring the midshipmen, not 
running their programs for them. 
Consistent and harsh punishment for extremely poor decision making (e.g. 
underage drinking, fake IDs, DUIs, Sexual misconduct). The lack of (this) 
contributes to continued poor decision making. 
Expect mistakes and allow them to occur...Allow them to see the results of 
their bad decisions. 
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Don't do the work for them...Force the midshipmen to be involved, force 
the midshipmen to make decisions and take responsibility for (those 
decisions). 
The only real way is to push the responsibility down...The problem with 
this is that we (the staff) have to be willing to accept the fact that mids are 
going to make BAD decisions, and in some cases we need to knowingly 
let them do that in order for them to learn...We need to change out 
mentality and be willing to absorb some risk as leaders ourselves. 
I think that the shift in summer training to place all mids in a position of 
small unit leadership during their first class summer is a step in the right 
direction. 
I like the 2/C Striper Shadow organization where, for every 1/C Striper 
position, there is a 2/C deputy or equivalent. Involving the 2/C more in 
Brigade operations would allow them to see the decision-making process 
at work before they had to attempt it themselves. 
Why is it that every tasker is sent directly to Company Officers and not the 
midshipmen in charge?  The answer is that civilian/military workers do 
not want to take the chance that the tasker will not be completed either 
quickly or correctly. 
Allow the midshipmen to make difficult decisions that impact others, 
show them the difficulty of being consistent, and then hold them 
accountable for their decisions.  Somehow we need to encourage the 
midshipmen to have confidence in their decisions as well. 
I think (we) need to get midshipmen more involved in the Conduct system 
and letting them award levels of punishment. 
As an institution we have to be willing to accept all the bad decisions 
made with good intentions along with the good (decisions). The more the 
midshipmen feel the true weight of responsibility, which comes from a 
sense of having the "final say so," the (richer) their decision making 
development will be. 
We should also formalize decision training in our Professional 
Development courses.  We put tremendous emphasis on academics and 
the institution's credibility as an academic powerhouse.  I believe that we 
should put some of this energy into the development and judicious use of 
our Naval Science and Leadership course resources.  Rather than these 
courses being academic in nature and geared largely toward human 
behavior, etc, we need to foster the actual professional development of 
midshipmen.  One of the vital aspects of this education should be decision 
making. 
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Give the brigade back to the midshipmen. They should have the primary 
leadership and supervisory roles during Plebe Summer, with officers there 
only to provide a sanity check on actions, and ensure safety precautions 
are being adhered to, not to stifle creativity. 
They need to be forced to make decisions, fail if necessary, and be held 
accountable for all that they AND their subordinates do and fail to do. 
They need more leadership opportunities earlier in the midshipmen life 
vice waiting till their 1/C year to “cram” all their leadership practical 
application in then. 
Use the Capstone classes during the second semester of 1/C year to focus 
on decisions that pertain to a specific warfare community. 
1) Develop a Leadership Reaction Course at the Naval Station and use for 
Leadership classes and Plebes. Simple, practicable, and effective; and, 2) 
Less concern about Brigade-wide consistency.  Within relatively broad 
guidelines, allow companies (which are the focus of leadership 
development) to enact policies and then learn to live with or adjust the 
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APPENDIX V: RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO GIVE 
MIDSHIPMEN MORE OPPORTUNITIES TO PREPARE TO BE 
DECISION MAKERS AS OFFICERS (MIDSHIPMEN RESPONSES) 
1. Striper/Non-athletes 
Make all the Battalion Officers O-4's instead of O-5's and O-6's...The O-
5's that we have as battalion officers have all had command before...and 
they are used to being the chief.  If they say it, it goes.  And...because they 
are all used to that, and then they come to the Naval Academy, then all of 
a sudden they are reporting to an O-6, who is the boss, and everything 
really goes through him.  And so they've gone from being commanders, 
and having a command, to "yeah, I've got 700 midshipmen under my 
control, but I really do absolutely nothing but try to make stuff up, try to 
look good."  So, if you had O-4's instead, they would not have had a 
command as of yet, and I just think they'd be closer to the midshipmen 
also. 
I really liked when my company officer would ask for my opinion, or 
maybe another midshipmen's opinion about what to do in a certain 
situation, before he expresses his own opinion.  For example, like if 
someone in the company had a little trouble, and he asked the squad leader 
what he thinks should be done, what's next?  And even if it's not the right 
decision that the squad leader has made, the squad leader expresses his 
opinion about what he thinks should be done, and it could be the right 
thing, and the company officer wants to follow through with that, or the 
company officer might believe it's really the wrong decision.  I think that 
midshipmen can learn a little lesson that may pay off in the Fleet, whether 
the company officer agrees with it or not. 
Leadership, in its most essential form, is based on trust and confidence.  
That's what the commission even says, "special trust and confidence" of 
the President, and they have absolutely none of that in midshipmen.  Or 
even in their own officers, O-6's, people who have had command, and yet 
(are not allowed to) make a simple decision.  It's the most awful example 
you can possibly imagine. 
Leave a little bit more room for imperfection.  For those people who make 
a mistake, have remediation. 
I think that, in talking with other company commanders, that the more 
decision making you have is directly related to the trust your company 
officer puts in you...and how close he is.  If he is there all the time micro-
managing, you won't have any decisions to make.  But if he trusts you and 
steps back, then you have more decisions to make...so I think the trust 
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issue is paramount.  The Naval Academy really has to put trust in the 
midshipmen, in the chain of command that they select. 
The officers need to trust the officers below them.  Battalion officers need 
to trust their company officers to do the right thing, to make the right 
decisions, and they don't need to micro-manage the company officers.  
And if that happens, then the company officers can trust their company 
commanders. 
My biggest observation is that people cannot bounce back from their 
mistakes.  People who have some sort of Conduct violation here, it's pretty 
much the end of any type of leadership position they are going to get.  It's 
hard to overcome a major Conduct violation.  And no matter how sorry 
they might be, or how long ago it might have been, some people have a 
major in their Plebe year and they will never be able to hold any type of 
leadership position.  To me, that just shows a lack of faith in that person's 
ability.  That's one of the good things about remediation...it gives people a 
chance to come back, and to make some kind of improvement, and show 
that they're worth that.  I mean...some of your best people, some of your 
best officers (are those) who have come back from a mistake. 
I think the Naval Academy rewards the wrong type of behavior.  Our 
company officer, last year, probably was the most micro-managing 
company officer in all 30 companies, and he got promoted (to a different 
job). 
2. Athlete/Non-stripers 
I know that a lot of people wouldn't agree with it, but I think that we 
should get more military training during the year, instead of just during the 
summer, when we are actually with our companies, in our leadership 
positions and actually leading squads. 
Leave the Company Officers out of the decision making as much as 
possible, and give the Firsties goals to meet.  They might surprise people. 
I think...people want the challenge of making a decision and creating a 
policy for other people to follow.  I think we need the opportunities to get 
to fall on our face and get back up and correct ourselves. 
I'd say the fear of getting into trouble is what actually keeps a lot of people 
from exercising their...abilities to make decisions. 
3. Non-striper/Non-athletes 
A certain amount of leadership is, unfortunately, trial and error.  You 
make a decision and you have to stick with it and have confidence in it, 
even if it's the wrong one, and then take responsibility for the 
consequences.  Unfortunately this place doesn't do that.  There's a decision 
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only if it's the right one...I think that if people were given the rope with 
which to hang themselves, you know it might pull tight, and it's going to 
hurt, but after a while you'd be your own person. 
I (hear) they are going to change the whole professional system around, to 
where 2/C are squad leaders, have squad-leader type jobs, and let the 
firsties move onto higher, company-commander type jobs, and that's good, 
I think, because...firstie leadership (and) decision making didn't happen.  
(2/C squad leaders) will be good because it will give us a whole extra year 
of...leadership (and) decision making. 
One of the things I'd like to change is the attitude the officers have 
towards us, like they feel like they can't trust us...get them to trust us more. 
It seems like every time decision making is taken from us...they come up 
with a new rule (because) basically they think we can't make a decision on 
our own.  Like wearing jackets to class or something like that...because of 
one isolated incident that they never want to see again...they completely 
change all the rules around to fit that. 
You can't learn about decision making if you (are not allowed to) make 
bad decisions, (if) you're not allowed to screw up every once in a while.  
Like (one other midshipman) said, we need a little bit of rope to hang 
ourselves with. 
If Mid Regs were reduced to half, and firsties were allowed to really make 
decisions without officers jumping in when they fall on their face the first 
time, then I think things would improve. 
I would say you could improve the relationship between officers and mids 
by being a little more honest.  You know, if you are not going to treat us 
like junior officers, then you probably shouldn't be saying you are going to 
treat us like junior officers. 
We can start making decisions without having someone babysit us all the 
time.  And if we can't be trusted to do that, then why are we even here 
anyway, because that's what this place is supposed to be 
about...developing leadership potential...and I think that...a lot of people 
come out of here crippled in a sense, because they have this inability to 
make a decision, they've had them made for so long for them, that they 
just can't (make a decision). 
I think the Academy could do a better job of figuring out what decisions 
wouldn't be so drastic if they let us have control of it. 
There are just a lot of decisions that I think could easily be made by the 
midshipmen and the midshipman chain of command that don't need to be 
left up to black & white typing on (the) pages of some USNA 
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instruction...And of course with that would also come (bad decisions, 
(and) if we make a bad decision, we get burned for it, and then we would 
learn from it here, from making a bad decision, instead of all of a sudden, 
"OK, you're commissioned, well now make all the decisions, and (we) 
hope you do them right...good luck." 
It seems like from the administration on down...it's instilled in us...that 
everyone is afraid of getting burned.  If you get burned, you're two steps 
behind already...they're afraid of failure...the structure's set up and you've 
just got to follow the structure, and you're just managing...you're just 
pushing them through the admin paper trail. 
The easiest thing I can think of...is to restrict the ability of the senior 
enlisted and the company officers.  I mean, I have a company officer that, 
in class last semester, he kept harping on that in our company it was so 
great he let the midshipmen officers take charge and lead the 
company...BS.  He was in charge, he told the midshipmen officers what to 
do...which he continues to do today... 
So just restrict their ability, or make it like it is on the sailing teams 
where you've got the officers there, an officer in charge...(but) they sit 
back and they watch you, and they stop you when you screw up.  So, that 
allows you to learn, to screw up a little bit, it's not going to hurt anybody, 
and they can fix it, (and then) let you keep going. 
Give the midshipmen a little bit more authority, and see what they do with 
it.  It seems to me that the companies that run really well...(have a) 
company officer who actually listens to what the midshipmen say, and he 
is secure enough in his own leadership (to let them lead)... Most of the 
companies that run really well, I think, (are the ones in which) the 
company commanders have a bit more authority. 
A lot of people that went out on cruises...met enlisted guys, (and) we'd sit 
around and talk sometimes and the perception of Academy grads isn't all 
that good a lot of time, and a lot of it stems from their unwillingness to 
make certain decisions. 
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